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THE SOCIAL COMPOSITION OF THE 
NAZI PARTY, 1919-1930
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
. . . Nazi measures on the local level were a
key to the establishment of totalitarianism in 
Germany. Before Hitler came to power he gained 
great support through the virtuosity and adapt­
ability of his local party organizations. The 
actual seizure of power in the spring of 1933 
occurred largely from below. . . . The Fuehrer
reached the pinnacle of power becéiuse his fol­
lowers were successful at the lowest levels, at 
the base.
William Allen, The Nazi Seizure of Power, ix
The Purposes and Objectives of This Study 
The importance of the rank and file membership 
for the ultimate success of the Nationalsozialistische 
Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (National Socialist German 
Workers Party, NSDAP or Nazis for short) has long been 
recognized by historians, as evidenced by the quote above. 
However, despite the enormous amount of material published 
about Adolf Hitler's movement, there have been relatively 
few attempts to determine which groups in society made up 
its membership. This is especially true of the party's
lean years, 1919-1930, before it became profitable or 
expedient to be a Nazi.
Hitler's biographers have correctly pointed out 
that without his charismatic personality and indomitable 
will the NSDAP almost certainly would have remained one 
of the obscure extremist parties which proliferated in 
Germany during the Interwar period.^ It is equally true, 
however, that without the fanatical devotion of his fol­
lowers, the Fuehrer's seizure of power could never have 
occurred. These "little" men supported not only their 
own local organizations, but also--through dues and con­
tributions-- the leadership of the party. They gave freely 
of their time as well as their money, spending innumerable 
hours at political meetings, demonstrating on the streets 
of almost every city in Germany, and spreading the gospel 
of Hitler. Many of them also gave their blood--and even 
their lives--in violent clashes with rival political 
groups. Without the dedication and sacrifices of these 
unknown Nazis it is unlikely that Hitler could ever have 
attained power.
Who were these anonymous Nazis who played such a 
pivotal role in the creation of the Third Reich? Were 
they, as has been suggested, members of a clearly identi­
fiable social class? Or did they, as has also been sug­
gested, represent the dissatisfied youth of Germany? Did 
National Socialism find its greatest support in small
3towns and rural areas, as has often been maintained, or 
was it actually an urban phenomenon? Did the same social 
groups make up the bulk of the membership of Hitler's 
party throughout the Kampfzeit of the 1920s? The purpose 
of this study is to answer these and other questions about 
the Nazi party membership, and to test the most commonly 
accepted generalizations about the social composition of 
the NSDAP.
Early Generalizations about the NSDAP Membership
Most of the currently accepted ideas about the 
social composition of the Nazi party derive directly from 
a few contemporary observers of Hitler's movement, along 
with several historians and sociologists who attempted to 
explain Nazism in the 1930s.
One of the most widely quoted sources on the social 
composition of the NSDAP membership is Adolf Hitler him­
self. Commenting on the party when he first entered it 
in 1919, Hitler characterized its members as coming 
"chiefly from the lower walks of life. He said that he 
personally brought a number of disgruntled young ex­
soldiers into the movement, giving birth to the theory 
that the early party was dominated by "young soldiers and 
workers" which is encountered in many works on party his­
tory. ^  He also confused the issue of how many members 
the party had at that time when he said that upon enter­
ing he ". . . received provisional membership card with
4seven people in the movement
Hitler's statements were subsequently reinforced by 
the writings of several other early Nazis, among them Kurt 
Ludecke, who was a close friend of the Fuehrer during the 
early years of the party. Ludecke also wrote that Hitler 
was the seventh member of the Deutsche Arbeiter Partei
The first scholarly attempt to chronicle the evolu­
tion of the NSDAP was made by Konrad Hoiden in 1935 « Sel­
dom providing a source for his information, Heiden made a 
number of generalizations about the Nazis which still find 
their way into general histories of Germany, and even into 
more specialized tracts on the history of the Nazi party. 
The most pervasive idea passed on by Heiden to subsequent
historians is that "the Nazis were a class party . . .
and that the membership was drawn primarily from the 
"lower middle c l a s s . H e i d e n  was curious about the so­
cial composition of the NSDAP and realized its importance 
to any understanding of the nature of National Socialism, 
but he could do no more than suggest that "the leadership
and nucleus of National Socialism in the years 1925-1930
consisted for the most part of failures. . . . This
statement, like many of Heiden's other pronouncements on 
the social composition of Hitler's party, has been repeated
5often in subsequent party histories. Heiden was also one 
of the first to attempt to establish the numerical strength 
of the party at various times during the 1920s. He gave a 
number of confusing figures which still obscure the issue 
today
Some other contemporary observers of the Nazis dur­
ing the period 1919-1930 commented on the youth of the 
members^^ and on the small-town character of the party.
Both of these characterizations of the Nazi membership 
have been used by recent historians to explain who the 
Nazis were.
The weakness of the statements by early observers 
of the NSDAP is that they are all based on little more 
than personal impressions and not at all on empirical in­
vestigation. None made any attempt to systematically 
examine the party membership. Consequently, they are of 
very limited value in answering the question "who were the 
Nazis?"
A number of social scientists attempted to define 
German fascism in the 1930s. They sought to determine who 
Nazism benefited and to whom in German society it appealed. 
There was a general consensus that the NSDAP in the years 
prior to the Machtergreifung drew its members primarily 
from the "lower-middle class," but hardly anyone bothered 
to explain what this term m e a n t . M a r x i s t  writers of 
this period identified the NSDAP members as the petty
6bourgeois "tools of big capital," but were willing to admit 
that some "demoralized elements" of the working class be­
came N a z i s . M a n y  identified the early party members as 
mostly demobilized soldiers unable to readjust to civilian 
life.^^
The first attempt to construct a comprehensive pic­
ture of the social structure of the NSDAP membership was 
by an American sociologist, Theodore Abel. Advertising 
in Nazi newspapers in 1933, Abel announced an essay con­
test on the theme "Why I Became a Nazi," with a cash prize 
for the winner. Me received 687 entries in his contest,
83 of which he rejected from his ensuing s t u d y . A b e l ' s  
statistics, constructed from the data gathered in the man­
ner described above, are very interesting. However, they 
are of doubtful value owing to the obviously unsatisfactory 
method in which they were obtained. A sample of only six 
hundred out of a population of "around a million"^^ persons 
lesponding to a "prize essay" contest can not be considered 
a representative sample. Nevertheless, Abel made a number 
of sweeping generalizations about the Nazi membership based 
on his statistics which continue to influence historical 
opinion about the social composition of the NSDAP.
During the Second World War, social scientists made 
attempts to systematically study the NSDAP membership. In 
1940, Hans Gerth attempted to show exactly who the party 
members and their leaders were from an examination of the
7"official party statistics. By scrutinizing biograph­
ical information on only eight prominent Nazis, Gerth con­
cluded that the NSDAP membership was largely made up of 
men who had been "failures in other spheres of life." 
"Princes without thrones, indebted and subsidized land­
lords , indebted farmers, virtually bankrupt industrialists, 
impoverished shopkeepers and artisans, doctors without 
patients, lawyei's without clients, writers without readers, 
unemployed teachei'S , and unemployed manual and white collar 
worker [sic] joined the m o v e m e n t . G e r t h  also pointed 
out the unusual youth of the NSDAP membership. Although 
others had commented on this, Gerth was the first to offer 
any sort of evidence.
In 19^2 , Talcott Parsons made a number of plausible 
generalizations about fascist movements in g e n e r a l . P a r ­
sons was one of the first to apply the methods of psycho­
analysis to a study of the party membership. lie pointed 
out several striking analogies between fascism and reli­
gious m o v e m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g  the fact that both seem to 
flourish during periods of social disorganization and 
widespread a n o m i e . A n o m i e ,  Parsons suggests, was wide­
spread during the 1920s in Germany, caused by a variety 
of factors growing out of World War I and the continuing 
industrialization of Europe. He concluded that the "vested 
interests" in Germany sided with fascism in an attempt to 
combat the dissatisfied and revolutionary elements of the
8political left.^^ Parson's observations are interesting, 
but they fail to identify who these "vested interests"
In one of the earliest examinations of voting pat­
terns, J. K. Pollock in 1944 attempted to show who the 
Nazis were by examining which areas of Germany showed the 
highest Nazi vote in certain significant e l e c t i o n s . V o t ­
ing patterns cannot identify the NSDAP membership with 
absolute certainty, but it can be assumed that party activ­
ity and membership was greatest in the areas from which the 
Nazis received the greatest number of votes. Pollock con­
cluded that "with few exceptions" big cities and industrial 
areas did not swing to Hitler, indicating that Nazi incur­
sions into the ranks of the working class were not great 
and that Hitlerism was a small-town and rural movement.
Current Historical Opinion on the 
Social Composition of the NSDAP
Since World War II, historical works on interwar
Germany have revealed several divergent theories as to the
identity of the membership of the Nazi party. The incom-
patability of these hypotheses have led to very different
conclusions about the nature of National Socialism. The
most widely accepted theories are as follows :
The "Marginal Man" Theory 
Several recent studies have examined the "marginal 
men" theory of the identity of NSDAP members. Jakub
9Banaszkiewicz, a Polish historian explains this thesis in
the following terms:
In the German fascist movement, a dominant role was 
played mainly by two social groups: the petty bour­
geois and people of the social fringe. . . . the
association of the petty bourgeois with the Nazi 
movement is a generally known and recognized fact.
. . . all prominent historians and sociologists of
the fascist movement agree that the social base of 
the Nazi party consisted of various segmenta of the 
petty bourgeois. . . . This subject has . . . been
almost completely exhausted and it would be diffi­
cult to advance any new facts or propositions.^8
Banaskiewicz does not define "petty bourgeois" or offer 
any proof for his contentions. Rather, he attempts to 
analyze the social structure of the Nazi party through 
speculation, without the benefit of original research.
His definition of what constitutes the "social fringe," 
which is the primary topic of both his book and his ar­
ticle, is only vaguely formulated.
A variation on the "marginal men" theme is the 
characterization of Nazi party members as "maladjusted 
m e n , o r  even as "a conglomeration of pimps, murderers, 
homosexuals, alcoholics and blackmailers,"^^ a view which 
has permeated popular historical writing on the subject.
It has also found its way into more scholarly treatments 
of party history, as for example in Dietrich Orlow's study 
of the organizational history of the N S D A P , a n d  Joseph 
Nyomarkay's exploration of factionalism with the party 
r a n k s . T h i s  interpretation also continues to be widely 
accepted among Marxist students of the NSDAP, as evidenced
10
by two recent studiejs by East European historians, Evelyn 
Pospisil^^^ and Jerzy Holzer.^^ Two of the best known 
American studies on the same theme, both by Daniel Lerner, 
embody all the shortcomings of the "marginal man" 
hypothesis.
In an introduction to Lerner's book, Eranz Neumann
wrote that "[this] study confirms the thesis that the Nazi
movement was a middle-class and lower-middle class move­
ment . . . [the] melting pot of the German middle class.
Lerner's conclusions were based on a "random" sample (every 
tenth name) from the Fuehrerlexicon, "Who's Who" in Nazidom 
published in 1934. Lerner thought that "this procedure 
gives us an adequate sample . . .  to determine salient 
biographical characteristics of this e l i t e . L e r n e r  
promised that his study would show: (1) how the party
elite compared with the membership as a whole, and (2) how 
the movement ("both elite and mass") compared with the gen­
eral population of G e r m a n y . I n  fact, he never did either, 
lie attempted to define what he meant by "marginal men" by 
erecting several criteria of marginality, including birth­
place, age, vocation, etc. He then examined how many Nazis
in his sample fit the criteria.
Lerner was able to prove from his statistics that 
56.6 per cent of the Nazi elite was "marginal" (if an in­
dividual was marginal in one or more categories, he was 
considered a "marginal man"). The greatest surprise is 
that everyone in Lerner's sample did not fall into at
11
least one of the categories created by the author. Why is 
a Bavarian marginal? Catholics? Enlisted men? Artisans and 
peasants? Why should a person's father-in-law determine 
his marginality? Why is one who has studied abroad mar­
ginal? Lerner never answered these questions satisfacto­
rily. Consequently, identification of the Nazis as "mar­
ginal men" or members of the "social fringe" remains 
speculative.
Lerner also failed to show incontrovertibly that 
the party membership was made up primarily of persons from 
the middle class. He did not correlate his statistics-- 
which came from the Nazi "elite" and not the rank and file 
--with those for the party as a whole. Thus they cannot 
be safely used for making generalizations about the total 
membership. This same objection holds true for the entire 
approach to the question of the social composition of the 
NSDAP membership which identifies the Nazis as "marginal 
men" and "people of the social fringe": they are unproven
and largely unprovable. Lerner's other contention--that 
no appreciable portion of the working class joined the 
Nazis and that the party membership was made up "primarily" 
of people from the lower-middle class *^--does lend itself 
to historical investigation, and can be proven or disproven.
The NSDAP as a Class Movement 
The hypothesis that the Nazi movement was primarily 
a class movement has found its way into almost every major
study of the party and of recent German history in gen­
eral. There have been a number of theoretical studies 
which have attempted to explain the supposed middle-class 
preponderance in the NSDAP, the most notable of which are 
those of Seymour Martin Lipset, Ernst Nolte, Karl Dietrich 
Bracher, and Heinrich August Winkler.
Lipset, writing in I96O, identified National Social­
ism as "extremism of the center,"*^ and pointed out a num­
ber of factors in Weimar Germany which influenced the 
middle classes--espedally the lower-middle class which 
he neglected to define satisfactorily--to seek radical 
political solutions to their problems, including (l) the 
real or imagined "red menace"; (2) the severe dislocations 
in the German economy resulting from World War I which pro­
duced the great inflation of 1923 and the world depression 
of the 1930s; and (3 ) the anomie in German society result­
ing from these specific issues, plus the general factors 
of industrialization and urbanization, and from the con­
tinuing decline of religion.
Bracher used many of the same arguments, writing in 
1966, but pointed out numerous other factors which inclined 
the middle classes toward fascism, including the intense 
nationalism of a large part of the middle classes which 
had been frustrated by the lost war and humiliated by the 
Treaty of Versailles. Bracher also identified the apparent 
ineptitude of the Weimar political system in dealing with
13
the multitude of problems which beset Germany during the 
1920s and 1930s as a powerful factor inclining the middle 
classes toward Hitler's party. This was caused in part, 
Bracher wrote, by the instability of the various German 
governments, which in turn stemmed from the multiplicity 
of ideologically incompatible political parties, and in 
part by the inexperience of the Germans with democracy.*^ 
Nolte, writing in 19^9, claimed that the middle 
class turned to Nazism primarily for one reason: fear of
Marxism. He characterized the Nazi movement as being 
"first and foremost a militant bourgeois resistance to the 
acute and incalculable threat of socialist revolution." 
According to Nolte, all the factors discussed by previous 
writers which inclined the middle classes in Germany toward 
fascism are of secondary importance when compared to the 
"red menace."
Winkler, writing in 1972, modified several of the 
arguments of his predecessors. He pointed out the conti­
nuity of petty-bourgeois political ambitions from the 
nineteenth century into the twentieth century, and sug­
gested that a movement such as National Socialism was a 
logical result. He did admit, however, that it took the 
catalyst of the Great Depression to trigger the mass in­
flux of the middle classes into the NSDAP.
All of these explanations of why the middle classes 
in Germany went over to the Nazis during the Weimar Republic
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are perceptive and well-reasoned and make an excellent 
basis for discussion. Of Nazi party membership, however, 
they prove nothing at all except the pervasiveness of the 
ideas of early Nazi-watchers based on educated guesses 
about the social composition of the NSDAP. Of all the 
"common knowledge" about the Nazis, the lower-middle class 
hypothesis is the most popular, the most enduring, and the 
most convincing. However, it has yet to be proven 
conclusively.
The National Socialist Movement 
as a Youth Rebellion
Another explanation of Hitler's movement first for­
mulated at almost the same time the party came into exis­
tence is the theory that the Nazis represented a rebellion 
of militant German youth. Like the lower-middle class 
hypothesis, some credence has been lent to the "youth" 
theory by the few statistical studies done on the social 
composition of the NSDAP for the period 1919-1930- Accord­
ing to this view, the National Socialist movement actually 
represented a "generational revolt." It was a turning away 
from traditional society by young Germans who were totally 
disillusioned with the world of their parents and wished to 
create a new society through National Socialism.
The first notable works after World War II which 
commented on this theme were by E. Vermeil and Rudolf 
Heberle, both writing in 1945.^'^ However, Vermeil
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mentioned the theme only in passing, while Ileberle merely 
speculated that the Nazis were largely young, unemployed, 
declassed elements in German society.
In 19575 Bracher commented briefly on the attraction 
that the NSDAP seemed to have for students, but concluded 
that the young people began flocking into the party only 
after 1928.  ^^ In I960, Walter Hofer mentioned that 38 per 
cent of the NSDAP members were under thirty years of age, 
but neglected to mention either the period of which he was 
speaking or the source of his information.^'’ Hofer, like 
Vermeil, Heberle, and Bracher before him, apparently felt 
that age was not as significant a factor in the social 
composition of the Nazi membership as class affiliation.
In 1965, Dietrich Orlow mentioned the youth of party 
members, but did not seem to think it as important a socio­
logical consideration as occupation and/or class affilia­
tion.^^ A year later Jeremy Noakes noted the extreme youth 
of Nazi party members, particularly in 1925, but did not 
list the source of his information.^^ The first post-World 
War II historian to emphasize the importance of the youth­
ful aspect of the NSDAP members was David Schoenbaum. 
Writing in I966, he used the Parteistatistik and several 
secondary sources to point out that youth was one of the 
most striking characteristics of the Nazi party before 
1930.^® However, many of Schoenbaum's generalizations 
are less than convincing because of his selective use of
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statistics and the unreliability of his sources for the 
pre-depression period.
Martin Broszat and F. L. Carsten, both writing in 
1969, commented on the youth of the early NSDAP members, 
but neither went into any detail on the subject. Apparently 
they felt other factors than youth were more important in 
drawing an individual into the Nazi m o v e m e n t . B y  1969, 
Orlow had apparently concluded that the age of party mem­
bers was mere important than he had at first realized. In 
his study of the organizational history of the NSDAP, he 
pointed out that the northern wing of the party after 1925 
in particular was made up of young people. "It appears 
likely," he commented, "that some two-thirds of the member­
ship [in the north] in 1925 was not yet t h i r t y . H e  
added, however, that any conclusions must be tentative be­
cause " . . .  detailed statistical analyses of the Nazi party 
membership in the formative years are still lacking.
Writing in 1970, Bracher was apparently still uncon­
vinced of the significance of the youthful aspect of the 
party membership. However, he was aware of it, and real­
ized that it applied not only to the period of expansion 
after 1928, which his earlier work had emphasized, but to 
the earlier years of the party as w e l l T h e  next year 
Michael Kater, in an innovative study of the early party 
membership forcefully pointed out that almost half of his 
sample of persons who entered the NSDAP in 1923 were
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twenty-three years of age or younger when they joined the 
p a r t y . T h i s  represented the first reliable proof to sub­
stantiate the "generational revolt" hypothesis that was 
suggested by some of the earliest observers of the party.
In 1971» Noakes also ascribed to the age structure 
of the Nazi party membership much more importance than it 
had received by most post-World War II historians. Con­
fining his comments to the persons who joined the party 
after 1925» Noakes identified "youth and activism" as the 
most "outstanding characteristics" of party members after
1925
Harold Gordon, writing in 1972, was even more em­
phatic about the importance of youth in the NSDAP member­
ship. "The most striking single social fact about the 
party," he wrote, "is that it was a party of the young. 
According to Gordon, the Nazis even before the Beer Hall 
Putsch were "a heterogeneous mixture of people of all 
classes and all professions and trades, whose youth was 
the binding factor. " . . .  [l]n many ways, the NSDAP.rep­
resented a rebellion of dissatisfied youth against an elder 
generation that had not only stumbled into war but had 
failed to win it, and that had equally failed to create a 
world with which these young men could sympathize.
There has been a trend in historical writing about 
the social structure of the NSDAP during the past few years 
toward an increasing awareness of the importance of the
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youth of the party membership in understanding National 
Socialism. Whether or not Nazism indeed represented a 
"generational revolt" remains to be resolved by future 
historians. The statistics provided below on the age of 
party members before 1930 should provide invaluable data 
for reaching sound conclusions on the topic. After all, 
a youth rebellion is a considerably different creature 
than a class movement, which is how National Socialism is 
usually characterized.^^
The NSDAP as a Refuge for the Unemployed 
The Nazis have also been identified recently as the 
unemployed in German society, at least during certain peri­
ods of the Weimar Republic. Like most generalizations 
about the social composition of the NSDAP, the "myth of 
the unemployed" had its origins in the writings of contem­
porary o b s e r v e r s T h e  recent champions of this thesis 
usually point out the apparent correlation between the 
rise in the party membership and the rise in the numbers 
of unemployed in German society, especially during the 
years 1928-1932. They make the assumption that many of 
these jobless persons, seeking radical political solutions 
to alleviate their condition, were absorbed into the mem­
bership of the NSDAP. This was one conclusion reached by
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of the NSDAP membership was made up of unemployed per­
s o n s . T h u s  f^r, there has been no evidence presented 
that any appreciable number of Nazis were unemployed at 
the time of their entry into the party. All available 
statistical evidence seems to refute this hypothesis.^*
Nazism as a Small-Town and Rural Movement 
As early as 1933, Miriam Beard noted that people 
from small towns seemed particularly susceptible to the 
Nazi appeal. In 1944, J . K. Pollock attempted to prove 
that Nazism drew its main support from outside the major 
metropolitan areas by an analysis of voting patterns in 
Reichstag elections during the period 1930-1932. Pol­
lock's findings suggested the majority of Nazis came from 
small communities.
In 1945, Heberle modified Pollock's generalization 
about the rural character of the NSDAP somewhat, saying 
that although the Nazis originated and initially flour­
ished in the cities, after 1925 the "membership . . .
became more and more rural; even in the cities a conspic­
uously large proportion of the membership had a rural or 
small town background.
Similar statements about the identity of the Nazis 
were made the following year by C. P. Loomis and J. H. 
Beegle. Going further than Heberle, however, they labeled 
the National Socialist movement in some aspects a "green 
rebellion" of disgruntled farmers who were anti-urban and
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anti-bourgeois. Loomis and Beegle dated the spread of 
Nazism to small communities and the countryside as occur­
ring in the "late twenties.
In 1952, Reinhai'd Bendix commented on the "anti- 
urban" aspects of National Socialism by suggesting that 
the membership was based outside metropolitan centers.
In 19591 Werner T. Angress explored the appeal of Nazism 
to German farmers in some detail and concluded that from 
1928 on, farmers in Germany made up a disproportionately 
large percentage of the NSDAP membership.
In 1962, evidence was presented that seemed to 
support these earlier generalizations about the spread of 
Hitler's movement from the cities. Gerhard Stoltenberg, 
drawing upon the Secret Reports of the State Criminal 
Police of Flensberg, showed that the NSDAP had only 8OO 
members in all of Schleswig-Holstein in 1928, but that the 
figure had grown to over 10,400 by the end of 1 9 2 9 . Al­
though Stoltenberg's figures are not conclusive since they 
deal only with Schleswig-Holstein, they nevertheless indi­
cate that Nazism was taking hold in the countryside and 
attracting a large number of farmers to the party in the 
late twenties.
In 19671 Horst Gies ' investigation concl'üded that 
"Prior to 1930 the National Socialist Party made little 
headway in the countryside other than in Schleswig- 
Holstein."^^ However, two years later this view was
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challenged by Carsten. He disputed the idea that Nazism 
came late into rural areas and only began to appeal to the 
farmers in 1928-1929- Basing his conclusions on an early 
party list from the Hauptarchiv collection, he concluded 
there were actually more farmers in the party percentage­
wise before the Deer Hall Putsch than in German society as 
a whole. He went on to generalize that even in the early 
phase of the party its supporters came largely from small 
communities.
The same year, Dietrich Oi’low commented in passing 
that in 1928 the party changed from a primarily urban 
movement into a predominantly rural one. Michael Kater's 
statistical study made in 1971 brought several surprising 
figures on this subject to light. His findings suggest 
that as early as 1923 the Nazi party had a significant 
percentage of farmers in its membership. Over $4 per cent 
of Kater's sample of persons who joined the NSDAP in 1923 
came from rural a r e a s . T h e s e  figures suggest that al­
though Nazism originated in a large city (Munich), its 
spread throughout the countryside was very rapid in South 
Germany before the Beer Hall Putsch. Stoltenberg*s work 
shows that the Nazis were not well established in Schleswig- 
Holstein in 1928, but grew rapidly thereafter.
The evidence presented on this subject to date is 
contradictory. Most studies have applied only to limited 
time periods and/or regions of the Reich, rather than to 
the entire pre-depression period and the whole of Germany.
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The NSDAP: A "Mass Movement" of all Germans?
A final generalization about the social composition 
of the NSDAP membership is that Hitler's movement was a 
"mass party," drawing its members from every layer of 
Gorman society. This also originated with early observers 
of the party and has been put forth in a refined form by 
historians and sociologists since 194^.
In 1936, Paul Sering in a critical examination of 
German fascism wrote that the NSDAP was a "mass party" 
which "recruited from members of all classes. The idea
that the Nazis came from every walk of life was apparently 
popular with the NSDAP leadership and most Nazi historians 
subscribed to it, pointing to the diverse social and geo­
graphical origins of selected party members as proof.
In 1.952, Reinhard Bendix described the NSDAP member­
ship as "quite heterogeneous."^^ The same year, W. Ehren- 
stein anticipated later arguments by identifying National 
Socialism as the direct result of mass democracy and the 
Nazis as members of all segments of s o c i e t y . J e a n  F. 
Neurohr, writing in 1957i made many of the same points and 
reached the same general conclusions.^^
Raymond Martin concluded in 1957 that National So­
cialism was a creature of all the people of Germany regard­
less of class. However, Martin hedged a bit by saying it 
drew its main strength from the lower-middle class.
Joachim Fest, writing in 1964, also identified the Nazis
as coming from all walks of life but in particular the 
middle class.
Wolfgang Zopf in I965 wrote that persons of all 
occupations could be found in the NSDAP with one exception: 
"only the industrial proletariat was not represented in any 
n u m b e r s . I n  I968, Wolfgang Horn rejected out of hand 
the characterization of the NSDAP membership as a lower- 
middle class movement and suggested instead that it was a 
mass party.
In his 1969 study, before concluding that the NSDAP 
drew its membership primarily from the Kleinburgertum, 
Carsten pointed out that the Nazis in his small membership 
list from the pre-putsch period "seem to represent a fair 
cross-section of the Munich population of the time. *  In 
1970, Bracher also paid lip-service to the mass party the­
sis, but said this was true only after 1928. Before that 
year , the NSDAP membership "was composed of the lower- 
middle class. The same year Jerzy ilolzer attempted to
ascertain the social composition of the Nazi party for the 
period 1928-1930 by an examination of voting patterns dur­
ing those years. His conclusions for the most part fol­
low !d the official Marxist line, but one generalization 
did not. Before concluding that the Nazis came largely 
from the lower-middle class, Holzer identified the NSDAP
of society.
ss party, drawing its members from every segment
96
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The idea that National Socialism was a movement 
which incorporated all social classes into its membership 
has survived intact from the early Nazi period and has 
found a number of supporters recently. However, such sta­
tistical studies of the NSDAP membership as have been pro­
duced to date seem to show that a disproportionately large 
part of the party members (when compared to German society 
as a whole) came from the middle classes in Germany, espe­
cially the lower-middle class. This issue is presently 
unresolved and is still a matter of controversy.
Statistical Studies of the Social
Composition of the NSDAP 
A number of works since World War II have produced 
statistics on the social composition of the Nazi party 
based on membership lists. Most have tended to support 
the "class" interpretation of Nazism, but a few have pro­
duced some less expected results.
Many of these statistical studies are based on pub­
lished sources: the Parteistatistik (compiled by the Nazis
in 1936)1 or on Hans Volz, Paten die Geschichte der 
N .5.D .A .P ., which is drawn largely from the Parteistatistik. 
Neither is reliable for the period before 1930. The sta­
tistics on the occupations of party members in these works 
are so general that the resulting information is of only 
limited value.
Two studies in particular have used either Volz* 
work or the Parteistatistik or both to attempt to identify
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the social/occupational groups in German society which made 
up the NSDAP membership: Wolfgang Schaefer, writing in
1957) produced statistics drawn from the Parteistatistik 
that have been widely quoted by succeeding historians of 
the party as a thorouglily reliable source. Schaefer's 
study suffers from all the shortcomings of the Partoista- 
tis tik itself. His statistics are unreliable and mislead­
ing as a guide to understanding the identity of the Nazis. 
Martin Broszat's study of the Nazi state also drew its 
statistics from the Parteistatistik, but used them in a 
much more sophisticated m a n n e r . B r o s z a t  compared the 
figures for party composition with a comparable breakdown 
of German society as a whole, thus showing the relative 
strength of occupational groups within the party and in 
the entire nation. However, the unsatisfactory occupa­
tional classification system used in the Partels ta bistik 
limited Broszat to using the same system.
During the past twenty years, a number of studies 
have appeared which have used at least some statistics 
drawn from original research in an attempt to ascertain 
the social composition of the NSDAP. All have tended to 
reinforce the lower-middle class hypothesis. However, the 
samples of party membership on which they were based are 
all very small, and the criteria used for occupational 
classification is often questionable.
One of the earliest inquiries into the social iden­
tity of the Nazis by statistical analysis of surviving
biographical data on party members was made by Geoi’g Franz- 
Willing in 1 9 6 2 . From a party list of forty-five persons 
--whom he admitted may have been visitors at a Nazi rally 
rather than party members--Franz-Willing drew some amazing 
conclusions. The list "proves" (according to the author) 
the middle-class character of the early NSDAP. Aside from 
the questionable occupational classification system used 
by the author^^^ and the uncertain nature of his sample, 
forty-five persons is not a representative number for a 
party of even modest size. Franz-Willing's statistics have 
been used in recent studies of the NSDAP and quoted by sev­
eral historians as proof that the Nazis came primarily from 
the lower-middle class.
Werner Maser made a more convincing, attempt to con­
struct a sociography of the early Nazi party in 1965.^^^ 
Maser "proved" that over ^0 per cent of the party member­
ship was from the lower-middle class, using several dif-
including the unrepresentative nature of his sample and 
the unsatisfactory method of occupational classification 
he adopted which closely resembled that used by Franz- 
Willing . Maser's statistics and conclusions have been 
widely accepted by historians of interwar Germany and are 
quoted in many respected works as authoritative.
In 19671 Franz Josef Heyen edited a number of Nazi 
documents from the Mainz-Koblenz-Trier area which included
sociological statistics on the local membership compiled 
by the Ortsgruppen themselves. Dealing with a later 
time period (1928-1929) than the studies by Franz-Willing 
and Maser, Heyen's documents displayed a striking dissimi­
larity to the earlier works, at least in some communities. 
Rather than a middle-class party, three of the five local 
organizations from the Rhineland were, according to Heyen's 
documents, made up overwhelmingly of industrial laborers 
and farmers. The criteria by which persons were assigned 
to occupational classification or by which occupational 
groups were categorized were not given. Heyen's figures 
must bo considered a valuable source, even tliough they 
apply to only one region and to a specific time period.
The discrepancies between the picture of the party given 
by Heyen's statistics and those of Franz-Willing and Maser 
are irreconcilable. This indicates the need for reliable 
figures on the social makeup of the NSDAP in all areas of 
Germany and in each of the years between its inception and 
the time Hitler seized power.
Several studies using statistical data on the occu­
pations of party members appeared in 1969» all more or less 
confirming the middle-class character of the NSDAP member­
ship. Dietrich Orlow, drawing his material almost exclu­
sively from secondary sources, declared the Nazis to be 
overwhelmingly petty bourgeois. Carsten, writing in 
the same year, reached the same general conclusions, but
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with some reservations, especially concerning the early 
party (1919-1923).^'^^ Basing his observations on a party 
list from the Hauptarchiv collection which is undated but
In 1971, Jeremy Noakes published a perceptive study 
of the development of the NSDAP in Lower S a x o n y . N o a k e s  
pointed out the lower-middle class character of the party 
during the period 1 9 2 1 - 1 9 2 4 ,  ^ but noted several dramatic 
changes in the social makeup of the NSDAP during the period 
1925-1928, when a number of young people and industrial 
laborers entered the Nazi movement in Lower Saxony. He 
also showed thcit the party leadership in Hannover was 
directing its propaganda efforts at the industrial workers
servation that although a number of workers did join the 
party in these years, nearly as many soon left it .
Noakes' contention that the Nazis made a determined 
attempt to win the workers to the party in 1923 is sup­
ported by the 1972 work of Max H. Kele.^^^ Through an ex­
tensive examination of Nazi publications, correspondence 
between party leaders, and the memoirs, autobiographies 
and speeches of party dignitaries, Kele succeeded in show­
ing that a good part of the NSDAP leadership was desirous 
of attracting workers into the party. He also pointed out 
that the Nazis expended a tremendous amount of effort to
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accomplish this end. The one instance in which he inves­
tigated party lists to determine the class origins of party 
members produced some very curious results. He wrote that 
the "earliest membership list" of the party, dated May 29, 
1920, is in the Hauptarchiv collection (why he decided that 
this is the earliest membership list is unclear). He con­
cluded that of the 675 members on this list "2? per cent 
were skilled laborers and craftsmen, while only 2-9 per 
cent were unskilled laborers.
If the propaganda efforts of the Nazis all over 
Germany during the period 1925-1928 were directed at the 
workers as those in Lower Saxony were--and Kele's study 
shows that they were--there is a good possibility that the 
social composition of the party during those years was con­
siderably different than has been thought. Noakes went on 
to show that in I928 the propaganda appeals of the Nazis 
in Lower Saxony were redirected toward the petty bourgeoi­
sie and, especially, the f a r m e r s . B a s i n g  his conclu­
sions on figures from the Parteistatistik, Noakes observed 
that propaganda appeals along with severe dislocations in 
segments of the Germany economy, changed the social char­
acter of the party drastically in 1928-1930, From a lower 
and lower-middle-clas8 movement with perhaps a large repre­
sentation from industrial labor, it changed into a party of 
"peasants, artisans, shopkeepers and small businessmen and
white collar workers. ,,120
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Noakes emphasized that the NSDAP was not a socially 
homogeneous movement throughout its years of incubation. 
The social composition probably changed considerably sev­
eral times. Although Noakes' statements are far from con­
clusive as to the social structure of the party, his study 
represents a significant step toward an answer to the 
question "who were the Nazis ?
Michael Kater, also publishing in 1971i contributed 
the most convincing statistics on the social composition 
of the party to date. Using biographical information 
on 4,726 persons who joined the NSDAP in 1923, Kater sub­
mitted data on the ago, sex, geographical origins, and size 
of community of origin of each Nazi to a computer, produc­
ing some unexpected r e s u l t s . S e v e r a l  of the previously 
held assumptions about the Nazis had to be scrapped in 
light of Kater's research, including the idea that the 
party during the early period was largely confined to 
South Germany; that the party in the pre-1924 period was 
oriented around large urban centers; and that "soldiers 
and workers" made up a large proportion of the party mem­
bership during the early Kampfzeit of the NSDAP.
Kater's work, as valuable as it is, has several 
limitations, the most serious of which is that the list 
from which he drew his statistics contains the names only 
of persons who joined the party in I923 : that is, during
a time of political and economic crisis in Germany.
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In 1972, Harold Gordon challenged most previously 
held opinions on the social composition of the NSDAP, and 
even many of the assumptions upon which prior social 
analyses of the party membership were b a s e d . U s i n g  a 
sample of 1,126 persons who joined the party in Bavaria 
in 1923,^^^ Gordon concluded that far from being over­
whelmingly lower-middle class, the party membership was 
"a heterogeneous mixture of people of all classes and all
dichotomy between Gordon's generalizations and most pre­
viously held notions of the social class origins of Nazi 
party members is that Gordon totally discarded the usual 
breakdown of German society used in all earlier studies 
in favor of a new system of his own which he considered 
"a more flexible system, representing modern society . . .
[fitting] actual social conditions and the attitudes of 
the groups and individuals involved."^ A m o n g  other 
differences from earlier studies, Gordon includes 
Angeste11te (employees) under Arbeiter (workers), whereas 
other writers have usually included them with the lower- 
middle class as white collar woi’kers.^^^
In 1973 Geoffrey Pridham took up the history of the 
NSDAP in Bavaria where Gordon left off, but he offered no 
original research on the social structure of the party.
He reached the conclusion that the Nazis were primarily 
lower-middle class from a rehashing of the Parteistatistik 
figures and several secondary sources.
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One further effort has been made to shed light on 
the social composition of the NSDAP by statistical method­
ology. In an article to be published in 1976, Kater has 
attempted to ascertain the social makeup of the party dur­
ing the period 1925-19^^5*^^^ Kater took a sample of tivo 
thousand biographies of persons joining Hitler's movement 
during this period from the Zentralkar tei of the Nazi par ty 
now at the Dei'lin Document Center. In his analysis, he 
considered all the persons who joined the party before 
1930 as one group, thus not showing what changes, if any, 
took place during the years 1925-1930* Kater's study has 
drawbacks, several of them serious. For one thing, the 
sample was drawn haphazardly, not randomly. For another, 
a sample of two thousand biographies from a total of 10.7 
million (the approximate number of membership cards at the 
Berlin Document Center) will probably not yield reliable 
r e s u l t s . A s  Kater himself points out, his study permits 
"nur einen ungenauen Eigenblich"^^^ into the social struc­
ture of the NSDAP. Despite these objections, Rater's work 
is the only one that gives any real idea of who the Nazis 
were during the period 1925-1930. His statistics support 
the lower-middle-class hypothesis of the social character
of the NSDAP.
Who Were the Nazis? A Synopsis of Current Opinion
The present state of historical opinion on the so­
cial composition of the NSDAP based on the preceding works
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runs as follows: (l) the Nazis came primarily from the
middle classes in German society, especially the lower 
ranks of that middle class, although other strata of so­
ciety were also represented; (2) the members of the NSDAP 
were exceptionally young, at least after 1928 and perhaps 
earlier; (3 ) although National Socialism began in metro­
politan areas, it found its greatest support in small 
communities and in the countryside, especially after 1928 ;
(4) there was no appreciable percentage of industrial 
laborers in the NSDAP before 1930 « Many historians would 
still accept the "marginal men" hypothesis of the social 
makeup of the Nazi party but it is largely unprovable. A 
few historians would still agree that the party in its 
earliest phase contained an appreciable number of soldiers. 
All of these generalizations have some merit and will be 
tested below, as will the hypothesis that tlie Nazis were 
almost exclusively men.
The Numerical Strength of the NSDAP 
Another matter on which there is a great deal of 
confusion is the number of Nazi party members in the years 
before 1930. Apart from general interest, this question 
takes on particular significance because of Bracher's 
assertion that when the party passed 100,000 members in 
1928 it made the transition from a class party to a mass 
party.
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It is especially difficult to find any agreement 
on the numerical strength of the early party (1919-1924). 
All figures presented on the subject until recently have 
been little more than approximations. These estimates 
vary as follows (all figures arc for December 31 of the 
designated year unless otherwise indicated):
1919 - 28 ( S e p t e m b e r ) 64,^^® and
1920 - "over 2 ,00 0 , 2 ,300 ,^ ^^  ^ and 3 ,00 0 .^ *^^ ^
1921 - "less than 1 ,000 ,"^^^ and "around 6 ,000."^^^
1922 - 39,000.^ ^^
1923 - 15,000 ( N o v e m b e r ) 2 0 ,0 0 0 , ^o,000,^^^
and 5 5 ,787.^^^
Estimates for party strength during the years 1925- 
1930 show a great deal more unanimity, largely because they 
are based on the same source (sometimes at second or third 
hand); Volz' Pat en die Geschichte der NSDAP. Volz gave 
the following figures for party strength (all numbers for 
December 31 of the indicated year):
1925 - 27,117
1926 - 49,523
1927 - 72,590
1928 - 108,717
1929 - 176,426.150
However, there have been several studies which have 
adopted figures which dispute those offered by Volz, a few 
of them based on solid evidence (all figures for Decem­
ber 31 of indicated year unless otherwise indicated):
1925 - 1 7 ,00 0 ,^^^ 1 8 ,0 0 0 ,^^^ 27,000,^5^ and
30,000.^5^
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1927 - 70 ,00 0 / ^ ®  and 8 1 ,000.^^^
1928 - 100,000.^^®
1929 - (Most agree ivith Volz.)^^^
This investigation of the social composition of the 
NSDAP will establish reliable figures on party membership 
strength for the years 1925-1930 by subtracting the per­
centage of persons who left the party during a given year 
from the highest membership number issued for that year.
The results will show that the true strength of the NSDAP 
at a given time between 1925 and 1930 was considerably less 
than has been previously thought.
Organization of the Study
The pages that follow will attempt to clarify the 
muddled state of knowledge about the social composition 
of the NSDAP described above. Chapter II will explore the 
sociography of the "early" NSDAP, 1919-1924. The primary 
sources of the statistical information are several:
1. A bound volume of membership lists for the pe­
riod 1919-October, 1921, entitled Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer. 
This volume is presently in the possession of the Berlin 
Documents Center. Its contents have not before been util­
ized in sociological analyses of the NSDAP.
2. The Hauptarchiv der NSDAP. This collection con­
tains a number of early membership lists for the Nazi party. 
I have made use of those for the period October, 1921 to
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November, 1922, which have not previously been submitted 
to statistical investigation. In addition I found it 
necessary to re-examine the sample used by Kater in "Zur 
Soziographie . . . ," because of the differences in occu­
pational classification between his study and mine.
Chapter III will attempt to accomplish the same 
goals as outlined for the early party for the period 1925- 
1928. The biographical information on NSDAP members from 
this period which are reflected in the statistics are 
drawn entirely from a representative sample of the party 
membership for those years, taken from the Zentralkar tei 
der NSDAP at the Berlin Documents Center. Chapter IV will 
examine the social composition of the Nazi party for the 
years 1928-1930 by the same methods as Chapter III. Fi­
nally, the Conclusion will summarize the findings of the 
entire study and offer some new generalizations about the 
social makeup of the NSDAP.
In addition. Appendix I gives a much more detailed 
explanation of my methodology, along with a description of 
the Berlin Documents Center and the master card file. Ap­
pendix II explores the difficult problems of occupational 
classification, and the criteria used for that purpose. 
Appendix III is concerned with the mathematical "proof" 
of the validity of the sampling technique used to gather 
the information in the 5 0,000-plus biographies utilized 
in Chapters III and IV.
CHAPTER I 
FOOTNOTES
^See especially Alan Bullock, Hitler. A Study 
in Tyranny (New York, I962) and Joachim C. Fest, Hitler 
(Munich, 1973).
p. 292.
^Ibid., p. 493.
^^Ibid., p. 301.
^Ibid., pp. 490-491.
^Kurt Ludecke, I Knew Hitler (New York, 1938), 
p. 49 ' Tlie Deutsche Arbeiter Partei (DAP) was the orig­
inal name of the Nazi party. Na tionalsozialistische was 
added in 1920.
^Ibid., p. 181.
^Konrad Heiden, History of National Socialism 
(New York, 1935)» PP- I8 and 28. Heiden never made it 
clear whether these generalizations applied to the entire 
period 1919-1933 or only to the years immediately pre­
ceding the Mach Lergreifung.
^Konrad Heiden, Per Fuehrer (New York, 1936),
p. 258.
^*^For a comparison of Heiden' s figures for party 
membership at various times during the 1920s with the 
numbers established by this study, see below pp. 6 8 , 7 2 , 
7 8 , 8 6 , 9 4 , and 100.
^^For example, Alice Hamilton, "The Youth who are 
Hitler's Strength," New York Times Magazine, October, 
1933) reproduced in John Weiss, ed., Nazis and Fascists 
in Europe, 1918-1945 (Chicago, 1969) ? PP* 83-9O .
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"The Tune Hitlerism Beats for 
Germany," New York Times Magazine, October, 1933, repro­
duced in Weiss, ed. , Nazis and Fascists, pp. 91-97 «
lower-middle class hypothe­
sis, see the following studies: Karl Lowenstein, Hi tier's
Germany. Tlie Nazi Background to War (New York, 19^ 0, rev. 
ed.), pp. 4-5 ; Frederick Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi 
Dictatorship. A Study in the Social Pathology and the 
Politics of Fascism (London, 193Ô ) , pi 1 0 2  ; David Saposs, 
"The Role of the Middle Classes in Social Development. 
Fascism, Populism, Communism, Socialism," Economic Essays 
in Honor of Wesley Clair Mitchell (New York^ 1935 ) , P P .
9 5 ,  9 7 ,  102-103; and Daniel Guerin, Fascisme et Grand 
Capital (Paris, 1936), p. 26.
York, 1935), especially p. 100 ; Guerin, Fascisme et Grand 
Capital, p . 9•
^^Lowenstein, Hitler's Germany, pp. 4-5; Schumann, 
Hitler and the Nazi Dictatorship, p. l6.
Came to Power (New York, 1 9 3 4 ) . O f t h e  89 entries re- 
yiecTedl 46 were discarded because their authors were 
women (4). Abel justified this procedure on the grounds 
that National Socialism was predominantly a masculine 
movement. A woman, being an atypical Nazi, could only 
prejudice the sample. In fact, women made up over 5 per 
cent of the total membership throughout the pre-depression
A perceptive and exhaustive analysis of Abel's 
original data has recently appeared by Peter Merkl, Polit- 
ical Violence Under the Swastika (Princeton, 1975)» which 
will be discussed below in some detail.
Nazi Movement, Appendix II, Table I.
^^Abel's statistics will be compared to those de­
rived in this study on later pages. For an example of the 
influence of Abel on recent works concerning the sociog- 
raphy of the NSDAP see Martin Broszat, "National Socialism, 
It's Socicil Basis and Psychological Impact," in E. J. 
Feuchtwanger, ed. Upheaval and Continuity. A Century of 
German History (Pittsburgh, 1974) , ppl 134-151, especially 
p. 140.
^^Hans Gerth, "The Nazi Party: It's Leadership and
Composition," American Journal of Sociology 45 (July 1940): 
517-541. The "official" party statistics that Gerth
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referred to is the Parteistatlstik which was not available 
to the general public in 1^40 though a great deal of the 
data therefrom was published in Hans Volz, Paten die 
Geschichte der NSDAP (Berlin, 1938). The occupational 
classification system used in the Parteistatistik and in 
Volz' book are much too vague to be of great value for 
determining social class. Also, the data is incomplete 
or missing entirely for the period 1919-1930.
^°Gerth, "The Nazi Party," p. 526. The idea that 
the Nazis represented the "failures" of German society has 
been adopted in several different forms by a number of 
historians since Gerth (see pp. 7-10 hereof).
^^Ibid. , pp. 529 end 530. Several comments had 
been made on the youth of party members before Gerth, but 
he was the first to support his statements with any sort 
of evidence.
^^Talcott Parsons, "Some Sociological Aspects of 
the Fascist Movements," Social Forces 21 (December 19^2):
138-147.
^^Ibid. , p. 138.
^^Ibid., p. 139.
^^Ibid., pp. 145-146.
. K. Pollock, "An Areal Study of the German 
Electorate, 1930-1933," American Political Science Review 
2 (May 1944): 8 9.
^^Ibid., pp. 90-9 1 .
z , "German Fascism and People 
of the Social Fringe," Polish Western Affairs ^ 8 (August 
1967): 251-2 88; by the same author, Powstanie Partei 
Ilitlerowskie.1 1919-1923 (Poznan, I968 ) . The latter work 
has an English summary on pp. 516-525*
^^The only attempt by Banaszkiewicz at statistical 
analysis to test his generalizations is several references 
to statistical fragments from George Franz-killing, Die 
Hitlerbewegnung. Der Ursprung 1919-1922 (Hamburg, 19^2) 
and Wolfgang Schaefer, NSDAP. Entwicklung und Struktur 
der Staatspartei des Dritten Reichs (Hannover, 1957 ) , both 
of which are discussed in some detail herein. Banaszkie- 
w i c z ' explanation of exactly what constitutes the "social 
fringe" of a society is confusing. Apparently, anyone who 
had been a member of Germany's armed forces during World 
War I was a "marginal man" according to Banaszkiewicz'
ko
definition, as was anyone affected adversely by the eco­
nomic crises in Germany during the period 1919-1924. 
Clearly, this includes a great majority of the male popu­
lation of the Reich. At best, these two works, which are 
representative of the "marginal man" theory of the social 
composition of the NSDAP, are unconvincing.
^^Michael John Thornton, Nazism, 1918-1945 (London,
19(56, p. 27 .
^^William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third 
Reich. A History of Nazi Germany (New York, 1960) , p^ 122.
^“Dietrich Orlow, The History of the Nazi Party; 
1919-1933 (Pittsburgh, 19^9)* Orlow, basing his conclu- 
sions on a statistical analysis of a very limited sample 
of the early party membership in Werner Maser's Die Sturm 
auf die Republik. Die Fruchgeschichte der NSDAP 
( Fr ankfur t - am-Ma in , 19f)5 ) , concluded the party membership 
was made up of "declasses or displaced students and often 
unemployable ps eudo - intellec tuals . . . "  (p. 5(5). P or a
critique of Maser's book and methodology, see p. 26 hereof.
^^Joseph Nyomarkay, Charisma and Factionalism in 
the Nazi Party (MinneaiJolis , I967 ) • Nyomarkay character- 
izcs tlie NSDAP, especially its leadership, as being 
"gradually" taken over by "military men and another group, 
the 'armed b o h e m i a n s i d e o l o g i s t s , adventurers, dis­
senters of all kinds, failures, and underworld charac­
ters" (p. 6 0 ). Nyomarkay offers no original research to 
support his contentions. He bases his analysis on sec­
ondary sources, primarily Schaefer, NSDAP.
Massenbasis des Faschismus," Jenaer Bel trap fuer Partei- 
geschichte 19 (February 19(59) •’ 31-40. Pospisil argues 
that "the declassed and ideologically untrained and 
politically reactionary| in German society made up the 
bulk of the Nazi party membership (p. 33)*
^^Jerzy Holzer, "La Partei sociale des NSDAP dans 
les annés 1928-1930," Acta Poloniae Historica 2 2  (October 
1970): 283-293. Holzer's generalizations are less dog­
matic than those of Pospisil. Although he concludes that 
" . . .  le NSDAP avait exerce une influence particulure- 
ment forte sur des représentants declasse les couches 
moyennes (Lumpenkleinburgertum)" (p. 299), he also points 
out that "Le NSDAP est devenu un partei a I'echelle 
nationale et son action a porte sur tous les milieux, 
independament de facteurs tels que le lieu d 'habitation, 
la stratification soziale, la confession, le sexe et 
1'age" (p. 299). Holzer based his generalizations on
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analyses of tlie Reichstag elections of I928 and 1930.
He felt that the same sorts of persons who voted for the 
Nazis were likely to be party members.
^^Daniel Lerner, The Nazi Elite (Stanford, 1951) 
and Lerner with Ithi el do Sola Pool and George K.
Sc hue H e r , "The Nazi Elite" in Howard D. L. Lasswell and 
Daniel Lerner, eds., World Revolutionary Elites. Studies 
in Coersive Ideological Movements (Cambridge, 1965), p p . 
194-313• This article contains much of the material in 
Lerner's earlier study somewhat updated.
^^Ibid., p. 1.
who was marginal, Lerner used fourteen criteria: (1) 
birthplace--anyone born in Bavaria, the Rhineland, Alsace 
and the Saar, or outside Germany was consideied marginal;
(2 ) age--"youth" equates with marginal, but Lerner did not 
say how old one must be to leave the ranks of marginal 
people; (3) employment changes--anyone who ever changed 
jobs at any time during his life is marginal; (4) geo­
graphical mov ement-- anyone in the party who moved from 
one region of Geimany to another or from a small community 
to a city is marginal; (5) religious affilial ion--Roman 
Catholics, Peufcschglaeubig and atheists are considered 
marginal ; (ïïl lifework--peasants and artisans are marginal 
by Lerner's definition; (?) occupation of father--again, 
peasants and artisans are marginal; (8) education--anyone 
who attended but did not graduate from any school is mar­
ginal, as is anyone who attended no higher school than 
grade school; (9) father-in-law's occupation--having a 
father-in-law who was a peasant or artisan makes one mar­
ginal; (10) military career--all enlisted men ai-e con­
sidered marginal by Lerner; (11) date of entry into the 
party--anyone who joined before 1925 is marginal ; (12)
spouse--anyone who married a non-German is marginal; (13) 
college--anyone who studied abroad is marginal, and (l4) 
occupation--anyone who ever worked outside Germany is 
marginal.
^^Many of these same objections to Lerner's work 
have been raised in Merkl, Political Violence Under the 
Swas tika, pp. II6-II7 . Merkl describes Lerner's criteria 
of marginality as a "preposterous choice of indices" (p. 
116) .
^^This is equally true for the variation of the 
marginal man hypothesis which calls the Nazis "losers" and
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National Socialist ideology an "ideology of the losers."
See Otis Mitchell, Nazism and the Common Man (Minneapolis, 
1972), especially pp”^ 5 and 1Ô. Also Wolfgang Sauer, 
"National Socialism: Totalitarianism or Fascism?" American
Historical Review 72 (December I967): 4o8-422.
uous nature of the term "lower-middle class." It has 
become a catchall which can refer to a number of socially 
and ideologically diverse groups in society. For a good 
discussion of the problems involved in identifying the 
lower-middle class, see Arno J. Mayer, "The Lower Middle 
Class as Historical Problem," Journal of Modern History 
47 (September 1976): 409-436, in which the author argues 
that the concept of the lower-middle class is a valuable 
historical tool when carefully defined and used. For a 
definition of the term as used in this study see below. 
Appendix II,
^^A partial list of only some of the more important 
works includes Karl Dietrich Brocher, The German Dictator­
ship: The Origins, Structure and Effects of National
Socialism (New York, 1970 ) , t'r ans . J ean S te inb erg , p . 101; 
Braeher, Die AuFloesung der Weimarer Republik. Fine Studie 
zuni Prob 1 em des Machtcr’fails in dor Demokrati~e (Stuttgart 
and Düsseldorf, 1957 ) , pi 170 ! Martin Brosza t, Dor Staat 
Hitlers. Grundlegung und Entwicklung seiner inncrn Ver- 
fassung (Munich, I96 9 ) 1 p p . 50-5 2; William Carr, A His­
tory of Germany, 1815-1945 (London, I969), pp. 343-344 ;
F . L . Cars tens, The Pise of Fascism (Berkeley, I969), P P • 
143-144; Joachim Fest, Das Gesiclit des Dritten Reich. 
Profile einer totalitarien Herrschoft (Munich, 1964), p.
4 0 ; William S. Halperin, Gernicvny Tried Democracy. A 
Political History of the Reich from Ï 918 to 1933 (New York, 
1946 ) , pi 226 ; Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man (New 
York, i960), pp. 127 and l48; Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of 
Fascism (New York, I969), passim; Orlow, History of the 
Nazi Party, especially pp. 47-48.
^^^Lipset, Political M a n ; Nolte, Three Faces of 
Fascism; Brae her, Tlie German Dictatorship; Heinrich August 
Winkler, Mittelstand, Demokratie und Nationalsozialismus 
(Cologne, 1972). See also the review article by Erich 
Volkmann, "Mittelstand und Nationalsozialismus in der 
Weimarer Republik," Historische-Politische Buch (1973)- 
97-9 8. Volkmann discusses the current state of the 
middle-class hypothesis in the light of the most recent 
publications on the subject. Lipset, Braeher, and Nolte 
discuss the bourgeois character of fascism in terms of 
voters, but all clearly feel that those motivated to vote 
for the Nazis were also the most likely candidates for 
party membership.
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Bracher, The Gorman Dictatorship, pp. 155-157 and
'^Ibid. , pp. 127, l40, and l46-l48. 
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^^Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, p. 399»
^^U'inkler, Mittelstcind, Deniokratie und National­
sozialismus , pp. 17 and I63-I7O '
•^ ^E. Vermeil, L'Allemagne. Essai d ' explication 
(Paris, 1945), and Rudolph Heberle, From Democracy to 
Nazism (Baton Rouge, 1945)-
^^Vermeil, L 'Allemagne, pp. 294-295*
^^Heberle, Democracy to Nazism, pp. 9-10.
^^Bracher, Die AuTloesung der Weimarer Repub1ik,
pp. 117-120.
^^Walther Hofer, Die Diktatur Hitlers. Bis zum 
Beginn des Zweiten Weltkrieg (Konstanz, I960) , p^ TÏ*.
Power: The Case of the Nazi Party, 1925-1926," American
Historical Review 72 (April I967) : 906-924.
NSDAP, 1924-1927," Journal of Contemporary History 
1 (October I966 ) : 3-36.
^^David Schoenbnum, Hitlers Social Revolution. 
Class and Status in Germany 1933-1939 (London, I966 ) , 
pp. 11 and 30.
^^Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 94; Broszat, Der 
Staat Hitlers, p. 5 0 .
^^Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 5 6 .
^^Ibid.
^^Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91 *
^^Michael Kater, "Zur Soziographie der fruehen 
NSDAP," Viertelsiahrhefte fuer Zeitgoschichte 22 (Septei 
bar 1971); 124-160.
^^Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, 1921- 
1933 (Oxford, 1971), p. 95. To substantiate his
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generalizations, Noakes quotes the following statistics 
taken from the Schumacher file in the Bundesarchiv at 
Koblenz, which contains a number of membership lists from 
the pre-1930 period: Hamburg, 64.5 per cent of persons
joining the party during the period 1925-1930 were under 
twenty-five years of age; Halle, 66.1 per cent under 
thirty. Noakes did not say how many individuals his 
statistics represent or how complete those lists are.
His study is an excellent indicator of the trends toward 
youth within the party, but cannot be considered 
conclusive.
^^Harold Gordon, Hitler and the Deer Hall Putsch 
(Princeton, I962), p. 6 8 .
^^Ibid., p. 82 .
^^Ibid., p. 71. Gordon's data on the age of party 
members consists largely of eyewitness observations of the 
pre-putsch Nazis and one membership list of 994 party mem­
bers. Of these 6IO were under thirty-one yeai's of age 
(p. 70). See also Mitchell, Nazism and the Common M a n ,
"generational revolt" hypothesis is Anselm Faust, Der 
Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studentbund. Studenten 
und Nationalsozialismus in dor heimnrer Pepublik, 2 vols. 
(Düsseldorf, 1973)« Faust is concerned with the appeal of 
the Nazis to German students rather than party membership, 
but he does jDoint out a number of factors which inclined 
German students "by the thousands" toward Hitler's party 
(especially pp. 27-28 and 45-46).
^^For early proponents of this argument, see 
Lowenstein, Hitler's Germany, especially pp. 4-6; also 
Michael T. Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism. . A 
Study of the Economic and Social Policies of the Totali­
tarian States (New York, 193^ especially p . 5’3“.
^^Odette Hardy-Hemery, "Le nazisme: passe et
actualité," Revue des Nord 48 (April-June 1971) : 307 «
A. B. Zeman, Nazi Propaganda (London, 1973)»
p. 28 .
^^Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91.
^^See Kater's statistics below p. 101 and those from 
the parteistatistik and Noakes study. None of these indi­
cate any unemployed in the party ranks. There exists the
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possibility, however, that persons joining the Nazis, when 
asked their occupations, would not admit to being unem­
ployed , but would rather give their previous occupations. 
Karl O'Lessker, "Who Voted for Hitler? A New Look at the 
Class Basis of Nazism," American Journal of Sociology 13 
(July 1968): 63-6 9 , concluded that a number of persons 
from the expanding ranks of the unemployed voted for 
Hitler. Assuming this is true it tells us nothing con­
clusive about party membership. O'Lessker's generaliza­
tion has been challenged by R. I. McKibbin, "The Myth of 
the Unemployed: Who Did Vote for the Nazis?" Australian
Journal of Politics and History 12 (August I96 9 ) : 25-40." 
McKibbin analyzed the same material from which O'Lessker 
drew his conclusions and decided that the bulk of the 
Nazis' electoral support did not come from the unemployed, 
but from "new voters."
torate," p p . 89-94.
^^Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, p. 21.
Heberle also pointed out the appeal the NSDAP apparently 
had for farmers without pursuing the point, except to 
date the mass defection of the farmers from their tradi­
tional political parties to Nazism as having occurred 
only after the beginning of the depression (p. 87).
^^0. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, "The Spread of 
German Nazism in Rural Areas," The American Sociological 
Review 11 (1946): 724-734.
^^Reinhard Bendix, "Social Stratification and 
Political Power," The American Political Science Review 
6 (February 1952): 357.
^^Werner T. Angress, "The Political Role of the 
Peasantry in the Weimar Republic," The Review of Politics 
21 (July 1959): 530-5 49 .
^*^Gerhard Stoltenberg, Politische Stroeinmungcn im 
Schleswig-Holsteinischen Landvolk, 19l8-1933 (Düsseldorf,
1962), pp. 146-147.
"NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche 
Organisaiionen in der Endphase der Weimarer Republik," 
Viertelsjahrhofte fuer Zeitgeschichte I5 (March 1967)- 
341-376 (quote from 36O ).
^^Carsten, Rise of Fascism, pp. l43-l44, 145. 
Carsten apparently did not quantify the information on 
the party list in question.
^^Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 1]8.
^^^Kater, "Zur Soziographie, " p. l40. It should be 
noted that Kater's definition of a "rural area" included 
all communities with under 10,000 population.
"Der Faschismus," Zeitschrift fuer 
Sozialismus 24-25 (September-October 1936j : 7Ê5-792.
^^See Rudolf Oillung, NSDAP; Die Geschichte einer 
B ewe gnu ng (Munich, 1931) . Even stauncli opponents of the 
Hitler movement like Theodor Ileuss, Hitlers Weg. Eine 
historische-politischo Studie ueber den Nationalsozialismus 
(Stuttgart, 1932), noted the heterogeneity of the party 
membership.
^^Dendix, "Social Stratification," p. 397.
1932) .
^^Jean F. Neurohr, Der Mythos voni Dritten Reich.
Zur Geistsgeschichto des Nationalsozialismus (Stuttgart,
1957) .
^^Raymond Martin, Le National Socialisme hitlérien. 
Une Dictature Populaire (Paris, 1959)«
dctitschen Elite.
Eine Zirkulationmodel Deutscher F u e Tir ung s gr up pen, 1919- 
1961 (Munich, I965). Zopf's thesis about workers has been 
disputed by Kater's statistical study of the party, at 
least in 1923, and in statistical analyses of the party 
membership by Gordon and Noakes, see below p.
^^Wolfgang Horn, "Hitler und die NSDAP. Neuere 
Untersuchung zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus,"
Netie Politische Literature 4 (April I968): 466-484. Horn 
was probably influenced by the work of Gerhard Ritter, 
particularly an article in Maurice Bnumont, John Fried, 
Edmond Vermeil, and others, eds.. The Third Reich (New 
York, 1955), PP- 389-412 , in which Ritter denied any 
class character in the National Socialist movement.
Ritter did not attempt to prove his contentions, and 
neither he nor Horn specified what period they meant.
This is an important consideration, since it is very pos­
sible that the social composition of the party changed 
several times during the years between 1919 and 1933*
^^Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 95-
157.
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^^Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 154-155» 
^^Holzer, "La Partee soziale des NSDAP," p. 299*
^^Volz' study has only a few generalizations about 
the occupational makeup of the party membership. The 
Par b eis tat istik differentiates between the following occu­
pational classifications :
(1) Arbeiter--no criteria listed for inclusion 
within this group. It is unclear whether agricultural 
laborers were included, or apprentices and journeymen in 
the artisanal trades, or clerks, etc.
( 2 )  Land-u. Forstwirtschaft--no information on which 
occupational groups are included in this category.
(3) Industrie u. Mandwerk (Handwerker und Gewerbe- 
triebende)--those included in this group are actually made 
up of at least two social classes.
(4) Freie Berufe--no information about which occu­
pations are included.
(5) Beamte--divided into "lehrer" and "anderer."
No information about who the anderer were.
(6 ) Anges tell te--no information on which occupa­
tions this category included.
(7 ) Mithelfende Fam.-Angehartige.--again, no 
information.
Attempting to ascertain the social class of most party 
membei-s using only the above information would be ex­
tremely difficult at best. Nevertheless, many have 
attempted to do just that.
11-19.
^^Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, pp. 50-54.
^^^Franz-Willing, Die Hitlerbewegnung.
^^^Franz-Willing included under "free professions" 
such occupational groups as "salespeople" and "bankpeople" 
(ibid., p. 126). In addition, he made no distinction be­
tween skilled laborers and artisans (ibid., p. I30) .
^®^In addition to Danaszkiewicz (see above p. 9)» 
a number of other historians have been influenced by 
Franz-Willing including Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social 
Revolution, p. I8 .
^^^Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP.
^^^Maser used five different party lists from as 
many different party Ortsgruppen. The first is, according
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to Maser, the oldest surviving list containing biographical 
data on the first 675 party members and dating from May, 
1922. The authenticity of this "oldest surviving list" 
has been convincingly challenged by Kater in "Zur Soziog­
raphie," p. 106 (see below p. 76). Tlie remaining lists, 
all from 1922, contain a total of 803 biographies.
^^^Many of the same objections voiced here have been 
made by Kater in "Zur Soziographie," p p , 126-127- Like 
Franz-Killing, Maser failed to distinguish between skilled 
laborers (Facharbeiter) and artisans (Handwerker) , a cru­
cial distinction in determining class affiliation, see 
Appendix II hereof.
^^^Among many others, Bracher, The German Dictator­
ship , p. 126. Bracher's work is considered by many his­
torians, including this writer, to be the definitive work 
on the Nazi period to date.
^^^Franz Josef Heyon, Nationalsozialismus im 
Alltap. Que11en zur Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus 
voranehmlich im Haum Mainz-Koblenz-Trior (Boppard-am- 
Rhein, I967).
^°^Ibid., p. 53, abt. 403 NA 16737, 5,5l5f.
^*^^Orlow , History of the Nazi Party, pp. 17, 47-48, 
and I3O-I31. Orlow largely concerned himself with the 
organizational history of the NSDAP and relied on Maser 
for the statistics he used on its social composition (p.
17). His one original attempt to ascertain who the Nazis 
were is presented in an analysis of the occupations of 
twelve Nazi Reichstag delegates elected in 1928 (p. 13l)« 
This is interesting in its own right, but sheds little 
light on the NSDAP membership as a whole.
Ibid., p. 95•
^^^Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony.
^Ibid., pp. 18-19 . Noakes based his observations 
on a list of the "first 25 members" of the party from the 
Hauptarchiv. These persons were, by occupational grouping, 
overwhelmingly lower-middle and middle class. Again, the 
observation must be made that this is not a large enough 
sample upon which to base firm conclusions.
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_________________  p • 101,
based on the correspondence between leading Nazis in the
1 94, based on membership lists.
________ ad Norkers. National Social­
ist Appeals to German Labor, 1919-1933 (Chapel Hill, 1972).
^■^^Ibid.j p. 3 6 . Kele argiies that Angestollto and 
Handwerker- should be considered as skilled workers. Many 
of the occupations he considers skilled labor are included 
in this study as unskilled laborers for reasons discussed 
in Appendix II hereof.
    105 ,
again based on correspondence between party leaders in 
the area. Noakes is not clear about whether or not he 
considers farmers to be a part of the lower-middle class.
l4l. Noakes' attempt to turn the 
P a r tels ta11s t i k figures into understandable occupational 
categories yielded the following results for persons join­
ing the NSDAP in 1929 : farmers, 2.7 per cent; workers
(industrial and agricultural), 22 per cent; self-employed, 
18 per cent (including artisans and the professions); 
white collar workers, I8 per cent; civil servants, 4 per 
cent; and "others," 7 per cent. The difficulties of the 
Parteis tatistilc as a guide to the social class of party 
members are discussed above, pp. 24-26.
141-142.
^^^Kater, "Zui' Soziographie," pp. 124-l60.
A table summarizing Kater's results from ibid., 
p. 1391 is included below, p. 101, with Kater's permis­
sion, for which I gratefully express my thanks.
^“^^Kater, "Zur Soziographie," p. 129. There is 
good evidence pointing to the probability that the social 
character of the NSDAP changed radically several times 
during the period 1919-1930 « One should not draw con­
clusions about the social origins of the Nazis who joined 
the party after 1924 from Kater's statistics. Even to 
consider them representative of the party membership for 
the years before 1933 is most questionable. Also, there 
is some question as to whether Kater's 4,726 party mem­
bers are a representative sample even of those persons who 
joined the NSDAP in 1923. The highest party number on 
Kater's list is above 55iOOO, indicating that over 48,000
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persons joined the party during that year. Since the 
Hauptarchiv list (Kater's source) is the only one known 
to have survived from 1923i Kater had little choice in 
sampling procedure. One further difficulty of Kater's 
study is that of occupational classification, discussed 
in some detail in Appendix II hereof.
^^^Gordon, Hitler and the Deer Hall Putsch.
Gordon supplies no information on his source, 
or how his sample was selected, ibid., pp. 80-82.
^^^Ibid., p. 82. For a more detailed analysis of 
Gordon's statistics, see below p. 101.
■^^®Ibid., p. 7 2 .
^^^Ibid., p. 73* One of the most perplexing 
problems of a study of this nature is occupational clas­
sification. For a detailed discussion of this problem and 
of Gordon's proposals, as well as an exhaustive explana­
tion of the classification system used to construct the 
statistics below, see Appendix II hereof.
Hitler's Rise to Power. The 
Nazi Movement in Davaria, 1923-1933 (New York, 1973)«
^^^Ibid., p. 185. Pridham relied heavily on Lipset, 
Political M a n ; Erich Fromm, Escape from Freedom (New York, 
1965); and Harold Lasswell, "The Psychology of Hitlerism," 
The Political Quarterly (1934), for his social analysis of 
the NSDAP.
^^^Kater, "Sozialer Wandel in der NSDAP in Zuge der 
nationalsozialistischen Machtergreifung." To be published 
in Wolfgang Schieder, ed., Zur Sozialgeschichte des 
Faschismus. Deutschland und Italian im Vergleich, by Hoff- 
man and Carupe in Hamburg in 197^. I appreciateProfessor 
Kater's kind permission to quote from this study.
Ill hereof.
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Kater, "Sozialer Wandel," p. 1.
Ibid., statistical Table 5« It should be noted,
however, that Water's classification system differs radi­
cally from Gordon's and from earlier studies. See below
p. 101.
^^^Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 133 « 
^^^Heiden, History of National Socialism, p . x.
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^^^Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 4 0 .
^^^Florinsky, Fascism and National Socialism, p. 37*
Selbstzeu.gnesse aiis der "Kanipf zei t " der NSDAP. Dokumcnta- 
tion und Analysis (Uusseldorf, I969), 13•
^^^Franz-Willing, Der Hitlerbewegnung, p. IO3 .
Later (p. 234) he agreed with Volz that the actual figure 
for the beginning of I92I was 3 iOOO.
 ^^ ^Abel, The Nazi Movement, App• II, A, I; Volz, 
Paten die Geschiclibe dor NSDAP, p. 7; Or low, History of 
the Nazi Party, p . 25•
^*^Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p . 4$).
^*^Volz, Oaten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 8 ; 
Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 100.
Sin
Hal
^^^^From the Official Report of Captain Truman 
t h , 25-11-22, quoted in Gordon, Hit1er and the Beer
1 Putsch, p. 64.
p. 39;
Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, p. 226; both of these 
may have originated from an obscure remark in Volz, Paten 
die Geschichte dor NSDAP, pp. 7-8.
pp. 27-31.
Hitlerism. The Iron Fist in 
Germany (Now York, 1932), p. 19*
^^^^Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, A, I. A num­
ber of other works give the figure 55,000. All are based 
on the largest number found on the Hauptarchiv lists.
Many of the numbers between 8,000 and 40,000 are missing, 
as are many between 45,000 and 55,000. The actual number 
of members in 1923 is still not definitely known.
^^*^Volz, Oaten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21.
Other studies which have adopted Volz' figures (sometimes 
rounded off) include Schumann, Hitler and the Nazi Dicta­
torship , p. 72; Hofer, Dio Diktatur Hitlers, p. 20; Abel, 
The Nazi Movement, App. IX, Table A, p. 1; Schaefer, NSDAP, 
p. 17; Shirer, Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p. 120; 
Ernst Deuerlein, Der Aufst eig der NSDAP in Augenzeugenber- 
eichten (Düsseldorf, 196 8 ) , p p . 254 j 266, 291, and 293 j 
Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. I3O ; Holzer, "La Partee 
soziale des NSDAP," p. 283; Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp.
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155-156; and Zeman, Nazi Propaganda, p. 28. Volz' figures 
are based on the highest membership number issued in a 
given year and therefore do not take into account the 
number of persons who left the party or the manner in 
which numbers were allotted. This makes his figures 
highly inaccurate in attempting to ascertain the number 
of members in the NSDAP at a given time. See also George 
Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin Documents 
Center," Central Bnropean History 5 (1972): 362-380, on 
the number of persons who left the party.
^^^Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 113 ; 
Bullock, Hitler, p. 109; Pest, Gesicht des Dritten Reich, 
P- 55 .
•^^ “Reinhad Kuehnl, Die Nationalsozia 1 istische 
Linke, 1925-1930 (Meisenheim-am-Glan, Ï966)Ï p^ 134.
153.Tyrell, Fuehrer Defiel, p. 352.
Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 113. 
He says (p. 124) the real strength of the party was
40,000 at this time.
■^^^Tyrell , Fuehrer Defiel, p. 362.
^^®Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352.
anything approaching convincing evidence which differs 
considerably from Volz' figures is one made by Broszat, 
Der Staat Hitlers, p. 49- Broszat uses the figures for 
the numerical strength given in the Parteistatistik which 
give the total strength of the party in September, 1930, 
as only 121,0001 The only possible way to reconcile this 
with Volz' figures is to conclude that a great number of 
members left the party.
CHAPTER II
THE SOCIOGRAPHY OF THE EARLY 
NAZI PARTY, 1919-1923
. . . when the National Socialist pai'ty appealed
for the first time to the German people it reso­
lutely refused . . .  to support either religious 
or economic interests within the nation: Its
appeals were from the first directed to the 
heroic instincts of the German people . . .  in 
all social strata of the nation.
Adolf Hitler 
Nuremberg, 1934
The Creation of the Weimar Republic 
On September 29, 1918, the chief of the German 
General Staff, General Erich von Ludendorff, informed 
Kaiser Wilhelm II that an immediate armistice was neces­
sary if Germany was to avoid invasion and dismemberment 
by the Allies. He also insisted that Germany should Imme­
diately establish a democratic parliamentary system in 
order to facilitate peace negotiations on the basis of 
Wilson's Fourteen Points. On October 3, at Ludendorffs 
suggestion, Prince Max of Baden became Imperial Chancellor. 
Prince Max was well-known for his liberal political views 
and it was hoped the Allies would negotiate more willingly 
with him than with his predecessor. His suggestions 
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followed, Ludendorff resigned on October 25 to leave the 
odious task of capitulation to others.
As Ludendorff was leaving office, the Reichstag 
carried out his instructions to create a true parliamentary 
democracy by resolving that the Imperial Chancellor must 
possess the confidence of the parliament. Wilhelm acceeded 
to this limitation of his power in an effort to preserve 
his throne, but it was too late. On November 3 the German 
fleet at Kiel mutinied, and revolt quickly spread to Berlin. 
The German Communist Party,^ led by Karl Liebknecht and 
Rosa Luxemburg, was preparing to proclaim a Soviet Republic 
on the Russian model. To avert this, Prince Max announced 
the abdication of Whilhelm II, and Philipp Scheidoinann of 
the Social Democratic Party^ proclaimed a republic. Prince 
Max resigned his office in favor of Friedrich Ebert, also 
of the SPD, in an effort to avoid a Bolshevik revolution. 
Ebert, who had labored mightily to preserve the monarchy, 
thus became the last Imperial Chancellor. Meanwhile, on 
November 9, Wilhelm fled to the Netherlands after being 
told that the army would not support him against the revo­
lution. The conservative General Staff and the reformist 
SPD had together carried out a revolution from above.
On November 10 the workers' and soldiers' councils 
of Berlin endorsed Ebert's government. At the same time, 
Ebert entered into an agreement with the Army high command 
which guaranteed the Army's support for Ebert's regime in
55
Z'et urn for which he would resist radicaliza tion of the 
revolution (in other words, bolshevization). On Decem­
ber 23, revolutionaries occupied the chancellory in Berlin 
and took Ebert prisoner. He was rescued the next day by 
regular army ti’oops. In protest against the provisional 
government's counterrevolutionary policies its three 
Independent Socialist^ members resigned at the end of 
December. This left Ebert a free hand to deal with the 
mounting revolutionary tide. He commissioned Gustav Noske 
to raise a volunteer force to combat the revolutionaries, 
which he did.
The dismissal of Emil Eichhorn, the Independent 
Socialist police president of Berlin, on January 4, 19-19» 
was the signal for mass demonstrations by the revolution­
aries. On January 11 Noske's troops enteied the capital 
city and in four days of bloody street fighting routed the 
insurgents. Liebknecht and Luxemburg were arrested on 
January 15 and executed by Noske's officers.
On January 19 elections for a National Assembly 
were held. Social revolution had been averted. A parlia­
mentary democracy was created which perpetuated much of 
the old economic order and class structure of the Imperial 
regime. The elections for the National Assembly held in 
January did not return a majority for any one political 
party.^ When the assembly met at Weimar on February 6,
1919, Scheidemann, as leader of the largest party, formed
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a coalition cabinet based on his own party (SPD), the 
Catholic Center Party,^ and the Democratic Party.^
Ebert was elected the first President of the Reich.
A constitution for the new republic was written by Hugo 
Preuss of the DDP and accepted by the assembly on August 11. 
This constitution has been severely criticized for the sys­
tem of proportional representation it introduced which en­
couraged the perpetuation of small political parties, and 
also for the wide emergency powers granted to the presi­
dent. However, the collapse of the republic in 1933 owes 
far more to the ensuing course of events than to flaws in 
its constitution.
A number of measures for the nationalization of seg­
ments of the economy were introduced by the SPD when the 
new parliament convened for the first time, but few were 
effective. German industry during the Weimar period, as 
during the Kaiserreich, was dominated by cartels and other 
combines of monopolistic character with control concen­
trated in the hands of a few. The German working class 
definitely improved its political and economic status 
under the republic, but the hoped-for sweeping social re­
forms never materialized. This insured the left-wing 
opposition to the government strong support from the work­
ing class and weakened the SPD. Economic power remained 
with those groups in society who were at best lukewarm to 
the republic and at worst worked actively for its overthrow.
The Treaty of Versailles and the Crisis Years 
of the Republic , 19J-9-192~¥
The German hope that the peace settlement granted 
by the allies would be more equitable if negotiated with 
a democratic Germany was soon crushed. In fact, there were 
no negotiations. The settlement, which seemed unbearably 
harsh to many Germans, was dictated by the Allies. The 
terms presented to the German delegation at Versailles on 
May 7, 1919» demanded tliat Germany cede Alsace-Lorraine to 
France; Danzig was to become a free city; East Prussia 
would be separated from the Reich by the Polish Corridor; 
Upper-Silesia with its large industrial plant was given to 
a resurrected Poland, along with West Prussia and most of 
Posen; Northern Schleswig was given to Denmark and several 
small districts in western Germany to Belgium; union with 
Austria was strictly forbidden. In all, Germany was forced 
to cede 2?,l88 square miles of territory with more than 
7 million inhabitants, not counting overseas colonies which 
were totally confiscated and divided among the Allies.
In addition, the left bank of the Rhine was to be 
occupied by Allied troops for an indefinite period to in­
sure Germany's compliance with the other terms of the 
treaty, and the right bank was to be permanently demilita­
rized for a distance of thirty miles. The coal of the Saar 
region was to go to France for fifteen years, after which 
time a plebiscite would be held to decide which nationality 
its population desired. A final decision on the total
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amount of reparations to be taken from Germany was put off 
until 1921, but Germany was forced to make an initial pay­
ment of 20 billion marks in gold and produce immediately. 
All German financial holdings in fo,r.e>gn countries were 
confiscated by the Allies and the merchant marine was re­
duced by 90 per cent.
Further, the German Army was to be reduced to
100,000 officers and men, all volunteers; the General 
Staff was to be abolished, and most war material was to 
be destroyed or handed over to the Allies. The possession 
of submarines, tanks, or military aircraft was forbidden 
to Germany.
To justify these terms, the Allies inserted Arti­
cle 231 into the Versailles Treaty, which made the Germans 
admit that their own aggression was the sole cause of the 
war. U m e  mark ably, the "war guilt" clause in particular 
and the entire treaty in general were not popular in Ger­
many. The German political parties united in outspoken 
opposition to acceptance of the terms. Newspaper edito­
rials accused the formulators of the Versailles Treaty of 
deliberately ignoring the provisions of Wilson's fourteen 
points. However, the Allies were not interested in these 
protestations. An ultimatum was presented to the Germans 
in June to sign or be invaded. Scheidemann resigned rather 
than sign the treaty. His successor, Gustav Bauer, formed 
a coalition of the SPD and the Zentrum, but the DDP joined
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opposition to acceptance of the treaty. Nevertheless, 
the German delegation at Versailles signed under duress 
on June 23» There can be little doubt that the forced 
acceptance of a settlement so humiliating to the German 
people considerably weakened the new republic and 
strengthened its enemies in the Reich. The republic in 
general and the SPD in particular were never able to over­
come the stigma of their association with defeat and 
Versailles. The Dolchstoss legend that the German Army 
was never defeated in the field but was stabbed in the 
back by the "November Criminals," the socialists, and 
particularly the Jews, became a powerful weapon in the 
hands of Adolf Hitler and other enemies of the republic.
The elections of March, 1920, took a heavy toll 
among the parties that signed the treaty. The DNVP, the 
DVP, and the USPD all gained heavily at the expense of the 
SPD and the Center Party. In June the SPD went into oppo­
sition and a new coalition was formed by the DDP, the DVP, 
and the Center Party, led by Konstantin Fehrenbach of the 
Zentrum. But this political change was not the only reper­
cussion of the acceptance of the Versailles Treaty.
Concurrently with the March elections an attempt by 
right-wing elements to overthrow the republic was made, 
led by Wolfgang Kapp and General von Luettwiz of the 
Reichswehr. The putsch was poorly planned and organized
6o
and was quickly defeated by a general strike called by the 
trade union leaders who supported the government. The 
putsch demonstrated, however, that there were powerful 
forces on the right in Germany unalterably inimical to the 
republic, and that factions in the army supported these 
forces. Furthermore, the Kapp Putsch also demonstrated 
that the republic was unacceptable to the radical left as 
well. Shortly after the putsch was suppressed the Com­
munists in the Ruhr attempted an armed uprising of their
The army soon restored order in the area, but only 
with the aid of the para-military Freikorps. Once again 
the Weimar Republic was saved from enemies of the left by 
relying on its not only anti-bolshevik but also anti­
republican allies on the right.
The Treaty of Versailles also contributed heavily 
to Germany's mounting economic problems during the period
1919-1924. The value of the mark decreased steadily for 
the first four years following the war, due in part to 
reparation payments and to the increasingly unfavorable 
balance of payments which were both traceable directly to 
the Versailles Treaty, and in part to the general exhaus­
tion of the German economy by the war. The government also 
resorted to the practice of printing paper money in order 
to meet its expenses, which added to the inflation. By 
1922 it required more than seven thousand Reichsmarks to 
buy one United States dollar (1914 value, 4.2 Dm=$l).
6i
In January, 1923, the French and Belgians declared 
Germany delinquent in the payment of reparations and occu­
pied the industrial heartland of Germany, the Ruhr Valley. 
Another Z-DVP-DDP coalition government headed by Wilhelm 
Cuno declared a state of passive resistance to the occu­
pation and on Franco-Belgian attempts to run the mines and 
factories of the Ruhr. Cuno also ordered a ban on repara­
tions payments until the occupation troops were withdrawn. 
The French and Belgians retaliated with mass arrests and 
an economic blockade which cut off the entire Rhineland 
from the rest of Germany. Germans in the occupied areas, 
particularly the Communists, resorted to sabotage and 
guerrilla warfare.
The German government, again adopting the expedient 
of printing huge volumes of paper money to meet emergen­
cies, finally pushed the mark over the precipice. By 
July, one dollar was worth l60,000 marks ; by October, a 
dollar would buy 2^2,000,000 marks; and by November the 
figure was a preposterous 4,200,000,000. The German 
economy reverted to a barter system because the currency 
was literally not worth the paper on which it was printed. 
Food riots were common, persons on fixed incomes suffered 
greatly, and the savings of the middle classes were wiped 
out. Conversely, many businessmen and industrialists 
prospered greatly, and the heavily indebted farmers were 
able to pay off their mortgages for literally nothing.
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Once again, it seemed as though the republic would 
dissolve into civil war and anarchy. On the left the Com­
munists fomented revolution in Saxony and Thuringia and in 
Hamburg; on the right, extremist groups, especially in 
Bavaria, were advocating a march on Berlin. The Bavarian 
government not only tolerated these groups, but encouraged 
and subsidized them as well.
On August 26 a now coalition government was formed 
by Gustav Stresemann, composed of his own party (the DVP) , 
the Z, the DDP, and (initially) the SPD. Stresemann or­
dered an end to passive resistance and an immediate return 
to work in the Ruhr. He also resumed reparation deliver­
ies. Using Article 48 of the Constitution, he declared a 
state of emergency and quickly dealt with the Communists. 
Fortunately for Stresemann, Hitler overplayed his hand in 
Bavaria, so that the threat from the right dissolved before 
reaching Berlin.
The danger of civil war averted, Stresemann issued 
a new currency on November 20 which ended the inflation. 
Despite his success in dealing with the crises, Stresemann 
received a vote of no confidence on November 23 and re­
signed the chancellorship. He retained, however, the post 
of foreign minister, at which he performed admirably until 
his death in 1929.
Post-War Bavaria and the Birth of the Nazi Party
When the Great War broke out in Europe, Bavaria was 
one of the least industrialized regions of the Reich.
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Aside from a few machine and textile factories in the large 
cities of Munich, Nuremberg, and Augsburg, this southern­
most state of Germany had very little heavy industry. The 
Bavarian government enjoyed considerable autonomy within 
the federal system of the emi^ire and largely regulated its 
own affairs. All this was changed by the war. Urbaniza­
tion began during the war years, spurred by the establish­
ment of war industries in Bavaria. The number of workers 
in factories employing two hundred or more workers rose to 
almost a quarter of a million by the end of 1917» This 
belated industrialization was accompanied by all the ills 
associated with newly-industrialized societies.
The war also forced greater interference by the 
federal government into Bavarian affairs. Bavaria's do­
mestic agricultural produce was regulated by the government 
in Berlin by price ceilings on grain and dairy products. 
Later in the w a r , the Kaiser empowered a Central Economic 
Planning Board for the Reich to establish a maximum quota 
of foodstuffs that could be consumed locally and to con­
fiscate the surplus for the war effort.
Bavarians, ever jealous of their independence and 
mistrustful of Prussia and the federal government, did not 
take well to these social and economic changes. As early 
as 1916, Bethmann-Hollweg (the Imperial Chancellor) was 
alert to the "not unmenacing intensification of Bavarian 
This resentment became more and more
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common throughout Bavaria as the war dragged on. The 
Bavarian minister of war, von Hellingrath, noted in the 
middle of 191? that the initial enthusiasm with which the 
war was greeted in Bavaria had been replaced by pessimism 
throughout the countryside as well as in the cities.
In 1917 the issue of local governmental and social 
reform which had been shelved by the war was reopened. A
bill was introduced in December, 191?, which proposed 
sweeping r e f o r m . A l t h o u g h  the bill was defeated, it 
pointed out the inequities of the system and the existence 
of strongly antagonistic forces in Bavarian society.
In November, I918, there was to be a state election 
in Bavaria os a result of the long awaited constitutional 
reforms the previous month. This was prevented by the 
outbreak of revolution. When news of the mutiny at Kiel 
reached Munich, Kurt Eisner, an Independent Socialist, 
capitalized on the change of ministries necessitated by 
the reforms of the previous month to stage a putsch. That 
night, King Ludwig III fled the capital bringing the an­
cient Wit telsbach monarchy to an end. Eisner, as the 
elected leader of the soldiers' and workers' councils of 
Munich, proclaimed a Bavarian republic, whose government 
was to be made up almost exclusively of socialists.
Eisner promised that the ultimate form of the republic 
would be decided by a national assembly to be elected at 
some unspecified time in t?ie future. The elections were
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finally held in January, 1919, and were disastrous for 
Eisner's r e g i m e . E i s n e r  tried, unsuccessfully, to 
save his own position by reuniting with the SPD.
Eisner came under increasing criticism from both 
the right and the left. The Communists were trying to 
radicalize the revolution, using the slogan "den Raeten 
Gehoert das Macht" ("power belongs to the councils") which 
to the conservatives sounded very much like the Bolshevik 
slogans in Russia in 1917- The bourgeois parties were 
also demanding Eisner's resignation. On February 21, 1919, 
Eisner prepared to go to the Landtag and tender his resig­
nation. On the way, he was assassinated by Count Anton 
Arco-Valley, who was himself shot down by Eisner's body­
guards. An hour later the leader of the SPD was shot in 
the Landtag itself by a Communist. This initiated a period 
of bloody civil war in Bavaria which produced great blood­
shed and bitterness. Freikorps and Wehrverbaende prolif­
erated. Units of the regular army, aided by the Wehrver- 
baende captured the city from the Communists in May, after 
widespread atrocities on both sides.
After the Kapp Putsch, the BVP 
ment of Gustav von Kahr as Ministerpresident. A Bavarian 
particularist, Kahr provoked a number of conflicts with 
the federal government. He refused direct orders from the 
allied command to suppress the Wehrverbaende. In 1921, 
after yet another impasse between Kahr and the Reich
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government, the BVP withdrew their support and replaced 
him with Hugo von Lerchenfeld, who followed a more con­
ciliatory policy with the government in Berlin.
In 1923 I the conflict between Bavaria and the fed­
eral government came to a head. Eugen von Knilling, who 
had replaced Lerchenfeld, was forced by the public outcry 
against Stresemann's Ruhr policy to appoint von Kahr as 
Bavarian state commissioner with dictatorial powers.
The Reich government, suspicious of Kahr, declared a state 
of emergency. Kahr enlisted the aid of Bavarian Reichswehr 
commander, General von Lossow. The confrontation with 
Berlin ended with Hitler's Beer Hall Putsch in November.
It was against this backdrop that the NSDAP was born 
and initially flourished. In a series of meetings held at 
a popular Munich beer hall from January 2  to January 5»
1919, Anton Droxler and a group of approximately twenty- 
five other men founded the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei (DAP).’*' 
The ideological ancestors of the fledgling party were 
legion, and have been adequately explored in other works.^ 
The immediate precursor of the DAP, however, deserves a 
brief examination.
Drexler and his fellow "patriots" from the first 
had close connections with a peculiar organization in 
Munich called the Thule Society. There is even some evi­
dence to suggest that this elitist group conceived and 
subsidized the D A P , hoping to create through it a mass- 
based political movement which the Thule Society itself
14
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could never become. From the Thule Society the DAP inher­
ited several of the ideological planks which distinguished 
the later NSDAP until its destruction in 19^5• The Thule 
Society owned a newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter which 
later became the main propaganda organ of the Nazi party. 
Through the medium of the Beobachter, the Thule Society 
expressed the same rabid anti-Semitism and super-nationalism 
that were so important in later Nazi propaganda appeals.
The Thule Society was also violently anti-Marxist and ex­
hibited the same mystical fascination for German antiqui­
ties and pseudo-scientific racial theories so integral a 
part of the National Socialist Weltanschauung.
To this ideological platform Drexler and some of 
his collaborators added a muddled brand of vaguely defined 
socialism, an antipathy toward capitalism and bourgeois 
society, and an amazing collection of esoteric economic 
and financial theories. It remained for Adolf Hitler to 
add the finishing touches to what may be loosely defined 
as the National Socialist "ideology, " and to convei’t the 
DAP, which was little more than a debating society and 
social club when he found it, into an effective political 
organization.
The Sociography of the Pre-Hitler DAP
The men who founded the DAP along with Drexler have 
generally been dismissed as his fellow "workers" and/or
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fifty-four persons who joined the NSDAP before Hitler, 
fifty-three are listed in the bound volume of membership 
lists at the Berlin Documents Center described earlier. 
The early members of the party were relatively young, 
as shown in Table 1.
TABLE 1
THE AGES OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE DAP BEFORE HITLER
Age No. in % in No. in % in
Group Party Party Reich Reich
Under 20 6 11.1 3,897,555 9.0
18 33.3 1 1 ,438,013 26.6
30-39 12 22.2 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 6 11.1 7 ,754,071 17.9
30-39 3 5.6 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 8 16.7 - -
53 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
To characterize the pre-Hitler DAP as a party of 
youth would be inaccurate. Its members were somewhat 
younger than the average in German society, as shown in 
Table 1, but not overwhelmingly so. Agewise, the early 
party can best be described as fairly representative of 
the Reich population, tending toward youth.
The occupations of the first party members, as 
listed in Table 2, are somewhat surprising considering 
previous characterizations.^^ To call the pre-Hitler DA] 
a party of "soldiers and workers" is clearly a
TABLE 2
THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE DAP BEFORE HITLER
Occupational
Categories
N o . in 
Party
% in % in
Unskilled Laborers 2 3.8 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 2 3.8 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers I 1.9 2,499,945 8.3
5 9.5 1 4 ,326,738 47.4
Artisans 10 18.9 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 10 18.9 5 ,274,232 17.4
Foremen Included under white collar
Managers 2 3.8 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 2 3.8 No figures available
Self-Employed 2 3.8 No figures available
School Teachers I 1.9 308,741 1.0
Totals: 27 51.1 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
F armers _ 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners - - Included with farmers
- - 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000 0.3
Professional 
Professors 
Industrialists/ 
Manufacturers 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
7.5
1.9
1.9
1.9
237,850 0.7
No figures available
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722
Clergy 
Unemployed 
Students 
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
4
3
6
13
53
7.5
5.6 
11.2 
24.3
100.0
No figures available
3.7
No figures available
1 5,650,000
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
3 0,259,310
0-5
100.0
NOTE: Occupational percentages for the Reich are computed without the
"housewives" category. The percentages for "unemployed" are taken from 
Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370-371, and are based on the percentage 
of trade union members receiving benefits. It is likely the unemployed 
among non-trade union members was higher than the figure given. The 
percentage of unemployed is not computed into the total Reich percentage.
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highly underrepresented vis-a-vis their strength in German 
society as a whole. The most overrepresented groups, when 
compared to their relative strength in the Reich, is the 
professional classification and persons from the arts. As 
is obvious from Table 2, the lower-middle class was present 
in strength in the party from its inception, although the 
membership was not overwhelmingly drawn from this stratum 
of society. This sample is also notable for the absence 
of any farmers on the list, and for the lack of anyone 
calling themselves "unemployed." It can be deduced from 
the absence of farmers that the party was still confined 
to the city of Munich before Hitler joined and had not yet 
begun to spread to the surrounding countryside. From the 
absence of unemployed persons, it may be concluded that 
the DAP was not a lefuge for the derelicts of Munich 
society as has sometimes been argued.
The Social Composition of the DAP 
at the End of 1919
These were the "twenty to twenty-five people, chiefly 
from among the lower walks of life" found by the young army 
observer, Adolf Hitler, when he attended a DAP meeting in 
a Munich beer hall during the late summer of 1919.^^ In 
September, after a great deal of soul-searching. Hitler 
decided to join the party. The DAP leadership did not 
immediately exploit Hitler's considerable oratorical tal­
ents and his early political activities were limited.
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At the end of 1919 the DAP vas still one of a mul­
titude of obscure political groups of only 213 members. 
Biographical data on 202 of these persons were available 
for this study, taken from Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer.
The age distribution of the party membership at the begin­
ning of 1920 did not differ markedly from the pre-Hitler 
party, as seen in Table 3 .
TABLE 3
THE AGE STRUCTURE OF THE DAP MEMBERSHIP 
AT THE END OF 1919
Age N o . in % in % in
Group Party Party Reich
Under 20 23 11.4 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 59 29.2 11,458,015 26 .6
30-39 46 22.8 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 21 10.4 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 12 5.9 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 5 2.5 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 36 17.4 - -
Totals ; 202 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
The DAP membership at the end of 1919 contained a
number of young people , but it could hardly be described
as a youth movement. Although the movement contained more 
people from the under-forty age groups than did German 
society, all age categories were represented.
The occupational origins of the DAP members changed 
very little after the admission of Hitler (see Table 4),
TABLE 4
THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DAP AT THE END OF 1919
Occupational No. in % in N o . in % in
Categories Party Party Reich Reich
Unskilled Laborers 10 5.0 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 10 5-0 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 6 2.9 2,499,945 8.3
Totals; 26 12.9 14,326,738 47.4
Artisans 34 l6.8 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 41 20.3 5,274,232 17.4
Foremen Included under white collar
Managers 6 2-9 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 4 2.0 No figures available
Self-Employed 4 2.0 No figures available
School Teachers 3 1-5 308,741 1.0
92 45.5 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers . 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners - - Included with farmers
- - 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 14 6.9 104,000 0.3
Military (officers) 4 2.0 No figures available
18 8.9 104,000 0.3
Professional 13 6.4 237,850 0.7
Professors 3 1.5 No figures available
Capitalists 3 1.5 No figures available
Financiers No figures available
Private Incomes 3 1.5 2 ,944,872 9.2
Totals: 22 10.9 3 ,182,722 9.9
Clergy _ No figures available
Unemployed - 3 .7*
Students 12 5.9 No figures available
Housewives 15 ,650,000*
8 4.0 134,236 0.5
Retired No figures available
No Entry 24 11.9 -
Totals: 44 21.8 134,236 0.5
All Categories: 202 100.0 30 ,258,310 100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average
for the year compiled from Angell, Recovery of Germany, 370, based on the
number of union members unemployed, It is likely that the figure for non-
union workers was higher.
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indicating that the party continued to appeal, through its 
modest propaganda efforts, to the same sorts of people.
Workers were not as numerous in the party as in 
German society. The professions, on the other hand, were 
greatly overrepresented in the movement compared to their 
strength in the Reich. The percentage of white collar 
workers entering the DAP increased considerably during the 
period from September, 1919 to January 1, 1920, while ar­
tisans declined somewhat. Overall, the membership of the 
DAP at the beginning of 1920 exhibited a decidedly middle- 
class character, with the upper-middle class present in 
much greater relative strength than their numbers in German 
society. Although some military persons came into the 
party, the DAP was in no danger of being submerged under 
a deluge of soldiers. The charge that Hitler brought a 
number of soldiers into the movement can be supported by 
the figures in Table 4 , but we may wonder if the persons 
who listed military occupations were still in the army, or 
whether perhaps they had already been discharged and had 
not yet found civilian occupations.
That the DAP was still confined to Munich, and had 
not yet spread into rural areas is shown by the absence of 
farmers in the membership. Only eighteen (8.9 per cent) 
of the pre-1920 members were women. Overall, there was 
nothing particularly remarkable about the social origins 
of DAP members before 1920. The party seemed to attract 
representatives from all segments of Munich society.
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1920--The NSDAP in Transition 
The year 1920 was a crisis year for the German 
republic and a year of considerable accomplishment for the 
DAP. In March, it added the words "National Socialist" to 
its name, becoming the NSDAP or N a z i s . I t  also found a 
new oratorical star to preach the party gospel. At the 
first "mass" meeting of the party in February, 1920, Hitler, 
though not the featured speaker, upstaged the principal 
orator, speaking on the inequities of Versailles. At the 
same meeting. Hitler proclaimed the new name of the party 
and announced its platform in the form of twenty-five 
"points," which attempted to spell out the vaguely formu­
lated ideology of National Socialism.
The speeches of party leaders throughout the year 
emphasized the importance of the role of the "workers" and 
the young people in the coming "rebirth" of G e r m a n y . A s  
the year progressed. Hitler waxed stronger and stronger in 
influence within the movement and his reputation as a 
speaker grew in all parts of southern Germany. In Decem­
ber, the NSDAP acquired the Voelkischer Beobachter. Appar­
ently purchased with secret army funds, the newspaper 
proved invaluable in providing a platform for Hitler and 
a medium for the dissemination of Nazi propaganda,
While the NSDAP prospered in 1920, the republic 
tottered. Sporadic Communist uprisings continued in sev­
eral parts of Germany even though the worst of the Red
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storm had been w e a t h e r e d . I n  March, the Republic faced 
a new threat in the form of a right-wing putsch supported 
by elements of the army. When Ebert, now president of the 
Reich, asked the commander of the Truppenamt, General von 
Seeckt, whether or not the army would support the Republic 
in the face of this threat, he received an evasive answer. 
In fact it was the socialist trade unions that rallied to 
Ebert's aid and saved the Republic by calling a general
The economic situation in Germany had not improved 
noticeably over 1919*^^ In the elections held in June, the 
parties who supported the Republic lost their majority in 
the Reichstag, never to regain it.^^ In addition, the 
first collections were made of the onerous reparations pay­
ments from Germany which further strained her economy. All 
of these factors could not help but aid an ably led, radi­
cal political movement which promised to alleviate the des­
perate conditions in which many Germans found themselves.
At the same time, the NSDAP offered everyone a scapegoat 
to blame for all their troubles: the Jew.
The NSDAP greatly increased in strength to 2,138 
total members by December 31, 1920--a net gain of 1,935 
m e m b e r s . Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer contains the records 
of 1,765 of these new Nazis, providing a reasonably reli­
able sample for ascertaining the sociography of the group.
The age distribution in the incoming membership is 
not markedly different than the distribution in German
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society, except in the over-fifty categories as shown in 
Table 5 .
THE AGE DISTRIBUTION 
ENTERING THE NSDAP
OF PERSONS 
IN 1920
No. of % of
New N o . in % in
Group Members Members Reich Reich
Under 20 143 8.2 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 545 30.9 1 1 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 313 17.7 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 282 16.0 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 142 8.1 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 36 2.0 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 304 17.1 - -
Totals : 1,765 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
Although the membership of the NSDAP at the end of 
1920 was somewhat younger than the average in the Reich, 
it was still not a youth movement. A substantial number 
of the persons joining the movement in 1920 were over forty 
years of age. There was nothing remarkable about the age 
structure of the party membership in 1920.
The number of women among the new recruits totaled 
212 or 12 per cent of the total, only one-third of whom 
listed their occupations as "housewife.” This represents 
a net gain of 4 per cent in new female members over the 
previous year, which may or may not be attributable to 
Hitler, who was now the party's chief speaker and was
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supposedly attractive to w o m e n . W h a t e v e r  the case, this 
was the highest proportion of women among new members for 
any year before 1930.
As seen in Table 6, several striking changes occurred 
in the occupational origins of the persons entering the 
NSDAP in 1920. The proportion of workers among incoming 
members in 1920 increased substantially over the previous 
year. Several factors may be considered instrumental in 
this increase, the most important being Hitler's success 
as a political speaker and the apparent left-wing program 
of the party as promulgated in the twenty-five points in 
F ebruary. Hitler emphasized the socialistic planks in 
the party platform in his speeches during 1920,^^ and it is 
probable that the new Nazi recruits from the working class 
considered the party to be a part of the political left, 
and not a reactionary splinter group of the radical right, 
as it is often characterized today. With the apparent de­
mise of the KPD in G e r m a n y , t h e  more militant workers 
were left without a political home, without a party which 
offered action and immediate redress of their grievances.
The Nazis, according to their own propaganda, filled this
The percentage of military personnel coming into the 
NSDiVP decreased significantly in 1920, dispelling the con­
tentions of several historians that the party during this 
early period drew heavily from the army for its membership.
TABLE 6
OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1920
N o . of % of
Occupational New % in
Categories Members Members Reich Reich
Unskilled Laborers 
Skilled Laborers 
Agricultural Laborers
^ 7 8
361
i l l
0.5
10,679,848
1.146.945
2 .499.945 
1 4 ,326,738
35.3
3.8
8.3
47.4
Artisans 
White Collar 
Foremen 
Managers 
Civil Servants 
Self-Employed 
School Teachers
286
326
21
20
129
43
19
844
16.2
18.5
1.2
1.1
7.3
2.4 
1.1
47.8
4,488,428
5 ,274,232
14.8
17.4
Included under white collar
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers
Large Landowners
1.2
0.2
2 ,139,878 7.1
Included with farmers
2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
0.6
1.3
104,000 0.3
No figures available
Professional 
Professors 
Industrialists/ 
Manufacturers 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
88
15
3
9
5.0 327,850 0.7
0.6 No figures available
0.8 No figures available
0.2 No figures available
0.5 2 ,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9.0
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
1
7
134
71
19
30
116
378
1,765
0.1
0.4
7.6
4.0
1.1
1.7 
6.5
21.4
100.0
No figures available
3 .8*
No figures available
1 5 ,650,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
3 0 ,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on 
the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for 
non-union workers was higher.
Persons from the professions joining Hitler's movement also 
decreased somewhat percentagewise in 1920, but were still 
present among the new members in numbers disproportionately 
higher than their strength in the Reich. Only a few farm­
ers came into the party in 1920, but their presence is 
significant. It shows that the Nazis had begun to spread 
to the countryside and were no longer confined to Munich. 
Even a very few Gutesbesitzer (gentlemen farmers/large 
landowners) joined the NSDAP in 1920.
The percentage of business owners, industrialists 
and financiers coming into the party appears low in 1920, 
but those groups could not have made up any appreciable 
proportion of German society. We may wonder why these 
occupational groups would find their way into a party 
which represented itself as "socialist." A glance at the 
twenty-five points will show that the Nazi version of so­
cialism was very unlike that of the Marxists parties, and 
that Hitler's propaganda appeals, both in his speeches and 
in the party newspaper, offered something for everyone, 
and made some special appeals to German businessmen.
Although their total percentage among new entrants 
into the NSDAP declined somewhat in 1920, white collar 
workers still represented the largest single classifica­
tion in the party. Hitler appealed to this group not as 
members of the middle class, but as workers--"Hand u.
Kopfarbeiter" (workers of the hand and head)--integral and
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important members of a "socialist" Volks.cçemeinschaft of 
all G e r m a n s . T h e  anti-Marxist planks in the Nazi plat­
form also appealed strongly bo this group, as it did to 
the artisans, the second largest occupational group among
to be appreciably more numerous than in German society.
The NSDAP drew its new members in 1920 from all 
segments of German society. The working classes were 
underrepresented in the party relative to their strength 
in the Reich, but nevertheless were present in great 
enough strength to lend credence to Hitler's claim that 
the National Socialist movement was the representative of 
all classes in the Reich. The NSDAP in 1920 had a dis­
tinctly middle-class charactei-, with strong contingents 
from both the old and new middle class, and a dispropor­
tionately high number of persons from the upper ranks of 
the bourgeoisie.^^ In addition, the party had spread out­
side the confines of Munich and was beginning to attract 
support in the countryside.^^
Judging strictly from the persons who joined the 
NSDAP in 1920 and the propaganda spread by Hitler, the 
Nazis were a popular movement attempting--and succeeding-- 
to bridge the gulf between the proletariat and the middle 
class, and in fact in drawing representatives from all 
segments of German society into a single movement intent 
on creating a German "national" socialism. The crisis
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atmosphere in Germany and the continued "red menace" were 
instrumental in the growth of Hitler and the Nazis, as 
was the unstable political situation in the Reich and the 
resentment provoked in German society by the Versailles 
Treaty. National Socialism thrived on controversy and 
crisis, and as a party of action, was increasingly suc­
cessful in the turbulent early years of the Weimar Republic.
1921--Hitier Takes Over
The year 1921 witnessed little alleviation in the 
economic difficulties Germany had been experiencing since 
the end of the war. Real wages did not approach the pre­
war level, and there were still many shortages in market 
goods. The inflationary spiral (which had actually begun 
during the war) continued to rise slowly, gradually drain­
ing away the purchasing power of German workers and the 
German lower-middle class.
There was still considerable concern among the 
German bourgeoisie in 1921 about a Communist uprising. 
Wehrverbaendc all around the Reich--but particularly in 
Bavaria--were armed and ready to resist a Red revolution.
The Republic remained unpopular with a great many Germans; 
strong elements from both extremes of the political spec­
trum plotted its overthrow. Ebert's government, hobbled 
by Allied restrictions imposed through the Treaty of Ver­
sailles on the one hand and by the inability of the minor­
ity cabinets of the Weimar Republic to effect a consistent
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policy, proved by and large unable to deal with the multi­
tude of problems which beset the Reich in 1921. The crisis 
atmosphere of 1920 did not subside. German society remained 
fertile ground for recruitment for a party such as Hitler's 
which promised to something, promised action.
For the NSDAP, 1921 was a decisive year. Hitler, 
through a power play within the party, managed to dislodge 
the founders of the NSDAP from positions of leadership, 
establishing himself as leader (Fuehrer) of the National 
Socialist Movement. On July 11, 1921, Hitler announced 
his resignation from the party, at the same time listing 
his conditions for rejoining, which included making him 
the absolute ruler of policy and tactics within the party.
It has previously been thought that Hitler's resignation 
was a sham and that he never left the party. This appar­
ently is not the case. There was a lag of almost t%vo weeks 
between the date on which Hitler left the party (July 11) 
and the date on which he rejoined (July 24). During this 
two-week period the "old guard" in the party perhaps de­
cided that Hitler was indispensible to the continued prog­
ress of the movement, or else were forced aside by Hitler's 
supporters. In any event. Hitler rejoined the party on 
July 24 as member number 368O , and from that time on was 
the dictatorial leader of the Nazi party.
The last entry in Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer is from 
October, 1921. A few lists in the Hauptarchiv collection
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date from the period October, 1921 to January, 1922, and 
are included in this sample, but they almost certainly are 
not complete. The NSDAP numbered approximately 4,100 mem­
bers at the end of 1921, meaning that about 1,950 new mem­
bers entered the party during that year. Of these, 
biographical data on only 1,021 were available for inves­
tigation. The sample for 1921 lacks the accuracy of those 
samples for 1919 and 1920, and must be used with greater 
caution.'’^
The persons who joined the Nazi party in 1921 (9.8 
per cent of whom were women) were younger than in previous 
years, as noted in Table 7. An absolute majority of the
TABLE 7
THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1921
N o . of % of
Age New % in
Group Members Members Reich Reich
Under 20 160 15.3 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 412 40.5 11 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 170 16.7 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 126 12.4 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 49 4.8 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 12 1.2 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 92 9.1 - -
Totals : 1,021 100.0 43 ,375,965 100.0
new members in 1921 were under thirty years of age. Over
70 per cent were under forty. It is not difficult to see
why someone viewing only the new recruits in 1921 might
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characterize the Nazi movement as a rebellion of dis­
gruntled German youth. It is probable that these young 
people were the most active in the street demonstrations 
that were staged more and more frequently by the Nazis, 
and in the newly formed Sturmabteilung (SA, the "storm 
troopers" or military auxiliary of the party). The young 
people in the party were probably more visible than the 
older people, but the NSDAP was far from being anything 
so simple as a youth movement, as attested by the number 
of older members already in the party and the still appre­
ciable number of older persons joining it in 1921. The 
program of the NSDAP as enunciated by Hitler appealed to 
a broad range of the societal spectrum in Germany, and the 
Nazi emphasis on action not surprisingly was attractive to 
impatient youth.
The occupational structure of the party continued 
to shift toward the working classes, as shown in Table 8. 
Workers of all classifications made up over one-fourth of 
the total new membership in 1921. Even with this increase 
in members from the proletariat, workers were still greatly 
underrepresented in the party relative to their strength in 
German society as a whole. Nevertheless, the presence of 
such a large contingent from the working-class categories 
is inconsistent with previous views of the social composi­
tion of the NSDAP. Nazi propaganda as expounded by Hitler 
in speeches and by the columns of the Voelkischer Beobachter
TABLE 8
OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1921
No. of % of
Occupational % in
Categories Members Members Reich
Unskilled Laborers 
Skilled Laborers 
Agricultural Laborers
217
47
12
21.2
4.6
26.9
10,679,848
1.146.945
2.499.945
14,326,738
35.3 
3.8 
8.3
47.4
Artisans 
White Collar 
Foremen 
Managers 
Civil Servants 
Self-Employed 
School Teachers
171
145
8
12
72
25
5
438
16.7
14.2
0.8
1.2
0.5
43.0
4,488,428
5,274,232
14.8
17.4
Included under white collar
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers
Large Landowners
0.7 2 ,139,878 7.1
0.2 Included under farmers
2 ,139,878
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
0.3
0.6
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000 0.3
Professional 
Professors 
Industrialists/ 
Manufacturers 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
48
4
6
3
4
65
4.7
0.4
0.6
0.3
0.4
6.4
237,850 0.7
No figures available
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9-9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Arts
Retired
No Entry
All Categories:
2
102
25
10
15
70
224
1,021
0.2
10.0
2.4 
1.0
1.5 
6.9
22.0
100.0
No figures available
2 .8*
No figures available
1 5 ,650,000*
134,236
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on 
the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for 
non-union workers was higher.
continued to emphasize the socialist aspects of the Nazi 
p r o g r a m . D e s p i t e  previous arguments, it is obvious from 
these figures that Nazism was not just a movement of the 
lower-middle class, at least not in 1921
Persons listing the military as their occupations 
continued to decline percentagewise among new Nazis in 
1921, as did representatives from the professions and 
teachers. However, professional people continued to be 
much more numerous in the NSDAP membership than in German 
society. Farmers also declined somewhat proportionately 
in 1921 compared to the figures for 1920,"^  ^ while the per­
centage of business owners and industrialists increased. 
Civil servants continued to constitute a significant por­
tion of converts to National Socialism.
The largest decline percentagewise in an occupa­
tional classification among new members in 1921 came in 
the white collar occupations. However, white collar 
workers and artisans (who increased slightly percentage­
wise among new members in 1921) continued to represent 
over 30 per cent of the total recruits, considerably higher 
than their strength in German society. Not too surprisingly 
considering the youth of the new members, the proportion of 
persons listing their occupations as "student" in 1921, 
increased considerably.
All segments of German society were represented in 
the membership of the Nazi party at the end of 1921. The
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party retained a distinctly middle-class character, but 
not overwhelmingly so. The rural districts of Germany 
were still greatly underrepresented in the party relative 
to their strength in German society, judging from the low 
number of farmers coming into the party in 1921. Hitler 
continued to enjoy his greatest popularity in urban areas. 
The accent within the movement was very definitely on 
youth, and a majority of the new recruits in 1921 were 
under thirty. However, the number of new members in the 
older age brackets precludes the definition of the party 
as just a youth movement. Despite the usual emphasis on 
lower-class elements, the early party continued to ex­
hibit an attraction for membei's of the professions, busi­
nessmen, industrialists, and financiers. Only a very 
small percentage of the new members in 1921 stated that 
they weie unemployed.
1922--The Embourgeoisment of the NSDAP 
Another crisis year came in 1922 for the Weimar Re­
public. The inflationary spiral rose rapidly, encouraged 
by unwise fiscal policies of the German government. Real 
wages tumbled to new lows ; the minority governments 
seemed incapable of accomplishing anything positive. A 
number of political groups continued to agitate openly 
against the Republic, blaming the government, the Commu­
nists, and especially the Jews for Germany's woes. Among 
the most vocal of these critics was the growing NSDAP.
92
The National Socialist movement prospered greatly 
in 1922, both in increased membership and in securing 
financial support from very conservative circles in German 
society. It was during this year that Hitler acquired the 
title "king of Munich," and through his friend "Putzi" 
Hanfstaengl was introduced to high society in the Bavarian 
capital. He especially took the fancy of two wealthy la­
dies, Frauen Bechstein and Bruckmann, who made substantial 
contributions to the struggling party which up until this 
time had operated on a shoestring. In addition, Hitler 
was introduced to and spoke at the prestigious National 
Club in Berlin. Although no financial records of the early 
party have survived, there has been considerable specula­
tion that contributions flowed into the party coffers (and 
into Hitler's pockets) from the wealthy members of the 
National Club.
Nazi propaganda in 1922 as expressed in the columns 
of the Voelkischer Beobachter and in Hitler's speeches con­
tinued to appeal to all sectors of society to join or sup­
port the NSDAP. In particular. Hitler tried to attract 
workers and ex-soldiers and especially the youth of Ger­
many, while at the same time he attempted to assure Ger­
mans about Nazi religious policy and bewailed the "Destruc­
tion of the Middle Class.
The number of new members coming into the Nazi party 
in 1922 can only be estimated. The highest party number on
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the membership lists in the Hanptarchiv collection for 
1922 is 7 ,768, for September. This is a net gain of about
3,000 members for the first nine months of the year, or 
slightly more than 300 per month. Extrapolating on to the 
end of the year, we may estimate that approximately 31900 
persons became Nazis during the year, making the total 
strength of the party around 8,100 at the beginning of 
1923.^^ The Hauptarchiv collection contains records for 
only 369 of these 1922 entrants, or less than one-tenth of 
the total. Obviously, this is a totally unsatisfactory 
sample on which to base firm conclusions, and the results 
of the tabulations for the year must be suspect and used 
with great caution.
The percentage of women among new entrants into the 
NSDAP in 1922 continued to decline relative to the first 
three years of the party. Only 8.7 per cent of the re­
cruits were female. The trend toward younger and younger 
members which had been so evident in the party since its 
inception also continued, although the percentage of new 
Nazis under twenty declined somewhat from 1921 as seen in 
Table 9 .
Persons under thirty entering the party in 1922 con­
tinued to make up an absolute majority of new members.
Over three-fourths of the recruits were under forty years 
of age. If the 3^9 persons in this sample are representa­
tive of all persons entering the party in 1922, the NSDAP 
was indeed becoming a party of youth.
THE AGES OF PERSONS
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TABLE 9 
ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1922
No . of 
New 
Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 20 52 14.1 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 162 43.9 11,458,015 26.6
30-39 64 17.3 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 39 10.6 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 16 4.3 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 8 2.2 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 28 7.6 - -
Totals: 369 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
As striking as the youth trend in the new membership 
was in 1922, the most dramatic changes in the social struc­
ture of the recruits occurred in their occupational origins 
(see Table 10). The first three years of the NSDAP was 
marked by more and more new members from the working 
classes and a corresponding decline in the percentage of 
new members from the middle classes, particularly the 
white collar workers. The abrupt reversal of this trend 
in 1922 revealed by the statistics in Table 10 is startling. 
The working class, which had furnished over one-fourth of 
the new members in 1921, furnished less than one-tenth in 
1922. At the same time there was a huge increase in new 
Nazis from the middle classes, particularly from what in 
this study is considered the lower-middle class.
Several factors may have influenced this sudden 
reversal of the trends of the previous years of the party's
TABLE 10
THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1922
N o . of % of
Occupational New No. in % in
Categories Members Members Reich Reich
Unskilled Laborers 
Skilled Laborers 
Agricultural Laborers
26
4
7.0
1.1 
0.3
10,679,848
1.146.945
2.499.945
14,326,738
35.3
3.8
8.3
47.4
Artisans 
White Collar 
Foremen 
Managers 
Civil Servants 
Self-Employed 
School Teachers
92
101
2
6
13
19
3
236
24.9
27.4
0.6
1.6
3.5
5.1
1.0
64.1
4,488,428
5,274,232
14.8
17.4
Included under white collar 
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers
Large Landowners
1.9
0.3
2 ,139,878 7.1
Included under farmers
2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
0-3
0.3
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Industrialists/ 
Manufacturers 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
18
1.9 
0.3
4.9
237,850 0.7
No figures available
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9-9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
16
7
7
6
38
74
369
4.3
1.9
1.9 
1.6
10.3
20.0
100.0
No figures available
1.4*
No figures available
1 5 ,6 5 0 ,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the year compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 370, based on 
the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure for 
non-union workers was higher.
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existence. The rapidly increasing inflationary spiral 
fell much harder on the middle classes than on the workers. 
The life savings of the Angestellte and the artisans were 
being steadily eroded away. These two groups had no po­
litical party through which to seek redress other than the 
Nazis. The same is true of the self-employed who more than 
doubled in percentage among the ne%y members in 1922. In 
addition, Germany approached full employment during the 
inflationary period 1922-1923 for the only time during the 
Weimar p e r i o d . W i t h  full work days, laborers may have 
been less inclined toward an activistic, radical political 
party which made great demands on their time and energy.
The new recruits coming into the National Socialist 
movement in 1922 had a pronounced lower-middle class char­
acter. The percentage of workers coming into the party 
declined markedly. The NSDAP had still apparently failed 
to make any significant gains in the rural areas of Germany 
and retained its predominantly urban make-up. The new mem­
bers in 1922 still came from all segments of German soci­
ety, but the lower-middle class as represented by small 
businessmen, white collar workers, and artisans in partic­
ular, clearly became the strongest pillar of new Nazi 
support.
1923--Growth and Disaster for the NSDAP
The year 1923 began disastrously for the Weimar R e ­
public when French and Belgian forces occupied the
industrial Ruhr region of Germany because of the failure 
of the Germans to meet reparations payments on time.
France and Belgium intended to mine the coal and iron 
fields of the Ruhr for their own benefit, using German 
labor, but the German government (a shaky coalition of the 
Center party, the DDP, and the DVP led by Wilhelm Cuno) 
declared a policy of passive resistance. It not only sub­
sidized the mine owners for their losses but also paid the 
miners for not working.
To raise the money for these subsidies, the govern­
ment adopted the simple expedient of printing huge quanti­
ties of paper money. This had the not too surprising 
effect of exacerbating the already disastrous inflation 
to a fantastic degree. By August 1, 1923, 1.1 million 
marks were required to purchase one United States dollar. 
By October a dollar cost 6 billion marks and by November 
the figure was an unbelievable 530 billion Reichsmarks to 
the dollar.
A state of undeclared war existed in the Rhineland 
and the Ruhr. Real wages plunged to a twentieth century 
low, while the economy was practically reduced to a barter 
system by the i n f l a t i o n . T h e r e  were food riots in sev­
eral parts of the Reich. Persons on pensions and fixed 
incomes suffered greatly, while the middle classes were 
virtually wiped out financially.
The Weimar government seemed totally incapable of 
dealing with the situation, and it appeared likely that
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the Weimar Republic was in its death throes. There was a 
renewed threat of Communist revolution, especially in 
Saxony and Thuringia. On the right, the various Wehrver- 
baende and Voelkisch groups in Bavaria and elsewhere were 
preparing for a coup. The situation seemed to require 
only that a leader appear on the right, capable of welding 
the various nationalist factions into one cohesive organi­
zation, and the Republic would topple. Hitler attempted 
to fill this role. After forming an alliance with General 
Ludendorff and other Voelkisch leaders, he attempted to 
seize control of the Bavarian government, after tlie suc­
cessful completion of which he intended to lead a march 
on Berlin, as Mussolini had seized power in Italy the pre­
vious year by a march on Rome.^ ^
The putsch was poorly planned and ineptly executed.
It ended in a hail of bullets which sent Hitler into head­
long flight. He was subsequently captured and tried for 
treason. Hitler gained a national reputation by the pub­
licity given his sensational trial by the German press.
He spent eleven months in a relatively comfortable "prison,” 
Landsberg Fortress, dictating Mein Kampf to his secretary 
Rudolf Hess. Most accounts of the Nazi party during the 
period of Hitler's imprisonment imply that the party was 
in a state of total disarray, leaderless, and split into 
antagonistic factions.
The Hauptarchiv collection has several party member­
ship lists containing biographical information on altogether
4,78? persons who joined the Nazi movement in 1923 
Since this is apparently only 10 per cent of the total
not a scientifically derived sample, the resulting sta­
tistics should be viewed as an indicator of the social 
composition of new members in 1923, not as definitive
As shown in Table 11, the great majority of Nazi 
recruits in 1923 were young people. Almost one-fourth of
TABLE 11
THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1923
Age
Group Members
% of 
Members
% in 
Reich
Under 20 1,135 23.7 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 2,155 45.0 1 1 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 839 17.5 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 423 8.8 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 107 2.3 6 ,561,314 14.9
60 & Over 90 1.9 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 38 0.8 -
Totals: 4,787 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
the new members were teenagers, and 68 per cent were not 
yet thirty. Over 86 per cent were under forty. This was 
due in part to the increasing emphasis in Nazi propaganda 
on the importance of young people in the movement and on 
efforts by the Nazis to create National Socialist youth
characterize the National Socialist Movement as a rebellion 
of German youth based on the new members of 1923*^^
Occupationally, as seen in Table 12, the converts of 
1923 differed considerably from those who joined Hitler's 
party the previous year. As in the first three years of 
the party, workers made up a significant part of the new 
membership. This suggests that the small sample used in 
Table 10 for 1922 may well be unrepresentative of persons 
joining the party in that year. The new members in 1923 
had, however, a distinctly middle-class character. Arti­
sans and white collar workers, considered in this investi­
gation as part of the lower-middle class, made up over 52 
per cent of the total r e c r u i t s . F o r  the first time, 
farmers were virtually as numerous in the NSDAP as in the 
Reich, indicating the Nazis were at last beginning to gain 
support in the rural areas of G e r m a n y . S u r p r i s i n g l y ,  
considering the youth of the new members, the number of 
persons listing their occupations as students declined in 
1923, indicating that most of the young people corning into 
the party were employed.
I919-I923--Summary 
The cumulative statistics for the social composition 
of the NSDAP for all the years I9I9 to 1923 present a pic­
ture considerably different than most previous works on the 
subject have suggested, as indicated by Table 13* That the 
membership of the Nazi party was not the exclusive domain
THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1923
Occupational
Categories Members
% of 
Members Reich
% in
Unskilled Laborers 809 16.9 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 119 2.5 1,146,945 3-8
Agricultural Laborers 69 1.4 2 ,499,945 8-3
Totals: 997 20.8 1 4 ,326,738 47-4
Artisans 1,182 24.7 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 1,322 27.6 5 ,274,232 17-4
Foremen 9 0.2 Included under white collar
Managers 7 0.1 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 54 1.1 No figures available
Self-Employed 125 2.6 No figures available
School Teachers 40 0.8 308,741 1.0
Totals: 2,759 57-1 1 0 ,321,736 34,3
Farmers 331 6.9 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 5 0.1 Included with farmers
Totals ; 336 7.0 2 ,139,878 7-1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
16
36
0.3
0.7
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
51
20
18
2.9
0.1
1.1
0.5
0.4
5.0
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
0
0
149
113
37
69
67
435
4,787
0.0
0.0
3.1
2.4 
0.8
1.4
1.4
9.1 
100.0
No figures available 
No figures available* 
No figures available
1 5 ,6 5 0 ,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
3 0 ,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. There are no reliable estimates of the 
percentage of the German work force which was unemployed during 1923 due 
to the economic chaos created by the Great Inflation.
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TABLE 13
THE AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923
No. of % of
Age % in
Group Members Members
Under 20 1,513 18.5 3 ,897,555 9 .0
20-•29 3,333 40.8 11 ,458,015 26 .6
30-39 1,432 17.6 8 ,863,091 20 .5
40- 49 891 11.0 7 ,754,071 17 .9
50-59 326 4.0 6 ,561,314 14 .9
60 & Over 151 1.9 4,841,919 11 .1
No Entry 498 6.2 - -
Totals : 8,144 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100,.0
of the middle class in general and the lower-miLddle class
in par ticular,I and tha t National Socialism did hav e a con-
siderable appeal for workers is demonstrated in the first 
column. Over one-fifth of the total membership of the 
party before the Beer Hall Putsch was made up of people 
from the working class. Although their percentage within 
the NSDAP was less than half the figure for German society, 
workers certainly constituted a large and important part 
of Hitler's movement.
The cumulative statistics also dispel the oft-stated 
myth that military personnel made ut> an appreciable part of
the early party membership. Even at the inception of the
party, soldiers and officers made up only a minor part of
the total party membership. In the ensuing years, military
personnel in the party declined to the point of becoming
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negligible. If the army dominated the NSDAP as some au­
thorities have suggested, it was not through the enrollment 
of members in the party.
The numbers of professional people and persons with 
college degrees in the Nazi party during the early period 
is much higher than previous studies have indicated. The 
percentage of those persons within the NSDAP is actually 
considerably higher than their total percentage in German 
society. Their presence in such numbers gives the early 
Nazi party a much more respectable look than many earlier 
studies have led us to believe. Whether or not these 
were "doctors without patients, [and] lawyers without 
clients" is not ascertainable from the data available for 
study. It is clear, however, that the intelligentsia of 
German society was attracted to the NSDAP despite the 
inconsistencies of its ideology and the frequent shifts 
in policy and emphasis that it displayed during the years
1919-1923.
The NSDAP clearly began as an urban movement and 
spread only slowly to the countryside. It was only in 
1923, probably due largely to the absorption of various 
other Voelkisch groups, that any appreciable number of 
people from rural areas came into the party.
The number of self-employed persons in the party at 
the time of the Beer Hall Putsch is considerably lower than 
earlier studies have suggested. It has long been speculated
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that the economic problems of many small businessmen during 
the early Weimar period prompted them to seek radical po­
litical solutions to their problems, and that the Nazis 
%vere the beneficiaries of the radicalization of this nor­
mally conservative socio-economic g r o u p . T h i s  hypothesis 
is not supported by the statistics, and in fact small busi­
nessmen constituted a very small segment of the NSDAP mem­
bership. Obviously a reassessment of the role of this 
group in early Nazi party history is in order. The sup­
posed flood of small businessmen into the ranks of the 
NSDAP as an effect of the financial disasters of the period 
I919-I923 did not take place.
One generalization made by many historians about 
the social composition of the early NSDAP that i^ supported 
by the cumulative statistics for the party membership in 
1919-1923 is the preponderance of white collar workers in 
the movement. This group easily constituted the largest 
single category in the party, although they were not an 
overwhelming majority as some earlier studies have theo­
rized.^^ The white collar workers combined with the arti­
sans ^  make up an absolute majority in the early party, 
supporting the thesis of the lower-middle-class character 
of the early NSDAP. However, this should not be construed 
as proof that the movement was merely a lower-middle-class 
movement. Other social groups joined in considerable num­
bers as well. It is far too simplistic to characterize
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National Socialism as a lower-middle-class movement. 
Clearly, it was a much more complex phenomenon.
The "myth of the unemployed" in the early Nazi 
party membership is not supported by the statistics above. 
The number of people declaring their situation as "unem­
ployed" was n e g l i g i b l e . L i k e w i s e ,  the category of 
"housewives" does not constitute a significant fraction 
of the party membership. This is consistent with the 
relatively small percentage of women in the party, which 
in turn is consistent with most previous assessments of 
the early Nazi party as the most male-oriented German 
political party. The number of pensioners in the party 
is also very small. This, too, is quite unremarkable if 
we consider that the old people and the physically infirm 
are not particularly fitted for an activistic and militant 
political movement.
The number of students in the early party is quite 
high and in line with the youth of the total party member­
ship, which shows that an absolute majority of party mem­
bers were under thirty years of age when they joined the 
party. The statistics in Table l4 indicate that, as sev­
eral earlier studies have suggested, there was a consid­
erable amount of dissatisfaction with German society among 
its younger members. To characterize the Nazi movement 
before 1923 as only a "youth rebellion"^^ on the strength 
of these figures, however, would be as misleading as to 
characterize it as only a lower-middle-class movement.
TABLE 14
THE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923
Occupational
Categories Members
96 of
Members Reich
% in
Unskilled Laborers 1,339 16.4 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 258 3.2 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 96 1.2 2 ,499,945 8.3
Totals: 1,693 20.8 1 4 ,326,738 47-4
Artisans 1,765 21.7 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 1,935 23.8 5 ,274,232 17.4
Foremen ko 0.5 Included under ■white collar
Managers 51 0.6 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 272 3.3 No figures available
Self-Employed 216 2.7 No figures available
School Teachers 70 0.9 308,741 1.0
Totals : 4,359 53.5 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers 366 4.5 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 11 0.1 Included with farmers
Totals : 377 4.6 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
44
70
0.5
0.9
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
F inaneiers 
Private Incomes
296
17
82
26
35
456
3.6
0.2
1.0
0.3
0.4
5.5
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
1
9
413
216
81
120
315
1,155
8,144
0.0
0.1
5.0 
2.7
1.0 
1.5 
3.9
14.2
100.0
No figures available
2.4»
No figures available
1 5,6 50,000»
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,319
0.5
100.0
»Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the period 1919-1924 compiled from Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 
3 70, based on the number of union members unemployed. It is likely that 
the figure for non-union workers was higher.
110
The Nazis during the period 1919-1923 assuredly 
benefited in membership recruitment from the financial 
plight of the lower-middle class, especially after 1921.
It also benefited from the disillusionment of German youth, 
to whom it held out the hope of a society based on more 
lasting values than those of the materialistic society 
created by their parents. However, within the lower- 
middle class and the young people--and in other sections 
of German society--many were attracted to the NSDAP for a 
variety of reasons. For example, the Nazis appeared to 
champion an egalitarianism, a "front socialism" that ap­
pealed to many ex-soldiers and offered workers an alterna­
tive to Marxism, in both its extreme and more moderate 
forms. The Nazis also appealed to a broad cross section 
of German society through its militant super-nationalism, 
its unshakable opposition to the Treaty of Versailles, and 
its rationalization of the loss of the Great War through 
perpetuation of the "Dolchstoss" legend.
Furthermore, Hitler was able to appeal to practically 
every stratum of German society with his outspoken anti- 
Semitism, which was especially well received in the numer­
ous Voelkisch groups proliferating in post-war Germany.
The violent anti-Marxism of Hitler's party won him many 
admirers among the upper as well as the lower-middle class, 
as is reflected in the statistics above. That the party 
could attract a considerable percentage of farmers during a
mperiod of relative prosperity in the countryside and with 
a land program which made very little sense, suggests that 
the Nazis appealed to something more in Germans than just 
their financial interests.
The seeming inability of the Weimar governments to 
deal with the problems of the inter-war period also influ­
enced Germans toward an authoritarian alternative. The 
Weimar governments, forever stigmatized in the eyes of 
many Germans as the signers of a dishonorable iieace, was 
colorless and lacklustre when compared to the imperial 
regime and was never accepted by a large segment of the 
German population. Even the army indicated its lack of 
devotion to the Republic during the Kapp putsch of 1920. 
Hitler presented himself and his movement as a stark con­
trast to the drab Weimar regime and many persons responded 
to this appeal.
The Nazi movement during the period 1919-1923 at­
tracted a cross section of German society into its member­
ship. By uniting a number of diverse and dissimilar cur­
rents in post-war German society through skillful use of 
propaganda and his own speaking ability. Hitler, by 1923, 
had built a political movement which recruited members from 
all strata of German society. The economic travails of 
many of Hitler's recruits undoubtedly played a major role 
in their decision to join the NSDAP, but ideological fac­
tors were also important in Nazi recruitment, as was the 
dissatisfaction of a large segment of German youth.
CHAPTER II
FOOTNOTES
Konimunistische Partez üeutschlands, ICPD pre­
viously the Sparticists.
^Sozial democratise lie Paz'tei Deutschlands or SPD, 
the largest of the Marxist parties.
^Unabhaeiigige Sozialdeiiiokratische Partei Deutsch­
lands or USPD, formerly a part of the SPD which had split 
off from the mother party during World War I.
^The Weimar political iiarties sent the following 
number of delegates to the first national assembly:
USPD, 8 ; SPD, 38; DDP, 19; Zentrum, 20; DVP, 4; DNVP, 10; 
and other parties, 2 .
^Zentrum or Z, the party of the German Catholics.
^Deutsche Deniokratische Partei or DDP, made up of 
the old Progressive Party of the Kaiserreich and the more 
liberal wing of the old National Liberal Party.
more conservative remnants of the National Liberal Party 
representing large industrial interests.
^Deutschnational Volkspartei or German National 
Peoples Party, made up of elements of the old Conserva­
tive Party from the empire and representing agrarian 
interests.
^Quoted in Allan Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, 
1918-1919 (Princeton, 1965), p. 24.
(1)
Elimination of the Upper House and adoption of a unicameral 
system, (2) Direct and universal suffrage with proportional 
representation, (3) Legislative initiative of the Landtag, 
(4) Abolition of the royal veto power, (5) Nomination of
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ministers by the Landtag, (6) Self-determination of con­
vocation and adjournment by the Landtag, (?) Annual
budget, (8) Abrogation of aristocratic titles and privi­
leges, (9) Prohibition of tax-free hereditary holdings,
(10) Elimination of royal exemptions from taxation and 
judication, and (11) Separation of Church and State. 
Mitchell, Revolution in Bavaria, p. 28.
^^Of the nine ministers of the new government, 
four were from the USPD, four from the SPD, and one with 
no party affiliation.
^^Eisner's party received only 2.5 per cent of the 
total vote, the SPD received 33>0 per cent, while the 
Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP, a particular1st Catholic 
party) received 35 per cent. The vote also confirmed the 
desire of a majority of Bavarians to remain a part of the
^^Bayerische Volkspartei or Bavarian Peoples Party, 
a particularist Catholic party.
^^There are a number of good accounts of the found­
ing of the DAP. One of the best in English is in Bracher, 
The German Dictatorship, p p . 79-81.
^^See especially Fritz Stern, The Politics of 
Cultural Despair. A Study in the Rise of the Germanic 
Ideology (New York, I96I); George L. Mosse, The Crisis of 
German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich
(New York, 1964); and Andrew ol Whitesidc, Austrian Na- 
tional Socialism Before 1918 (The Hague, I962).
■^^Regardless of the principle subject of any arti­
cle in the pre-Nazi Voelkischer Beobachter, anti-semitism 
was a dominant theme. The early issues of the newspaper 
exhibited militant opposition to Bolshevism (for example, 
see the front page lead article on February 20, ].920, "Der 
Bolschewismus vor den Toren 1"); it featured appeals to 
German labor to forsake the Marxist SPD and USPD and join 
with their "racial brothers" from other social classes in 
rebuilding Germany (this was a recurring subject in the 
early V B , but see especially the lead article in the Janu­
ary 7, 1920, issue, and a long article on p. 3 of the 
May 4, 1920, issue condemning the bondage of the German 
worker by international Jewery); it called on German youth 
to join with German workers to lead the Voelkisch movement 
for "national regeneration" (see especially the April 1? 
issue on p. 2); and it tried to bridge the gap between the 
workers and the middle classes (for example, see an arti­
cle on p. 4, June 20, 1920, entitled "Arbeiter und Burger").
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For an overwhelming summary of the racial stand of the pre- 
Nazi V B , see the entire front page of the April 22 issue, 
consisting of excerpts from and analyses of the Protocols 
of the Wise Men of Zion.
^■^There is a good account of the relationship be­
tween the early DAP and the Thule Society in Reginald 
Phelps, "Before Hitler Came: Thule Society and Germanen
Orden," The Journal of Modern History 35 (November 1963): 
passim.
^^A number of students of National Socialism have 
denied that there really was a consistent ideology of 
Nazism. That Hitler's movement did have a central 
Weitanschauung from which it never deviated and was 
basically as described above is the central argument in 
Eberhard Jaeckel, Hitlers Weltanschauung (Tuebingen,
1969), passim.
^^For example, Friedrick Schumann, Hitler and the 
Nazi Dictatorship, p. 1 6 , dismisses the early party as 
"ambitious soldiers and political adventurers." (Numerous 
historians since have said something similar.)
^^The figures for the Reich are based on the 1923 
census, which means they will not be exact for 1919. How­
ever, there is no reason to suppose the age distribution 
above fifteen would change significantly between 1919 and 
1923. The Reich figures are compiled from Statistische 
Jahrbuch des Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 1928)" pp i lé-17.
Reich is compiled from Statistik des deutschen Reichs,
Band 402, vols. I and II, Die Beruf1iche und soziale 
Gliederung der Bevoelkerun.g des Deutschen Reich (Berlin, 
1927), which is based on the 1925 census. As in the case 
of age distribution, there is no reason for concluding 
that the occupational structure of Germany changed sig­
nificantly between 1919 and 1923.
^^It is difficult to reconcile this picture of the 
party with Maser's description of the pre-Hitler DAP in 
Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 107 : "Until Hitler joined
the party, the German Workers Party was a group of work­
men, especially railway workers. . . . "  Although there 
were some railway workers in the party, the above sta­
tistics show that the early DAP was much more than just a 
"group of workmen." It is equally difficult to reconcile 
the statistics in Table 2 with Joseph Nyomarkay's charac­
terization of the DAP membership before Hitler in Charisma 
and Factionalism, p. 38 : "The DAP," Nyomarkay said, "at
its inception . . . was composed of people of working
class origins."
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____________ p. 292. This same descrip­
tion of the early party is repeated in Reginald Phelps, 
"Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei," American His­
torical Review 68 (July I963): 975, without quotation 
marks.
^^Hitler did speak at two Nazi rallies in 1919, but 
was not the featured speaker either time. Ernst Deuerlein, 
"Hitlers Eintritt in die Politik und die Reichswehr," 
Viertels.i ahrhef be f uer Zeitgeschichte I6 (April 1959) •'
177-227.
^^Heiden, History of National Socialism, p. 39, 
gives the total party strength at the end of 1919 as 
sixty-four. He does not reveal the source of his misin­
formation. Abel, The Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A-I, 
gives the same figure, also without a source. No other 
well-known works on Nazi party history offer any estimate 
of the numerical strength at the end of 1919.
^^This misconception, like others, was caused by 
Hitler himself in Mein Kampf, p. ^l93* The above statis­
tics do not, however, substantiate Nolte's claim in Three 
Faces of Fascism, p. 399, that there was a preponderance 
of soldiers in the early party, or Nyomarkay's generaliza­
tion in Charisma and Factionalism, p. 54, that the DAP was 
transformed into a party of soldiers after Roehm joined in 
May, 1919 (actually Roehm joined after Hitler, as proven 
by his higher party number).
Die Hitler Bewegnung, pp. 129-130, 
working from what he characterizes as the "oldest known 
party list" from January, 1920 (which is now, he says, in 
private hands), gives the following breakdown of the 
social composition of members contained on his list (with­
out, unfortunately, telling how many persons are included): 
Average age--between thirty and thirty-two years old; 
women--10.3 per cent of the total; F acharbeiter and Hand- 
werker--33 per cent; Frei e Akademische Berufe--l4.5 per 
cent; Beamte and An.gestellte--l4 per cent; Soldaten and 
Offiziere--13 per cent; Kauflcute--12 per cent; Studenten 
--7 per cent; Geschaftshaber--4 per cent; Ungelernte 
Arbeiter--2.5 per cent. Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 94, 
looked at a membership list with 193 entries which is un­
dated but "clearly from this period" (l919--early 1920) 
at the Bundesarchiv in Koblenz. He did not submit the 
list to statistical analysis, but concluded after looking 
at it carefully that the membership "seems to represent a 
fair cross section of the Munich population of the time, 
looking much more respectable than has often been thought, 
with a clear preponderance of the small people and the 
lower classes." He did not define "small people" or
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"lo-wer classes." Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 91» 
characterizes the recruits who joined the party after Hit­
ler as "ex-soldiers and Freilcorps elements." After Hitler 
came into the party, according to Bracher, ". . . the
working-class element diminished. At the same time, many 
unemployed found their way into the party. . . . "  These 
conclusions are in direct conflict with the statistics in 
Table 4, above. Nor is there any evidence that "many mem­
bers of the protestant clergy embraced the new gospel at 
an early date" as Lowenstein argues in The Nazi Background 
to U'ar, pp. 5-6. Clergymen of any denomination were never 
present in the party in appreciable numbers. Maser, 
Fruehgeschichte dor NSDAP, pp. 107-108, gives a somewhat 
misleading picture of the party at the end of 1919, char­
acterizing party members as follows: "Hitler brought the
party salespeople, business owners and intellectuals as 
members, and soldiers and, remarkably, many women as sup­
porters." These groups did come into the party in some 
numbers after Hitler's entry (excluding the women), but 
so did persons from a number of other occupational groups, 
most notably the professions. The percentage of profes­
sional persons in the early DAP was actually seven times 
greater than their percentage in German society. Yet 
another "oldest party list" was submitted to statistical 
analysis in Maser, ibid., p. 255- Maser dates his list, 
which contains 6?5 entries as May 29, 1920. Maser's oc­
cupational categories are different from those used in 
this study, and he does not describe his criteria for 
assigning occupations to particular categories. This 
makes an exact comparison of his statistics with those 
above very nearly impossible. Kater, "Zur Soziographie," 
p. 129, casts grave doubts on the authenticity of Maser's 
list, calling it a "peculiar document" ("Merkwurdiges 
Dokument"). Maser's statistics: Facharbeiter and Hand­
worker- -2? per cent; Akademische Berufe--8.5 per cent; 
Beamte and Angestellte--l4.6 per cent; Soldaten and 
Offiziere--5 .2 per cent; Kauf1 eute--13•3 per cent; 
Geschaftsinhaber--3.1 per cent; Studenten--?.2 per cent; 
Ungelernte Arbeiter--2.9 per cent; Frauen, Schuler, and 
"Members who made unclear statements"--l8 .2 per cent.
^^Volz' semi-official Oaten die Geschichte der 
NSDAP, p. 5, says the change of name was announced at the 
February rally and officially and legally changed on 
March 4, 1920.
based on Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner im Jahre 1920," 
Vi ertelsjahrhefte fuer Zeitgeschichte 11 (November 1963): 
passim. The twenty-five points were reprinted in their 
entirety in the May 15, 1920, issue of the Voelkischer 
Beobachter, p. 4. The issuance of the program in February
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drew only a brief announcement in the February 28 issue 
of the on page 3 which said that the party's program 
was "very similar" to that of the Deutschsozial Partei 
(DSP). This indicates that the NSDAP became much more 
powerful in the Voelkisch movement during the interven­
ing months.
the following speakers and topics 
were announced in advertisements in the Voelkischer 
Beobachter for upcoming Nazi rallies: Bernhard Koehler,
"Das Arbeitende Volk als Zinssklave des Leihkapitalismus" 
(March 13, p. 4); Adolf Hitler, "Politik und der Jugend" 
(April 24, p. 3). At the same time, the newspaper, still 
owned by the Thule Society, was also attempting to lure 
the youth of Germany and German workers into the movement 
with such articles as "Deutsche Jugenden" (April 17, p . 2), 
and "Arbeiter erwachedl" (May 4, p. 3)- These articles 
typically called on the workers and the youth to join and 
lead the Voelkisch movement.
I Paten die Geschichte der 
NSDAP, p. 27, the newspaper was purchased for 120,000 
marks, but he does not say where the money came from. 
Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 88, suggests the 
money was furnished by the Army, as do a number of other 
historians. However, no conclusive evidence has been 
forthcoming to substantiate this claim.
IS not hold true for the 
Ruhr area, where the KPD seized short-lived control of 
Essen, Düsseldorf, and other cities in March and April of 
1920. They formed a "red" army which was only put down 
by the Reichswehr after considerable bloodshed.
James W. Angell, The Recovery of Germany (New 
Haven, 1929), P P • I8 , 393 and 397- Agricultural produc­
tion was actually declining, which added to Germany's 
miseries. Industrial production increased somewhat, 
although it remained well below the 1913 level.
^*The percentages of valid votes received by the 
major parties in Germany in the elections of June, 1920 
were as follows: KPD--2 per cent; USPD--I8 per cent;
SPD--22 per cent; DDP--9 per cent; Z--14 per cent; BVP-- 
4 per cent; DVP--14 per cent ; DNVP--I5 per cent; others 
--3 per cent.
^^Anti-Semitism was the most recurrent theme in 
the pages of the Voelkischer Beobachter, both before and 
after it was purchased by the Nazis. The defeat in 1918, 
the November revolution. Communism, corruption in govern­
ment, the inflation--in fact all the troubles of the
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world--were blamed on international J ewery. The Protocols 
of the Wise Men of Zion were quoted almost daily in the 
columns of the newspaper, and many speeches which were 
advertised in its pages had the Jews as their principle 
topic.
strength at the end of 1920 have given the figure ],0 0 0 , 
including the following: Heiden, History of National
Socialism, p. 39 (quotes no sourceTl Schumann, Hi11er and 
the Na%i Dictatorship, p. l6 (quotes no source); Volz, 
Paten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 8 (quotes no source);
V er me il, L ' A11 ma ,e ne~ pT 3 30 Tquotes no source); Abel, The 
Nazi Movement, App. II, Table A-I (quotes no source); 
Helga Grebing, Der No tionalsoziali sinus . Ur sprung und 
Wes en (Munich, 1959) , p . 5^ (quotes no source) ; Orlow, 
History of the Nazi Party, p. 25 (quotes no source); 
Bracher, The German Dictatorship, p. 88 (quotes Schafer, 
NSDAP, who quotes Volz). Franz-Willing, Die Hi tier- 
bewegnung, p. 103, says Munich alone had 2,500 members by 
January 1, 1921. Later, without divulging the source of 
his information, he says the total strength of the party 
in January, 1921, was 3,000 (p. 254). Tyrell, Fuehrer 
Befiel, p. 13, says the membership strength at the end of 
1920 was "over 2,000," but lists no source for his infor­
mation. The figures arrived at in this study derive from 
the simple expedient of looking at the highest party num­
ber for December of the year in question and the lowest 
number for January of the next year, keeping in mind that 
the numbering sequence began with 501. If the two are 
not consecutive, the number most nearly in the middle is
that "20 to 30 per cent of the participants in the Hitler- 
assemblies were women," and on the same page argues that 
Hitler brought with him into the party "many women" as 
supporters ("Anhaenger").
^®A number of historians are very skeptical whether 
or not Hitler ever took the socialistic planks in the Nazi 
program seriously, but that did not prevent him from em­
phasizing them in his speeches. See Bracher, The German 
Dictatorship, p. 86.
^^Phelps, "Hitler als Parteiredner," p. 138, and 
Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 47-48.
^^The KPD was outlawed in several parts of Germany, 
and made a dismal showing in the 1920 general election, 
winning only 2 per cent of the total vote. In addition.
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it received instructions from Moscow to stop its terror­
istic methods. For this see Halperin, Germany Tried 
Democracy, p. 201.
^^^The Voelkischer Beobachter also directed propa­
ganda appeals to the German farmers in 1920, encouraging 
them to join or at least support the movement (April 10 
issue, p . 3).
^^For example, small businessmen would undoubtedly 
favor point sixteen of the twenty-five-point party plat­
form, which called for the dissolution of chain department 
stores. The Voelkischer Beobachter continually called on 
Germans of all classes to unite against the common enemy: 
the Jew.
*^For example, see the Voelkischer Beobachter,
May 15, p. 4 and March l 6 , p. Ti
^^Warnings of the danger of an eminent Bolshevik 
revolution appeared in every issue of the Voelkischer 
Beobachter. A typical article (February l4 issue, pT 1) 
was entitled "Der Bolshewismus vor den Toren!"
However, it is likely that artisans constituted 
a greater part of the total work force in Bavaria than 
they did in other areas of Germany due to the belated 
industrial development in that area discussed above.
^*^This does not at all substantiate Orlow's con­
tention that in 1920 "the DAP's still relatively small 
membership was, socially and economically, a very homo­
geneous body. For the most part the members came from
the same social milieu as Drexler and the old guard." 
History of the Nazi Party, p. 17.
in 1920 as Heiden suggests in History of National Social­
ism, p. 39, is doubtful. In the "aus der Bewegnung" 
column of the Voelkischer Beobachter which appeared daily 
the functions of the party all over Germany were discussed. 
Even in 1923 there were very few Ortsgruppen mentioned 
from north Germany and none at all in East Prussia, 
Schleswig-Holstein, or the Ruhr.
^^See Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. I7-6O.
The value of German currency dropped from $l=Dm 15*5 in 
January, 1921 to $l=Dm 62.5 in November (ibid., p. 366). 
Wages rose, but not as quickly as the cost of living 
(ibid.).
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*^See Robert G. L. Waite, Vanguard of Nazism. The 
Freicorps Movement in Postwar Germany, 1918-1923 (New York, 
1952), pp. 183-239".
^^For Hitler's resignation from the party, see 
Maser, Fruehgeschichte der NSDAP, p. 23; Franz-Willing,
Der Hitlerbewegnung, p. 110, and Bracher, The German 
Dietatorship, p. 91. See also the reproductions of Hit­
ler's two entries on the party lists from Adolf Hitlers 
Mitkaeinpf er, below Appendix II. Hitler's new position in 
the party was not announced in the Voelkischer Beobachter 
until August4, page 1.
stimate of the NSDAP member­
ship strength at the end of 1921 is Able, The Nazi Move­
ment , App. II, Table A-I, who writes that there were 
"about" 6,000 members in the party at this time. Bracher, 
The German Dictatorship, gives the same figure for some 
unspecified time in 1922 (p. lOO).
'’^ There are no other known party lists from 1921. 
Since this is not a scientifically derived sample, the 
possibility exists that it is not representative of all 
persons joining the NSDAP in 1921.
^^It is also true, however, that the Nazis made 
special propaganda appeals to the young people of the 
Reich. For example, an article on page 6 of the Janu­
ary 1, 1921, Voelkischer Beobachter entitled "Deutsche 
Studentum" emphasized the pivotal role the youth of Ger­
many must play in creating a new and better Vaterland.
The February 20 issue of the newspaper carried excerpts 
from a speech by Hitler to German students on page 4 in 
which he delineated the importance of young people of all 
classes for the coming "rebirth" of the Reich. An article 
on page 5 of the August l4 VB entitled "an Unsere deutsche 
Jugend" exhorted party members to recruit young people 
into the movement.
of the
August 21, 1921, issue of the Voelkischer Beobachter is 
typical of Nazi propaganda aimed at the workers. It went 
into great detail on the "failure" of the German revolu­
tion and the betrayal of the working class by the SPD.
It then outlined the Nazi plans for a true social 
revolution.
^^Contrast these figures with Wolfgang Zopf's con­
tention in Wandlungen der deutschen Elite, p. 52: Persons
of all occupations could be found in the Nazi movement in 
its early years, including a representative portion of the
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old German elite. "Nur die Industriearbeiterschaft war 
nicht se hr zahibericli vertreten." Also Evelyn Pospisel, 
"Diskussionbeitrag : Die Massenbasis des Faschisinus , " 
p. 33: "The NSDAP did not succeed in penetrating the
ranks of the working class." That the Nazis did expend 
considerable propaganda efforts to attract workers is 
supported by Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, pp. 
I8-I9 , and by Kele, Nazis and Workers, p p . 4?-48.
^^This despite the fact that a greater amount of 
propaganda was directed at them in the columns of the 
Voelkischer Beobachter. See, for example, "National- 
sozinlistische Agrarrevolution" (March 31» P* 1), and 
"Der Bauer" (August I8 , p. 3)*
^^The value of the mark decreased from #l=Dm 45.5 
in January to Sl = Dtn 1, 8IO in December. At the same time 
the cost of living I'ose 3,000 per cent. Wages rose spec­
tacularly, but did not keep pace with the cost of living. 
Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 366.
^^Actually, Hitler's introduction to the Nationalen 
Klub and his subsequent meetings with leaders of North 
German Voelkisch groups through the Vereingte Vaterlaend- 
ische Verbaende Deutschland took place in December, 1921. 
See Volz, Paten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 9»
the Voelkischer Beobachter, 
January 7, 1922, page 1: full page attack on SPD and its
"betrayal" of the workers; March 22, page 1: article en­
titled "Vernichtung des Mittelstands"; May 13, page 2 : 
appeal to all ex-soldiers to join the movement; same issue, 
page 2: appeal to German students; same issue, page 3 :
synopsis of a Hitler speech in Landshut on the subject 
"1st unser Kampf gegen die judische Weltdiktatur kapital- 
istische, reactionaer, gewirkschaftlich us w , oder ent- 
spricht er den Interessen der Arbeiterschaft?" and finally 
an article on December 22, page 2: article entitled
"Christentum und Nationalsozialismus" proclaiming the 
religiosity of the movement.
^^Previous estimates of party strength at the be­
ginning of 1923 include Eliot Wheaton, Prelude to Calamity. 
The Nazi Revolution (New York, I968), p . 5 8 , guessing that 
in November, 1922, the party had "about" 10,000 members; 
Kurt Ludecke, I Knew Hitler, p. 40, says the party had 
"less than a thousand inscribed members in 1922." Gordon, 
Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, p. 64, estimates 35,000 
members at the end of 1922, based on eyewitness accounts. 
This would mean that over 27,000 persons joined the party 
during the last three months of the year. Bracher, The
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German Dictatorship, p. 100, estimates the party had "only 
about 6,000 members," in 1922, but did not say upon what 
his estimate was based. Grebing, Der Nationalsozialismus, 
p. 5 6 , also says 6,000 and also lists no source. Bracher, 
The German Dictatorship, p. , and Maser, Fruehgeschich be 
der NSDAP, p. Ill, both state that the Nazis absorbed the 
DSP in December, 1922. Neither give any estimate of how 
many members that party had. Volz, Daten die Geschichte 
der NSDAP, p. 7, says the DSP was incorporated into the 
National Socialist movement in October, 1922, but also 
does not say how many people this involved. If it was 
large, the number of party members at the beginning of 
1923 could have been considerably higher than the 8,100 
estimated hei-e. Volz, ibid., p. 9 , gives an estimate of 
"rund 6000 eingeschriebene Mitglieder" in the party at the 
beginning of 1923.
^^Unemployment was under 1 per cent for six months 
of 1922 and never more than 3-3 per cent of the total work 
force, which figure was recorded for January, 1922.
Angell, The Recovery of Germany-, p. 371-
^^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 366. The
inflation was reflected in the price of the Voelkischer 
Beobachter: In January and February the newspaper sold
for 100 marks per copy ; by June it was 400 marks; in the 
middle of July the price had risen to 1,200 marks ; at the
beginning of the next month the Vj3 sold for 5,000 marks
per issue; and by the end of August it went for 80,000 
marks; the issue for September 23-24 went for 1 .5 million 
marks; but the next day the price had risen to 2 million 
marks. The final issue on November 9, 1923, sold for 
8 billion marks.
Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, pp. 248-259.
putsch and the putsch itself is Gordon's exhaustive,
Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, passim.
^^The best account of the "hitlerprocez" in English 
is in Bracher, The German Dictatorship, pp. 119-121.
^^Tifo excellent accounts of the party from the 
failure of the putsch to the refounding of the NSDAP in 
1925 are in Bracher, The German Dictatorship, and Orlow, 
History of the Nazi Party. Both give the impression that 
the party was in a state of total collapse during 1924.
Collection, microfilm reel 10.
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^^The highest membership number listed for the 
pre-putsch party is 55,7^7• Subtracting 500 from this 
number, we may estimate the total strength of the NSDAP 
in November, 1923i as 55,28? members. This does not 
take into consideration persons who may have quit the
^^These same lists were quantatively analyzed by 
Kater, "Zur Soziographie” in 1971 « However, since Kater's 
categories and classification systems differ considerably 
from those used in this study, it was necessary to r e ­
analyze the Hauptarchiv lists.
new daily column was begun in the Voelkischer 
Beobachter on February 25-26, page 6, entitled "aus der 
Jugendbewegnung." Numerous articles such as "deutsche 
Jugend1" (August 10, p. 5) appeared in the newspaper 
calling on young people to join the movement to revital­
ize the fatherland. Nazi speakers, especially Adolf 
Hitler, also appealed to young people in particular. For 
example, see excerpts from a Hitler speech in the Febru­
ary 24, 1923, VB, p. 2, entitled "German Students and 
German Workers as the bearers (tracger) of the German
Kater used only two age groups in his analysis 
of the above data: under 23 and over 23. In Kater's 
study 48 13er cent of the total were under twenty-three 
years of age.
no less than at young people in 1923 - For example, see 
the Voelkischer Beobachter, January 13, page 1 lead, be­
rating the SPD for not nationalizing industry and calling 
on workers to desert the marxists and join the Nazis; in 
the same issue an article on page 2, "Student und 
Arbeiter," argued that only these two groups could end 
the corruption in Berlin and save Germany from the inter­
national Jewish/Marxist conspiracy. Hitler's speech 
"German Students and German Workers as the Bearers of the 
German Future" mentioned above, followed much the same 
theme. These appeals continued throughout the year.
received little direct attention in 
Nazi propaganda because they were considered "workers" by 
the Nazis. In fact, the predominantly young artisans and 
white collar workers probably did have more in common with 
young workers than with the middle classes.
^^That the party leadership was making a conscious 
effort to win farm support for the movement is illustrated
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by the appearance in the Voelkischer Beobachter in 1923 
of such articles as "Nationalsozialismus u. Bauernverein" 
in the January 13 issue on page 2, which emphasized the 
bad treatment accorded farmers by the Berlin government 
and outlined the Nazi agricultural program.
Kater's occupational statistics for this same 
sample differs in several important respects from those 
presented above largely because of the different occupa­
tional classification system used. Rater's tables read 
as follows: Unskilled laborers--448 or 9-5 pei’ cent of
the total; Servants--80, 1.7 per cent; Skilled laborers-- 
401, 8.5 per cent; Military--28, 0.6 per cent; Acaderni- 
cians--8 0 , 1.7 per cent ; Farmers--491, 10.4 per cent; 
Retail merchants--66, 1.4 per cent; Contractors--122, 4.0 
per cent; Lower and middle employees--524, 11.1 per cent; 
Lower and middle executives--293i 6.2 per cent; Sales 
people--652, 13.7 per cent; Higher employees--l8, 0.4 per 
cent; Higher executives--l8, 0.4 per cent; Unemployed-- 
none; Students--I9 8 , 4.2 per cent; Housewives--5I , 1.1 
per cent; Welfare--l4, 0 .3 per cent; Artisans--945, 20.0 
per cent; Apprentie es--61, 1.3 per cent ; No entry--179, 
3.8 per cent.
Rater's statistics do not agree with those derived 
by Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 80-82, 
from a sample of 1,126 persons who joined the party in 
1923. Gordon pointed out the notable absence of peasants 
and nobles in the party, and marshalled not only the re­
sults of his statistical study but also eyewitness 
accounts (ibid., p. 74) to support his case. Gordon 
broke his sample into the following occupational cate­
gories: Technical University Teachers and Gymnasium
Teachers--20 ; Lawyers--6; Clergymen--3; Economists--!; 
Medical Doc tors--l8; Dentists--8; Veterinarians--8 ; 
Nurses--!; Students--119 ; Grammar School Teachers--27» 
Writers and Editors--27i Publishers--5 ; Book Dealers--8 ; 
Artists--40; Factory Owners--13 ; Managers and Directors-- 
8 ; Shopkeepers--27 ; Landowners--14; Bureaucrats--6 ; Farm 
Renters--2 ; Private Incomes--3; Real Estate Dealer--!; 
White Collar Workers--242 ; Chief Clerks or Foremen--13 i 
Technicians--22 ; Skilled Workers--230 ; Unskilled Workers 
--25; Semi-skilled Workers--7 ; Engineers--2 8 ; Architects 
--11; Government Civil Servants--76; Policemen--26; 
Forsters--4; Reichswehr Employees--3; NSDAP Employees-- 
20; Apprentie es--22 ; and Women without occupations listed 
--35' On p. 7 8 , ibid., Gordon says that "only" thirty-one 
persons out of a sample of 1,672 persons in the Nazi party 
were "nobles." He does not give the source of his sample, 
how he ascertained the nobility of the members, or tell 
how many nobles were contained in German society as a 
whole. From this, Gordon concluded on ibid., p. 8 2 , that
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the early Nazi party was "a heterogeneous mixture of 
people of all classes and all professions and trades." 
Gordon's sample of persons joining the NSDAP in 1923 is 
significantly different from Rater's, but not vastly from 
tlie figures derived by this investigation.
^^That the Nazis did attract sizeable numbers of 
workers into their party has already been suggested by 
Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, especially pp. 
74-76. Gordon marshalls a great deal of eyewitness re­
ports of Nazi rallies including some from leaders of the 
KPD and SPD to support his case. Contrast this with 
Hardy-IIemery ' s statement in "Le Nazisme," p. 306, that at 
the time of the putsch only 3 per cent of the NSDAP mem­
bership were workers ("travailleurs"), and Halperin's 
unsupported generalization in Germany Tried Democracy, p. 
436, that only an "insignificant fraction" of the workers 
went over to the Nazis.
9 0 , was
clearly wrong in insisting that the "backbone of the Nazi 
movement was composed up until 1923 of the Reichswehr and 
the police." A number of subsequent works have quoted 
this mistaken assumption of Heiden's, which he made no 
attempt to prove. There is, however, a definite possibil­
ity that many Nazis were ex-soldiers. There is no doubt 
that the party leadership made efforts to attract this 
group into its rtvnks in articles in the Voelkischer 
Beobachter mentioned above and like that in Per National- 
sozialist, no. 4, p. 2, appealing to "Frontsoldaten" to 
support the movement.
^^Contrast this with Michael Thornton, Nazism, p. 
27, who says it was only the "bigoted lower class mind" 
that was attracted to Hitler's movement.
identified as a mainstay of Nazi support. For example, 
Dutt, Fascism and Revolution, p. 103.
^*^For example, Carr, History of Germany, pp. 343- 
344. "During the lean years the hard coi'e of Nazi sup­
port came from the 'white collar proletariat.'" Whether 
they were the "hard core of Nazi support" is not deter­
minable from the statistics above, but they were certainly 
present in strength in the NSDAP membership.
^^Contrast this with Heiden, History of National 
Socialism, who continually throughout his study charac­
terizes the NSDAP members as coming almost exclusively 
from the lower-middle class (see especially p. 18).
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^^These statistics are in direct conflict with 
Bracher's contention in The German Dictatorship, p. 91» 
that "many unemployed found their way into the party" 
in the pre-putsch era.
^^Gordon, Hi11er and the Beer Hall Putsch, p. 68, 
argues that "the most striking single social fact about 
the [early] party is that it was a party of the young." 
Gordon is certainly right, but what he calls "the most 
striking single social fact" may be legitimately ques­
tioned. He goes on to say that " . . .  in many ways the 
NSDAP represents a rebellion of dissatisfied youth against 
an elder generation that had not only stumbled into a war 
but had failed to win it, and that had equally failed to 
create a world with which these young men could sympathize" 
(ibid., p. 71).
CHAPTER III
DISSOLUTION, RESURRECTION, AND GROWTH: 
THE NSDAP, 1924-1928
Princes! Workers of the hand and the brain! 
Artisans! Farmers! Anti-Semites! German 
men and women of all classes! Unite behind 
Hitler, join the National Socialist Movement!
Voelkischer Beobachter 
March 24, 1926
Interregnum
After a sensational trial in early 1924, Hitler was 
convicted of high treason and received a very mild sen­
tence considering the gravity of his crime. He used the 
trial itself as a platform from which to attack the re­
public. The press, which gave the trial great publicity, 
presented Hitler with the opportunity to disseminate his 
views throughout Germany. He was subsequently imprisoned 
at Landsberg Fortress in Bavaria where he enjoyed a great 
deal of liberty and received visitors practically at will. 
During his stay at Landsberg he dictated the first volume 
of Mein Kampf to Rudolf Hess (later deputy Fuehrer of 
Germany), and to his chauffeur, Emil Maurice. The turgid 
and pretentious style of the book makes it very difficult
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to read. However, the "new course" that Hitler determined 
for the future activities of the Nazi party was laid out 
in great detail.
Apparently sobered by the failure of his putsch, 
Hitler decided he would come to power legally, within the 
framework of the Weimar Constitution. Then and only then 
would he overthrow the very institutions that had brought 
him to power. Hitler's "new course" was to win mass elec­
toral support for his party which necessitated a highly 
organized and dedicated party membership. The new weapon 
was to be the "truth" as revealed by Hitler and spread by 
the party faithful through a massive propaganda effort-- 
not the militaristic and overtly revolutionary "movement" 
of the I919-I923 period.
During the fifteen-month interval between the Beer 
Hall Putsch in November, 19231 and the refounding of the 
Nazi party in February, 1925» the NSDAP, banned by the 
government, dissolved into several antagonistic groups. 
Alfred Rosenberg, former editor of the Voelkischer 
Beobachter (also banned) and Hitler's handpicked succes­
sor, was unable to hold together the diverse elements 
that the Fuehrer had united in the NSDAP. Rosenberg 
joined forces in early 1924 with several non-nazi racist 
groups in Bavaria in order to participate in the May elec­
tions for the Reichstag and the Bavarian state parliament. 
Several factions of the NSDAP in south Germany opposed
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this "legal" course to power, and, led by Julius Streicher 
and Hermann Esser, formed a rival organization of former 
Nazis called the Grossdeutschc Volksgemeinschaft. This 
group spurned electoral participation and maintained the 
putschist character of the earlier Nazi party.
Many former Nazis outside Bavaria joined with the 
Deutschvoelkische Frciheitspartei (DVFP) in the electoral 
campaigns of 1924. The DVFP had been founded in 1922 by 
three Reichstag deputies from the Peutschnational Volks­
partei (DNVP) who felt that party too conservative. How­
ever, a great many former Nazis from north Germany, par­
ticularly the younger and more activistic, denounced the 
DVFP as too conservative and its goals as reactionary and 
bourgeois. These northern opponents of the DVFP joined 
with Stretcher's and Esser's groups for awhile, then broke 
with them also. They appealed to Hitler, still impiisoned 
at Landsberg, for support. Hitler declined to enter the 
debate. Most historians have maintained he deliberately 
encouraged this dissension in the party ranks during his 
imprisonment so that no single rival might arise to chal­
lenge his leadership upon his eventual release.
A degree of unity was restored to the NSDAP in 
August, 1924, when Gregor Strasser, the leader of the 
northern party, joined with Ludendorff and a leader of 
the DFVP to form an electoral bloc calling itself the 
Nationalsozialistische Freiheitsbewegnung which enjoyed
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some electoral success in the December elections. Strasser 
himself was elected to the Reichstag but a number of former 
Nazis remained unreconciled to the new party.
When Hitler was released from prison in November, 
1924, he found the political and economic crises had passed 
on which much of his earlier success had been based. Ger­
many was entering into a brief period of prosperity. Un­
employment abated, real wages rose, and the political 
situation became more stabilized. The situation appeared 
anything but promising for a radical bent on overthrowing 
the Weimar system. Nevertheless, the refounded party grew 
much more rapidly (in sheer numbers) than did the early 
party. Within a year it had spread to all parts of the 
Reich. During the most halcyon years of the Weimar Repub­
lic Hitler was able to establish a small but fanatical 
party membership from which sprung the electoral successes 
after the onset of the Great Depression.
False Dawn: Weimar Germany
after the Great Inflation
The crisis atmosphere prevailing in postwar Germany 
which had greatly aided the growth of the Nazi party di­
minished significantly during the first three years fol­
lowing Hitler's release from prison. Economic crises 
produced by the prolonged exertions of the war and exacer­
bated by the reparations payments and territorial losses 
Germany was subjected to by the Treaty of Versailles had
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culminated in the Great Inflation of 1922-1923* A wave 
of prosperity which lasted, except for a brief recession 
during the last two months of 1925 and the first half of 
1926, swept away many of the effects of those years. The 
unstable Weimar coalitions which had seemed powerless to 
cope with the many problems of the Reich before the Deer 
Hall Putsch were still the rule in Germany during I925- 
1928. However, they gained a measure of confidence from 
the public largely through the international successes of 
the foreign minister, Gustav Stresemann. Working largely 
out of the limelight, Stresemann was also responsible to 
a great degree for the relative stability of post-inflation 
cabinets and for the new-found ability of the ideologically 
diverse political parties of Weimar to work together.
During a brief stint as chancellor in 1923, Strese­
mann had ended the runaway inflation which had struck 
Germany. As foreign minister in 1924, he had worked out 
the Dawes Plan with the Allies, putting the payment of 
reparations on a sound footing which the German economy 
could bear.  ^ The Dawes Plan brought in its wake the 
ingredient which was indispensable for German economic 
recovery: foreign loans, primarily from America. These
loans, which amounted to more than 19 billion marks by 
1928, began funnelling into Germany in 1924.^ As a result, 
the economy of the Reich made an immediate recovery. Un­
employment fell to 4.1 per cent in May, 1924.^ Concur­
rently, real wages began a steady rise which was not to
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end until the onset of the Great Depression. The cost of 
living in Germany also increased during this period, but 
much more slowly than wages, indicating that the material 
well-being of Germans definitely improved.* The only 
negative aspect apparent in this period of prosperity was 
the high rate of unemployment that prevailed and the gen­
erally depressed state of German agriculture.
When the recession of 1925-1926 struck, unemploy­
ment zoomed to almost I5 per cent of the total work force 
in December, 1925. Never again during the Weimar period 
did the figure drop to under 7 per cent. In 1925 the high 
point was July, with 22.1 per cent of the total work force 
unemployed. For the entire period 1925-1928, unemployment 
averaged over 10 per cent.^
Agricultural production during the period 1925-1928 
was never equal to pre-war production even though more 
acreage was utilized. This was due in part to outmoded 
agricultural methods and in part to soil exhaustion caused 
by lack of necessary fertilizers. As a result, there was 
considerable dissatisfaction in rural Germany which un­
doubtedly contributed directly to the "green rebellion" 
of the late twenties
The most important political event of the period 
1925-1928 in Germany was the death in February, 1925 (the 
same month in which the NSDAP was refounded) of the Presi­
dent of the Weimar Republic, Friedrich Ebert. This was
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followed by the election of Field Marshall Paul von 
Hindenburg, an avowed monarchist, as President of the 
Reich. The significance of Hindenburg's election only 
became apparent during the crisis years of 1930-1933. 
During this period the old man was manipulated by a suc­
cession of shrewd self-seekers into using the extraor­
dinary emergency powers delegated to his office by the 
Weimar Constitution in ways definitely detrimental to 
democracy in Germany.^
Other than Hindenburg's election, nothing excep­
tional happened in Weimar politics before 1928. Gains 
made by the radical parties in the national elections 
of May, 1924, at the expense of the moderate republican 
parties were lost in large part seven months later. In 
1928, the republican parties made further gains, with 
the result that another Grand Coalition could be formed. 
The Weimar picture had brightened considerably. All Ger­
man governments during this period retained Stresemann as 
foreign minister, the post which he held until his death 
in 1929. Stresemann was able during 1925-1928 to accom­
plish several notable gains for Germany internationally, 
including admission to the League of Nations, the Locarno 
Agreement with the Western nations, and the Treaty of 
Berlin with the Soviet Union. All of these were advanta­
geous for Germany and increased the prestige of the Weimar 
government both at home and abroad.^
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The RGfoundin.B: of the NSDAP 
At the time of Hitler's release from Landsberg in 
November, 1924, he found the Nazi party banned all over 
Germany. State governments had also suppressed its prin­
cipal newspaper, the Voelkischer Beobachter. The former 
members and leaders of the party had dispersed. Many of 
them had been partially or completely absorbed by other 
radical Voelkisch parties. Those left, divided into a 
number of competing factions surrounding Hitler's former 
lieutenants, most notably Rosenburg, Strasser, and 
Streicher. Furthermore, the recovering economy of the 
Reich and the somewhat stabilized political situation 
described above seemed to offer little chance of success 
for a radical political movement which thrived on societal 
discontent and crisis. Undismayed, however, Hitler set 
about to reorganize his party and turn it toward the con­
quest of power in Germany, this time by a new route-- 
legality.
The first problem confronting Hitler was the gov­
ernmental ban on the party and its newspaper. By making 
a deal with the Bavarian government through one of its 
ministers--assuring him of the "legal" intentions of the 
Nazis and of their devotion to the existing government-- 
Hitler was able to have the restrictions removed (at least 
in Bavaria).^ The first issue of the new Voelkischer 
Beobachter appeared on February 26, 1925• It announced
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the refounding of the NSDAP, the beginning of its "new 
course," and the new and rather stringent requirements 
for membership. Membership cards were to be issued, 
duplicates of which were to be kept in a central file 
at party headquarters in Munich. A new number sequence 
for party members was begun with Hitler himself receiving 
membership card number one of the "new" party.
During the years 1925-1928 the Nazis did not direct 
their propaganda appeals to any particular group in Ger­
many. Their appeals to the German people through news­
papers and speeches were directed to all segments of 
s o c i e t y . A  typical issue of the Voelkischer Deobachter 
during the period contained articles discussing the prob­
lems of farmers, workers, white collar workers, shop­
keepers, and all other socio-economic groups in the Reich. 
These articles generally blamed the "corrupt" Weimar poli­
ticians, the Versailles Treaty, and above all, the Jews 
for those problems and went on to propose "National Social­
ist" solutions.
In July, 1927. Joseph Goebbels initiated the publi­
cation of a particularly offensive, sensationalist Nazi 
newspaper in Berlin--Der Angriff. It has been suggested 
that the crude propaganda appeals of Goebbels' paper were 
directed mainly at Berlin's w o r k e r s . A  survey of the 
pages of Der An,griff for 192? reveals that it did indeed 
contain a great number of articles emphasizing the benefits
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workers could derive if they joined the National Socialist 
movement. However, the newspaper also contained appeals 
to German youth (students in particular), small business­
men, artisans, and practically every other occupational 
group with the exception of f a r m e r s . B a s e d  on the 
columns of the most infamous Nazi propaganda organs. 
Hitler's party remained true to its stated intention of 
unifying all segments of German society into one mass 
movement.
After the refounding of the NSDAP, Hitler quickly 
eliminated all persons posing a threat to his absolute 
leadership and those who opposed the new c o u r s e . A m o n g  
those who left the party was Roehm, who clashed with 
Hitler over the role and organization of the SA. He re­
signed his post in April and subsequently left the coun­
t r y . H i t l e r ' s  power within the movement was demonstrated 
during the presidential campaign which began almost con­
currently with the refounding of the NSDAP. He initially 
supported the Voelkisch candidate, Ludendorff, his former 
putschist partner. Ludendorff received only an embarras­
sing 200,000 votes in the general election and Hitler pre-
1925--Modest Beginnings 
When the "new" Nazi party was born in February,
1925, the economic boom which had begun in 1924 was getting 
into full swing. Unemployment was at its lowest point
since the end of the inflation and wages were rising rap­
idly . Only in the agricultural section was there a note 
of discord in the otherwise harmonic German economic situ­
ation.^^ Politically, the poor showing by the Communist 
candidate Thaelmann and by Ludendorff in the presidential 
election indicated a turning away from the political ex­
tremes by the German electorate. On the international 
scene, Stresemann was on the verge of consummating the 
Locarno agreement and securing several important conces­
sions for Germany from the Allies. Despite all this, the 
Nazi party grew in size much more rapidly than it ever had 
in the pre-putsch era, except for 1923.
Over 2 7 >000 people joined the NSDAP in 1925.^^ Of 
that total, 5,225 biographies are used in this sample.
In addition to data on the age, sex, and occupation avail­
able for the early party period, it was also possible to 
retrieve the following information about party members 
who joined in the pre-depression period: the size of the
communities in which each new member lived; the region of 
Germany from which each new party member came; the date 
on which each member left the party, where applicable; and 
the date on which those members who left the party re­
joined, if applicable. This makes possible several more 
definitive conclusions about the social composition of the 
party membership in the 1924-1930 period than was possible 
with the limited information available about members in 
the early period.
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The percentage of women among new members entering 
the NSDAP in 1925 continued the decline evident from the 
first year of the early party. Only 8.2 per cent (42? 
individuals) of the sample of new Nazis for 1925 were 
women.
Although many of those persons joining the NSDAP 
in 1925 were undoubtedly draivn from the pre-putsch member­
ship, this could not have been true of all the new members. 
This is evidenced by several striking dissimilarities in 
the age and occupational classification of members from 
the two periods. The age structure of those joining the 
party in 1925 was as follows in Table I5 .
TABLE 15
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925
Group Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
fa in
Under 20 631 12.1 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 1,992 38.1 1 1 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 821 15.7 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 631 12.1 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 327 6.3 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 93 1.8 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 730 13.9 - -
Totals: 5,225 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
The trend toward extreme youth among new Nazis 
noted in I92I-I923 abated slightly during 1925, but there
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were still a great number of young people among incoming 
members. It is obvious from these figures that despite 
the economic recovery of Germany noted above, there r e ­
mained a large residue of dissatisfaction with German 
society among the younger g e n e r a t i o n . T h e  figures for 
the areas of Germany from which the new members of 1925 
came are especially interesting as shown in Table l6 .^^
TABLE 16
GEOGRAPHIC
JOINING
ORIGINS 
THE NSDAP
OF PERSONS 
IN 1925
No. of % of
Geographic % in
Area Members Member s Reich Reich
South Germany 1,741 33.3 1 6 ,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 1,035 19.8 1 3 ,950,000 21.3
North Germany 2,212 42.4 2 4 ,567,000 37.6
East Prussia* 156 3.0 4,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 81 1.5 5 ,983,000 9.2
Totals : 5,225 100.0 6 5 ,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig
One conclusion must be drawn from these figures : 
either the assertion that the pre-putsch party was pre­
dominantly a South German organization is wrong and the 
early party was already well established all over Germany 
by 19231 or else the characterization of the party as 
totally disorganized, paralyzed, and retrogressive in the
i4o
fifteen months between the failure of the Beer Hall Putsch 
and the refounding of the party is mistaken. The latter 
is probably the case because by the end of 19^5 the NSDAP 
was already well established nationwide, with the possible 
exceptions of Schleswig-Holstein and East Prussia. Al­
though South Germany is overrepresented in the party in 
relation to its percentage of the total German population, 
it is far from being even the most heavily represented 
region. That dubious honor belongs to North Germany.
East Prussia is underrepresented in the Nazi mem­
bership of 19251 us is Schleswig-Holstein and the Rhine­
land, when compared to their total populations in relation 
to the Reich. However, both Schleswig-Holstein and East 
Prussia have at least the beginnings of an orgeinization 
with a definite potential for growth. The Rhineland, a 
predominantly industrial region and a stronghold of the 
SPD and KPD, had a representation only slightly smaller 
than its total population relative to that of the Reich. 
Taken collectively, these figures indicate that at least 
by the end of 1925 the NSDAP was a nationwide movement 
with its greatest strength in North and South Germany, 
somewhat weaker on the eastern and western borders.
The statistics for the size of communities from 
which those who joined the Nazis in 1925 came are very 
revealing as seen in Table 17-^^ The conception of Ger­
many as a largely urban representative of modern indus­
trialized nations held by many is in error. In 1925 the
I4l 
TABLE 17
COMMUNITY SIZE FROM WHICH PERSONS 
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925 CAME
Community
N o . of
New
Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 10,000
10-50,000
50-200,000
Over 200,000
1 ,220 
1,293 
1,028 
1,654
23.3
24.7
19.7
31.7
33,048,020
9 ,777,134
6,246,998
13,755,048
52.6
15.6 
9.9
21.9
5,225 100.0 6 2 ,828,000 100.0
majority of the German population still lived in small 
communities or in the countryside, and the Nazis had not 
yet made any considerable number of converts in rural 
Germany. The main strength of the NSDAP was still con­
centrated in the large urban centers with over 200,000 
population, as well as in the smaller metropolitan areas.
It is obvious that those who have characterized Nazism as 
a small-town phenomenon are mistaken--at least in relation 
to the party membership as it stood in 1925.^^
The occupational statistics for those who joined 
the NSDAP in 1925 are notable for several differences in 
the party structure from the trends indicated in the last 
two years of the pre-putsch party--see Table l8 . The ap­
parent trend toward fewer workers among new members coming 
into the NSDAP which appeared in the statistics for 1922 
and 1923, in Chapter II above, was reversed in the incoming
TABLE 18
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1925
No. of % of
Occupational Yo in
Categories Members Members Reich Reich
Unskilled Laborers 915
Skilled Laborers I68
Agricultural Laborers 70
17.5
4.2
1.8
10,679,848
1.146.945
2 .499.945
1 4 ,326,738
35.3 
3.8 
8.3
47.4
Artisans 
White Collar 
Foremen 
Managers 
Civil Servants 
Self-Employed 
School Teachers
973
1,278
63
80
205
205
51
2,855
18.5
24.4
l.l
1.4
3.8
3.8 
1.0
54.0
4,488,428
5 ,274,232
14.8
17.4
Included under white collar
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
10,321,736 34.3
Farmers
Large Landowners
187
13
3.6
0.2
3.8
2 ,139,878 7.1
Included with farmers
2 ,139,878
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
14
0
0.3
0.0
104,000 0.3
No figures available
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
F inanciers 
Private Incomes
144
0
43
6
27
220
2.7
0.0
0.7
0.5
4.0
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
3
0
222
171
71
76
234
Totals: 777
All Categories: 5 , 2 2 5
0.05
0.0
4.1
3.2
1.3
1.4
4.4
14.45
100.05
No figures available
6.3*
No figures available
1 5 ,65 0 ,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an 
average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, 
based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely 
that the figure for non-union workers was higher.
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members of 1925- Unskilled laborers among the new members 
for 1925 wore more numerous percentagewise than in any 
year except 1921, although still very low relative to the 
percentage of that occupational category in German society 
as a whole. The percentage of skilled laborers in this 
sample, although not as high as in 1919-1921, was still 
much higher than 1922 and almost equal to the percentage 
of that group in the Reich work force. Agricultural 
laborers were better represented among the new members 
in 1925 than in any previous year, indicating the Nazis 
were making some progress in the countryside. However, 
that group was still strongly underrepresented in the 
NSDAP compared to their numbers in all of German society.
The Reichswehr had enacted strict regulations 
against its members belonging to a political party in 
1924.^^ Although this rule was violated by a few offi­
cers and enlisted men, military personnel made up no 
appreciable segment of the party during the period I925- 
1930. However, the percentage of enlisted men coming into 
the party in 1925 was approximately equal to their per­
centage in the German work force.
The percentage of new Nazis from the ranks of the 
professions was slightly higher than in 1922 and 1923, but 
was still much lower than the figures for the first three 
years of the party. The figure of 2.7 per cent of new 
professional members among Nazi recruits for 1925 is over
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twice as high as that group's representation in the Reich, 
indicating there was still a residue of discontent among 
the educated in German s o c i e t y . S c h o o l  teachers, who 
have been maligned as one of the chief sources of support
of new members for the NSDAP in 1925, exactly equal to the 
strength of that group in society as a whole. No one 
listing their occupation as professor appeared in the 
sample for 1925, and only three clergymen.
Farmers and large landowners in this sample for 
persons entering the NSDAP in 1925 made up a larger part 
of the whole than in 1919-1923. However, the percentage 
of farmers entering the NSDAP in 1923 showed a decided 
increase over the first four years of the party. There­
fore, the increase in this category is not greatly 
surprising.
Self-employed persons among new members in 1925 
declined somewhat percentagewise as compared to the pre­
putsch era, but still made up a considerable part of the 
total membership. Capitalists and financiers continued 
to constitute only a small part of the NSDAP membership, 
but large if one considers how small those groups were in 
German society as a whole. The percentage of persons with 
private incomes in this sample is about the same as for 
the period 1919-1923, well below that group's representa­
tion in the Reich. The number of civil servants entering
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the party in 1925 was slightly higher than in 1922 per­
centagewise, but still appreciably lower than that group's 
total during the party's first three years.
By far the largest single occupational group in the 
sample is the white collar workers. The percentage for 
this group is slightly lower than in 1922-1923, but still 
significantly higher than the figure for Germany as a 
whole. The occupational classification of foremen con­
stituted a slightly higher percentage of members entering 
the party in 1925 than it did in 1923, and managers were 
about the same. Persons from the arts were slightly 
fewer in 1925 percentagewise than in 1923. Artisans 
showed an appreciable decline in 1925 as compared to 1923 
but still made up a somewhat larger part of the NSDAP mem­
bership than they did of the total German work force. All 
of these occupations taken together with self-employed 
represent the urban lower-middle class. They make up a 
majority of party members but clearly do not overwhelm 
the membership. Characterizations of the NSDAP as "over­
whelmingly" lower-middle class are demonstrably wrong for 
the party as it was constituted at the end of 1925.
The percentage of students was almost the same for 
those entering the NSDAP in 1925 as in 1923. Both were 
considerably lower than for the first three years of the 
party's existence. The housewives made up a slightly 
higher portion of the party membership in 1925 than in
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1922-1923, but they ere still nowhere near the strength 
of that group in the Reich. Retired persons constituted 
about the same percentage in the party in 1925 as in 1922, 
still well below their representation in society as a
Another datum not available for the early party 
membership that is contained on the membership cards for 
the period 1925-1930 is the number of people who left the 
NSDAP. The percentage of persons leaving the party in 
1925 in this sample is not great (5-7 per cent), but be­
comes much greater in succeeding years. Even this trickle 
of quitters means that the party had at least 1,600 fewer 
members at the end of 1925 than the membership numbers 
quoted by Volz indicated. Thus, at the beginning of I926 
the party had approximately 25,400 members.
Taken as a whole, 1925 must be considered a suc­
cessful year for Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party. From 
a state of leaderless disorganization the NSDAP became a 
nationwide movement with strong leadership and purpose.
The party membership was overwhelmingly male and very 
young, with the middle class overrepresented, but with 
sizeable representations from all segments of German 
society. The membership as portrayed in this sample was 
largely urban, but substantial inroads had been made into 
the rural areas of Germany. The party was strongest in 
North and South Germany, but all sections of the country
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were represented, including a strong showing by the Rhine­
land, a region previously supposed to be a stronghold of 
Social Democracy. In 1925 also a small number of persons 
left the Nazi party after less than a year of membership. 
This trend was to become more and more pronounced in suc­
ceeding years. As is sometimes the case with persons who 
are "saved" at religious revival meetings, a number often 
backslid; so it was at emotional meetings of the NSDAP.
1926--Nazi Incursions into the Proletariat
The business recession which struck the German 
economy in the last months of 1925 continued well into 
the summer of I926. Only during the latter part of July 
did a renewed flow of foreign capital once again prompt 
a recovery, lasting until the onslaught of the Great De­
pression. One immediate effect of the recession was a 
sharp rise in unemployment which reached as high as 22.1 
per cent of the total work force by July, only slightly 
lower than the worst days of 1923. Even in December, 
with the business recovery well underway, the jobless 
rate declined only to 12.8 per cent of the total work 
force. Unusually high rates of unemployment continued 
throughout the Weimar Republic, belying the apparent 
prosperity of the years 1926-1929.
The agricultural crisis continued unabated in I926. 
Production of most agricultural products remained below 
1913 levels in Germany, and despite high protective
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tariffs, foreign agricultural products continued to under­
sell domestic produce.
The recession took a large toll of small and/or 
undercapitalized and marginal businesses. During the 
first seven months of 1926 bankruptcies averaged almost
2,000 per month. By the end of the year the staggering 
number of 4,000 incorporated companies and 13,000 limited 
liability companies in Germany had failed.
Despite this gloomy picture of the German economy 
in 1926, there were a few bright spots. For the first 
time since the war (except for the unnatural period of 
the Great Inflation), wages in Germany surpassed the 1913 
level. The cost of living remained at about the same 
level as 1925, while wages took a hefty jump. This meant 
that real wages rose sharply in 1926, making for a sub­
stantial improvement in the situations of many Germans-- 
at least those who were employed.
On the political and international scene 1926 wit­
nessed new triumphs for Stresemann's foreign policy and 
new fiascoes for the chronically weak Weimar governments. 
In April, Stresemann concluded the Treaty of Berlin with 
the USSR, which reassured the Russians about the Locarno 
agreement reached the preceding year with the Western 
nations, and at the same time reaffirmed its provisions.
In September, Stresemann brought Germany into the League 
of Nations. However, the instability of the Weimar gov­
ernment was emphasized in May when Luther's second cabinet
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fell over a minor dispute. On the other hand, there 
were no national elections, Communist revolts, or rightist 
putsches. All in all, 1926 was a good year for the repub­
lic politically.
Over 22,000 people joined the NSDAP in 1926. A 
total of 4,435 biographies, or almost one-fifth of the 
entire new membership are used in this sample.
Male dominance became even more pronounced among 
persons entering the NSDAP in 1926 than it had been in 
previous years. Only 5-4 per cent of the incoming members 
were women. Concurrently, the persons under thirty years 
of age entering the party remained an absolute majority 
as shown in Table 19.
TABLE 19
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1926
No. of % of
Age N o . in % in
Group Members Members Reich Reich
Under 20 859 19.5 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 1,971 44.5 11 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 762 17.3 8 ,865,091 20.5
40-49 473 10.8 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 202 4.6 6 ,561,514 14.9
Over 60 83 1.3 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 86 2.0 - -
4,436 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
The number of persons over forty years of age in
this sample of persons who entered the Nazi party in 1926
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is extremely low in relation to their total strength in 
German society. For the first time in its history, the 
Nazi movement--when judged by its re emits--began to take 
on the appearance of a "youth r e b e l l i o n . H o w e v e r ,  
there were still a great number of older persons coming 
into the party. To attempt to identify the NSDAP as only 
a rebellion by the disillusioned youth of Germany would 
be misleading, even though 8l per cent of the incoming 
members in 1926 were under forty years of age.
The areas of Germany from which the new members 
came is very revealing in assessing the social composition 
of new Nazis in 1926--see Table 20. The most striking
TABLE 20
GEOGRAPHICAL ORIGINS OF PERSONS 
ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1926
N o . of % of
Geographic New % in
Area Members Members
South Germany 1.359 30.6 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 1,195 26.9 1 3 ,950,000 21.3
North Germany 1,631 36.8 2 4 ,567,000 37.6
East Prussia* 127 2.9 4,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 112 2.5 5 ,983,000 9.2
Not Given 12 0.3 - -
4,436 100.0 6 5 ,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
change from the statistics for 1925 is in the substantial
increase in new members from the Rhineland, which suggests
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that the Nazis made inroads into industrial labor in
1926.^^ New members from the Rhineland actually exceeded 
their relative strength in the Reich as a whole in 1926. 
The new members from Schleswig-Holstein in this sample 
rose slightly over the previous year, but were still con­
siderably lower than the size of Schleswig-Holstein's pop­
ulation relative to Germany's total population, as was 
East Prussia's percentage of the new Nazis. New recruits 
from North and South Germany decreased somewhat percent­
agewise in 1926, but remained above their population size 
relative to the rest of Germany.
There was a decided shift in the size of the com­
munities from which new members of the NSDAP came in 1926 
as seen in Table 21. The percentage of new members de­
clined in all categories except communities of under
TABLE 21
SIZE OF COMMUNITIES FROM WHICH NEW 
NSDAP MEMBERS CAME IN 1926
Community
Size Members
% of 
Members
No . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 10,000 1,314 29.6 33,048,820 52.6
10-50,000 1,035 23.3 9 ,777,134 15 .6
50- 200,000 711 16.1 6,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 1,346 30.3 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 30 0.7 - -
4,436 100.0 6 2 ,828,000 100.0
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10,000 persons. All of the other categories, however, 
supplied a higher proportion of Nazi recruits than their 
share of the total population of the Reich warranted. The 
only category of community size which was underrepresented 
relative to its percentage strength in the nation as a 
whole was the "under-10,000" classification.
The occupational breakdown of Nazi recruits in 1926 
reflected the changes in the size of the communities from 
which they came (see Table 22). The most striking changes 
in the occupational structure of the new party members are 
these: a substantial decrease in the percentage of new
members from those occupations which we may call the "new" 
middle class--white collar workers, professional people 
and school teachers, foremen and managers. Concurrently, 
there was a sharp increase in the proportion of new Nazis 
in this sample from the "old" middle class--artisans, 
self-employed persons, and farmers. Nor the first time, 
the percentage of farmers coming into the party was 
approximately equal to the strength of that group in 
German society, substantiating the generalization made 
possible by the statistics on the size of the communities 
from which new members came. National Socialism was at 
last well on its way toward becoming solidly established 
in the rural areas of Germany.
Workers in the sample of new converts to Nazism in 
1926 increased substantially percentagewise over the
TABLE 22
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1926
Occupational
Categories
N o . of 
Members
% of 
Members Reich
% in
Unskilled Laborers 894 20.2 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 185 4.2 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 81 1.8 2 ,499,945 8.3
1,160 26.2 1 4 ,326,738 47.4
Artisans 944 21.3 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 777 17.5 5 ,274,232 17.4
Foremen 3 0.1 Included with white collar
Managers 45 1.0 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 169 3.8 No figures available
Self-Employed 189 4.3 No figures available
School Teachers 39 0.9 308,741 1.0
2,166 48.9 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers 273 6.2 2 ,139,878 7-1
Large Landowners 6 0.1 Included with farmers
Totals: 279 6.3 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
0.0
0.1
104,000 0.3
No figures available
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
15
0
18
136
2.3
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.4
3.0
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3 ,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories :
238
122
59
61
201
686
4,436
0.1
0.0
5.4
2.8
1.3
1.4
4.5 
15.5
100.0
No figures available
18.3*
No figures available
15 ,65 0 ,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30 ,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an 
average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, 
based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely 
that the figure for non-union workers was higher.
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previous year. Workers from all three categories exceeded 
one-fourth of the incoming recruits for the first time 
since 1921. A combination of Nazi propaganda appeals to 
laborers and the high rate of unemployment in Germany in 
1926 contributed to the number of work rs entering Hit­
ler's m o v e m e n t . T h e  percentage of new members in this 
sample falling into the other occupational categories in 
1926 remained relatively unchanged from 1925.
Proportionately, persons who left the party in 1926 
increased substantially from the 1925 figure. Of those 
who joined the party in 1925, 16.2 per cent (846 individ­
uals) left the movement in 1926. A further 329 persons 
(7.4 per cent of the total sample for 1926) did not com­
plete a year in the party. When these percentages are 
extended to the total membership of the NSDAP it means 
approximately 4,400 of the 27,000 persons who joined the 
party in 1925 left it in I926 and that about 1,700 of 
the approximately 22,000 new members who joined in 1926 
left it the same year.
Instead of the almost 50,000 membership claimed by 
the Nazis for the beginning of 1927, the total strength 
of the party at that time was probably closer to 42,000.^^ 
This indicates that a number of persons attracted to the 
Nazi movement by its propaganda and its emotional mass 
meetings concluded very soon that it did not actually 
meet their needs as they had hoped. Seventeen persons
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in the sample who left the party in 1925 rejoined it in 
1926, receiving new membership cards with new numbers.
The old numbers were left vacant which further complicates 
efforts to ascertain the true numerical strength of the 
NSDAP.
The social composition of the NSDAP was undergoing 
a basic transformation in I926. The strength of the party 
was shifting from the larger cities to smaller communities, 
particularly smaller communities in the more industrial­
ized regions of Germany. At the same time, the membership 
was becoming overwhelmingly masculine and predominantly 
young. The "new" middle class, formerly the largest 
single occupational category in the party, was being dis­
placed by the "old" middle class and by the worker class­
ifications as the backbone of Nazi strength. For the 
first time (discounting 1923), farmers made up a signifi­
cant percentage of new members entering Hitler's party in
1926. The exodus from the party which had begun in 1925 
reached rather large proportions in I926 , indicating that 
the Nazis did not deliver everything they promised.
Considering the high rate of unemployment in Ger­
many in 1926, along with the great number of business 
failures and the continuing agricultural depression, Nazi 
gains in membership were not impressive. One conclusion 
that may be tentatively drawn from this is that those who 
see the Nazi successes as directly tied to unemployment
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and economic crises are not entirely correct. The rela­
tive lack of success of the Nazis in attracting new mem­
bers in the economic recession of I926 indicates that 
factors other than material were instrumental in the deci­
sions of Germans to join the National Socialist movement.
It is tempting to suggest that the relative polit­
ical stability of Germany in I926 along with several 
apparent gains in foreign policy dissuaded the masses 
from seeking radical political solutions to their problems, 
but this, too, is overly simplistic. A great number of 
factors--economic, emotional, political, psychological, 
ideological, etc.-- entered into the attraction of individ­
uals for the Nazi party. In I926 these many factors were 
not present in sufficient amount to attract any large per­
centage of the German population to the ranks of Hitler's 
movement.
1927--Floodtlde of Youth in the NSDAP 
As far as Germany was concerned, 192? was a rela­
tively uneventful year both in international relations and 
in internal politics. The German economy reached boom 
proportions in response to the steady flow of foreign 
capital--mainly Amerlean--into the country. The Weimar 
Republic, benefiting from the growing prosperity of the 
nation, had apparently become, if not popular, at least 
accepted by most Germans. However, there were ominous 
signs that all was not as well as it seemed in Germany.
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The agricultural depression not only continued, but deep­
ened, creating the beginnings of a "green rebellion." The 
high rates of unemployment reached in I926 were not re­
peated, but nevertheless the unemployed continued to con­
stitute an alarmingly large portion of the total German 
work force.
Industrial production in Germany in 192? exceeded
same time, real wages increased substantially as the cost 
of living rose slowly and wages took a healthy jump. 
Unemployment was still quite high, averaging about 8 to 9 
per cent of the work f o r c e , I n  the countryside, agri­
cultural production was still less than the 1913 total as 
the agricultural depression c o n t i n u e d . T h e  Nazis, par-
worsening conditions in rural areas and to make inroads 
among the workers in industrial regions by an intensified 
propaganda campaign. In 192? Goebbels was appointed 
Gauleiter of Berlin, a stronghold of the Marxist parties. 
Here he initiated a weekly newspaper aimed largely at the 
workers, especially in Berlin, called Per Angriff (The 
Attack). An indication of his success was the Nazi rally 
in the Wedding district of Berlin--an old Marxist strong- 
hold--where he attracted over one thousand workers. 
However, party propaganda on the national level continued 
to be directed at all segments of German society, partic­
ularly the middle classes. Hitler (who could now speak
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anywhere in Germany except P r u s s i a ) c o n t i n u e d  to attack 
the ineptness of the Weimar regime, labeling its officials 
as "November Criminals" and Jews intent on the complete 
subjugation of the German people to the interests of "in­
ternational finance capital." Other prominent Nazi 
speakers continually pointed out the social inequities in 
the Reich and the helplessness of the "little man" against 
the "establishment." Nazi newspapers called for the crea­
tion of a Volksgemeinschaft in which all members of society 
would share equally in its products.
The NSDAP grew slowly in 1927, gaining only about
23,000 new members. This brought the total number of per­
sons who had joined the refounded party since 1925 to 
approximately 72,000, but the actual strength of the mem­
bership was considerably less due to attrition.^^ For this 
study, 3,970 biographies were available, or slightly more 
than one-sixth of the total number of new recruits for
1927.
These new Nazis were even more overwhelmingly male 
than in previous years. Only 4.7 per cent of the incom­
ing members were women. Despite the professed legality 
of the NSDAP, women were not attracted to its ranks in any 
numbers, partly because of the Nazi's rather chauvinistic 
philosophy of the role of women in society.
The youth explosion in the party membership reached 
its zenith in 192?. The age distribution of new members
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•was as shown in Table 23. Persons under thirty years of
age constituted over 7O per cent of the total incoming
TABLE 23
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING 'THE NSDAP IN 1927
No . of 96 of
1 Age New N o . in % in
Group Members Members Reich Reich
Under 20 851 21.3 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 1,957 49.2 1 1 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 566 14.2 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 323 8.5 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 162 4.1 6 ,561,314 14.9
Over 60 86 2.1 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 28 0.6 - -
3,973 100.0 4 3 ,375,965 100.0
membership in 1927. New recruits over forty years of age 
represented less than 15 per cent of the total. These 
figures indicate that at least in the relatively prosper­
ous year of 1927, the radical political appeal of the 
NSDAP was by far the most effective among young Germans. 
One possible explanation for this is that younger Germans 
did not share proportionately in the economic prosperity 
of 1927. It is probable that the high unemployment rates 
contained a disproportionately large percentage of young 
people.
The surprisingly large percentage of persons under 
thirty years old coming into Hitler’s party might be ex­
plained also as the rejection of bourgeois, materialistic
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society by a younger generation that was determined to 
build a new and better world. In searching for paths to 
this brave new world, many hit upon National Socialism. 
There is evidence that a considerable amount of Nazi pro­
paganda was structured to appeal to exactly these senti­
ments among German y o u t h . T h e  Nazi movement, through 
a steady infusion of new members under thirty years of 
age, continued to be a young and dynamic movement, in 
direct contrast to many of its political rivals. For 
example, only 7*7 per cent of the members of the SPD were 
under twenty-five and a further 9.6 per cent between 
twenty-five and thirty years of age at the beginning of
1927. The thirty to forty age group made up slightly 
more than 25 per cent of the total membership at that 
time, while well over half of the members were over foi'ty 
old.
The geographical origins of the new party members 
in 1927 were very little changed from the previous year 
except in one notable case--see Table 24. The percentage 
of new members from East Prussia and from Schleswig- 
Holstein increased slightly, but both remained substan­
tially below their total strength relative to the Reich. 
This indicates that despite the agricultural depression 
in Germany during the period, the people of these two 
primarily rural districts had not yet turned to the radi­
cal solutions to their problems offered by the Nazis in 
any great degree.
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TABLE 24
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1927
N o . of % of
Geographic New fa in
Area Members Members Reich Reich
South Germany 1,370 34.5 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 797 20.1 1 3 ,950,000 21.3
North Germany 1,513 38.1 24,567,000 37.6
East Prussia^ 136 3.4 4,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 137 3.4 5 ,983,000 9.2
No Entry 20 0.6 - -
Totals: 3,973 100.0 6 5 ,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
The surprising jump in the percentage of new members 
from the Rhineland coming into the NSDAP in 1926 was not 
repeated in 1927- The percentage of converts to Nazism 
coming from that region declined substantially to 20.1 
per cent--almost exactly the same as the population of the 
Rhineland relative to the population of the Reich.
Tlie representation of new members from North Ger­
many was also very close to the percentage of that area's 
total population relative to the national total. Only 
South Germany, the birthplace of Hitler's movement and 
still its headquarters, had a substantially higher repre­
sentation than its population relative to the Reich. In 
1927, the Nazis continued to do better in membership
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recruitment in the more industrialized and urban areas of 
Germany than in the predominantly rural, agricultural 
areas, although slow progress was apparent in these latter 
regions.
However, new members from smaller communities con­
tinued to increase, percentagewise, in the NSDAP in 192? 
as seen in Table 25. The percentage of new members join­
ing the party in small and rural communities continued to
TABLE 25
SIZE OF CGFDIUNITIES FROM WHICH NEW 
NSDAP MEMBERS CAME IN 192?
Community
Size Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 10,000 1,397 35.1 33,048,820 52.6
10-50,000 941 23.7 9 ,777,134 15.6
50-200,000 503 12.7 6,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 1,104 27.8 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 28 0.7 - -
Totals : 3,973 100.0 6 2 ,828,000 100.0
increase in 192?, but still remained substantially below 
the total proportion of persons living in such communi­
ties in Germany. It is apparent that although the Nazis 
were making progress in rural areas of Germany, the main 
strength of the party remained concentrated in urban 
centers. The percentage of new members from small cities/ 
large towns of from 1 0 ,000-50,000 population showed a very
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small increase and remained well above the figures for 
communities that size in the Reich, as did the percent­
ages of members from the two larger-city categories, al­
though both of these declined somewhat in total proportion 
of new members of the Nazi party in 192? as compared to 
1926. The overall results are plain: new members enter­
ing the NSDAP in 1927 in this sample overwhelmingly came 
from urban areas. The characterization of Hitler's move­
ment as anti-urban does not hold up--at least in 1927*
The urban character of the Nazi party was once 
again demonstrated by the occupational structure of those 
entering the movement in 1927 as shown in Table 26. The 
percentage of workers among incoming members reached its 
peak in 1927> totaling 28.7 per cent in the three worker 
categories and surpassing the previous high of 1921. Al­
though the total proportion of workers in German society 
continued to be considerably higher than their represen­
tation among the recruits for Hitler's movement, it is 
clear from these figures that the Nazi propaganda directed 
at the workers, along with the continued high rate of 
unemployment in Germany, was definitely attracting growing 
numbers of workers into the NSDAP.
The percentage of military personnel among new mem­
bers continued to be negligible. The trend already seen 
in the membership of the NSDAP in the previous years of a 
slow but steady increase in the numbers of new Nazis from
TABLE 26
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 192?
Occupational
Categories
N o . of 
New 
Members
% of 
Me mbers
N o . in 
Reich
% in
Unskilled Laborers 888 22.4 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 148 3.7 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 105 2.6 2,499,945 8.3
1,141 28.7 14,326,738 47.4
Artisans 901 22.7 4,488,428 14.8
White Collar 810 20.4 5,274,232 17.4
Foremen 32 0.8 Included with white collar
Managers 54 1.4 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 3.1 No figures available
Self-Employed 123 3.1 No figures available
School Teachers 30 0.8 308,741 1.0
Totals: 2,072 52.3 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers 229 5.8 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 9 0.2 Included with f cirmers
Totals : 238 6.0 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
0.3
0.0
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
60
3
9
5
30
107
1.5 237,850 0.7
0.1 No figures available
0.2 No figures available
0.1 No figures available
0.8 2 ,944,872 9.2
3,182,722 9.9
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
Totals : 
All Categories:
0
0
120
61
39
28
156
4o4
0.0
0.0
3.0 
1.5
1.0 
0.7 
3.9
10.1
100.0
No figures available
8.8*
No figures available
1 5,65 0,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the year compiled from B r y , Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, based on the 
number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure 
for non-union workers was higher.
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the upper middle class was continued in 192? « with fewer 
recruits in the categories of "professional," "profes­
sors," self-employed," and "capitalists," The only ex­
ception to this trend was a minute increase in the per­
centage of the category of "managers." There was a 
decrease in the proportion of farmers among NSDAP members 
in this sample, but the percentage remained very close to 
that group's total in German society. The number of 
school teachers coming into the party remained very low 
in 1927 again disproving the generalization that this 
group made up a disproportionately large part of the Nazi 
party membership.
The total percentage of the lower-middle class 
represented here by the "old" lower-middle class category 
of artisans and the "new" lower-middle class classifica­
tion of white-collar workers continued to grow, reaching 
more than 49 per cent of the total new members in 192?1 
compared to their national total of only 30 per cent.
This indicates that although the NSDAP was becoming 
increasingly attractive to the workers in Germany, its 
main strength still lay in the lower-middle class. Sur­
prisingly- -considering the youth of the new members in 
19271 particularly the number of those under twenty--the 
proportion of new members listing their occupations as 
"student" decreased substantially in 1927 compared to 
1926. This suggests that the new members were largely
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young blue and white-collar workers, young artisans, and 
young farmers. Despite the high unemployment rates in 
1927, none of the incoming members in this sample listed 
their occupation as "unemployed.”
The stream of persons leaving the NSDAP become 
quite pronounced in 1927. Of the total number of new 
members in this sample who joined Hitler's party in 1925» 
22 per cent left it in 1927. Of the 1926 recruits, 22.5 
deserted in 1927 and 12.3 per cent of those who joined in 
1927 did not stay out the year. If these figures are 
applied to the entire membership of the party, it means 
that by the end of 1927 approximately 13,800 persons had 
left the Nazi party. Although membership numbers reached 
over 72,000 by the beginning of 1928, the actual strength 
of the party was probably less than 5 9 , 0 0 0 . Of those 
who left, twenty-four persons in the sample re-entered the 
party in 1927 with new party numbers and were included 
with new entrants.
The trends indicated by the statistics for 1925 and 
1926 continued and in fact culminated in 1927 with two 
exceptions. The "youth explosion" among the new members 
in 1927 reached its peak as did the "prolitarization" of 
the party. Concurrently, the representatives from the 
lower-middle class among new members also reached its peak 
for the pre-1930 period. The new Nazis from communities 
of less than 10,000 persons continued to rise percentage­
wise; however, the urban centers continued to be the
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largest suppliers of recruits for Hitler's movement. The 
number of persons leaving the party continued to increase 
at an accelerating rate. North Germany continued to be 
the largest supplier of new recruits, but in relation to 
its total population in the Reich, South Germany remained 
the chief Nazi stronghold.
One of the trends indicated by the statistics for 
1925 and 1926 was that the Nazis would draw increasingly 
large numbers of new members from the Rhineland. This 
did not prove true in 1927- Another indication of the 
1925-26 figures was that fewer new Nazis would come from 
the ranks of the white-collar workers of Germany. Again, 
this did not turn out to be true in 1927.
Despite the general prosperity of Germany in 1927 
and the relative lack of controversy in international 
affairs and in internal politics, the Nazis continued to 
be successful in attracting new converts into a political 
movement whose rhetoric demanded fundamental changes in 
the political and social structure of German society. 
However, the Nazi party remained in 1927 a very small 
splinter party whose voice was much stronger than its 
numerical strength.
The NSDAP during 1925-1928--Summary 
The social composition of the NSDAP membership 
underwent a number of changes between its refounding in 
February, 1925, and January 1, 1928. To begin with, the
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average age of new members entering the party became pro­
gressively younger as seen in Table 2?. The membership 
of the early party was youthful, but not overwhelmingly 
so. In contrast, the refounded party could, by the end 
of 19271 justifiably be characterized as a party of youth. 
Of its new members, 6l per cent were under thirty years of 
age at the time they joined the movement. This character­
istic will be explored in some detail in the conclusion 
of this investigation of the social composition of the 
Nazi party. At the same time it was becoming younger, the 
NSDAP membership was becoming markedly more masculine as 
shown in Table 28.
Significant changes were also evident in the year- 
by-year occupational structure of the Nazi party member­
ship in the period 1925-1928. The percentage of laborers 
among new recruits became progressively greater, as did 
the percentage of artisans. Professional people declined 
steadily proportionately. New members listing their oc­
cupations as "farmers" fluctuated percentagewise, but was 
still appreciably higher in 1927 than in 1925. The pro­
portion of white-collar workers among new recruits also 
fluctuated. Although the total percentage of this occu­
pational group was lower in 1927 than it was in 1925 (the 
peak year percentagewise for white-collar workers) it was 
still appreciably above the total of that group in German 
society as a whole. Occupationally, Hitler's party at the
CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY 
BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH THOSE FOR I919-I923 AND THE REICH
Age
Group 1919-23
% in 
Party
1919-23
N o . in 
Party
1925-28
% in 
Party
1925-28
% in
Under 20 1,513 18.5 2,341 17.2 3 ,897,555 9.0
20-29 3,333 40.8 5,920 43.8 1 1 ,458,015 26.6
30-39 1,432 17.6 2,149 15.7 8 ,863,091 20.5
40-49 891 11.0 1,427 10.4 7 ,754,071 17.9
50-59 326 4.0 691 4.9 6 ,561,314 14.9
60 & Over 151 1.9 262 1.8 4,841,919 11.1
No Entry 498 6.2 844 6.2 - -
8,144 100.0 13,634 100.0 4 3 ,275,965 100.0
CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE SEX OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY 
BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH THOSE FOR I919-I923 AND THE REICH
N o . in % in N o . in % in N o . in % in
Party Party Party Party Reich
Sex 1919-23 1919-23 1925-28 1925-28 (over 16) (over 16)
Male 7,457 91.6 12,780 93-7 19,511,514 45-1
Female 642 7-9 854 6.3 23,764,451 54.9
Undeter. 45 O .5
8,144 100.0 13,634 100.0 4 3 ,275,965
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beginning of 1928 was decidedly middle class, particularly 
lower-middle class but with a much larger representation 
from other segments of society than has been previously 
supposed--see Table 29 «
A number of differences between the cumulative 
occupational statistics for the early Nazi party member­
ship and the figures for 1925-1928 are evident in Table 
29. One of the most notable is the apparent success of 
the party's propaganda apparatus in attracting workers to 
the NSDAP. The percentage of white-collar workers and 
artisans entering the party between 1925 and 1928 also 
increased significantly, as did the proportion of farmers. 
Concurrently, the percentage of professional people among 
new converts declined by more than one-half, although it 
remained considerably above the proportion of that group 
in German society.
Another striking change was the dramatic decrease 
in the percentage of civil servants among the new members 
for the period 1925-1928 compared to that of the early 
party, perhaps indicating an increased confidence in the 
government on the part of its employees. Overall, the 
occupational structure of the refounded party had a much 
broader base than the early movement had had. Its main 
strength at the beginning of 1928 clearly lay in the old 
and new lower-middle class (white-collar workers, arti­
sans, and farmers), but the upper-middle class and the
CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR TUE OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI 
PARTY BETWEEN 1925-1928 COMPARED WITH I919-I923 AND FOR THE REICH
No. in % in No. in % in
Occupational Party % in
Group 1919-23 1919-23 1925-28 1925-28 Reich
Unskilled Laborers 1,339 16.4 2,697 19.8 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 258 3.2 501 3.7 1,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 96 1.2 256 1.9 2 ,499,945 8.3
Totals: 1,693 20.8 3,454 25.4 1 4 ,326,738 47.4
Artisans 1,765 21.7 2,818 20.7 4,488,428 14.8
White-Collar 1,935 23.8 2,865 21.0 5 ,274,232 17.4
Foremen 40 0.5 98 0.7 Included with
white-collar
Managers 51 0.6 179 1.3 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 272 3.3 496 3.6 No figures available
Self-Employed 216 2.7 517 2.8 No figures available
School Teachers 70 0.9 120 0.9 308,741 1.0
Totals: 4,359 53.5 7,093 52.0 1 0 ,321,736 34.3
Farmers 366 4.5 689 5.1 2 ,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 11 0.1 28 0.2 Included with
farmers
Totals : 377 4.6 717 5.3 2 ,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 44 0.5 25 0.2 104,000 0.3
Military (officers) 70 0.9 6 0.04 No figures available
Totals: 114 1.4 31 0.24 104,000 0.3
Professional 296 3.6 307 2.2 327,850 0.7
Professors 17 0.2 3 0.02 No figures available
Capitalists 82 1.0 67 0.5 No figures available
Financiers 26 0.3 11 0.08 No figures available
Private Income 35 0.4 75 0.5 2 ,944,872 9.2
Totals : 456 5.5 463 3.3 3 ,182,722 9.9
Clergy 1 0.0 8 0.05 No figures available
Unemployed 9 0.1 3 .1% & 11.1%*
Students 413 5.0 580 4.3 No figures available
Housewives 216 2.7 354 2.6 15 ,650,000*
81 1.0 169 2.21 134,236 0.5
Retired 120 1.5 165 1.2 No figures available
No Entry 315 3.9 600 4.4 -
1,155 14.2 1,876 13.76 134,236 0.5
All Categories: 8,144 13,634 3 0 ,259,310 100.0
♦Not included in totals. The percentages of unemployed is an average 
for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 298-399, and Angell, 
The Recovery of Germany, pp. 370-371.
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working class were still solidly represented in the party 
membership.
Although the geographic origins of new NSDAP mem­
bers fluctuated between 1925 and I928, the total percent­
ages of the five geographical regions of Germany were very 
little different at the beginning of I928 than they had 
been in 1925. One notable change was in the larger pro­
portions of new members from primarily agricultural areas 
at the expense of more industrialized regions. The large 
percentage of new members from the Rhineland area in 1926 
was apparently an anomoly^^--see Table 30.
TABLE 30
CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS 
OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1925-1928 
COMPARED TO COMPARABLE STATISTICS 
FOR THE GERMAN REICH
Geographic No. in % in No. in % in
Area Party Party Reich Reich
South Germany 4,470 32.8 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 3,011 22.1 13,950,000 21.3
North Germany 5,556 39.3 24,567,000 37.6
East Prussia* 419 3.1 4 ,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 330 2.4 5,983,000 9.2
No Entry 48 0.3 -
13,634 100.0 65,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
The size of the communities from which new Nazis 
came underwent a very pronounced change during the period
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between the refounding of the NSDAP and January 1, 1928. 
New recruits from rural communities (under 10,000 popu­
lation) grew steadily percentagewise during the period, 
while the proportion of new members from all the other 
categories progressively declined. However, the number 
of Nazi converts from these rural areas remained substan­
tially below the percentage of the total number of people 
in Germany living in such communities. At the same time, 
the percentage of new Nazis from all three urban cate­
gories was higher than the proportion of all Germans 
living in such areas^^--see Table 31-
TABLE 31
CUMULATIVE STATISTICS FOP THE SIZE FROM 
WHICH PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP 
1925-1928 CAME WITH COMPARABLE 
STATISTICS FOR THE REICH
Community No. in % in No. in % in
Size Party Party Reich Reich
Under 10,000 3,931 28.8 33,048,820 52.6
10-50,000 3,269 24.0 9 ,777,134 15 .6
50-200,000 2,242 16.4 6,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 4,104 30.2 13,753,048 21.9
No Entry 88 0 .6 - -
Totals : 13,634 100.0 6 2 ,828,000 100.0
Thus, the NSDAP was increasingly successful in re­
cruiting new members in the rural areas of Germany. How­
ever, its main strength still lay in the cities, particu­
larly the large urban population centers with over 200,000
inhabitants, the largest supplier of new members percent­
agewise of the four categories
The final observation concerning the refounded 
party between 1925 and I928 is that an amazingly large 
percentage of those who joined the NSDAP left it shortly 
after joining. Of those who joined the Nazis in 1925»
45 per cent had left the party before January 1, 1928. 
Almost 30 per cent of those entering the party in 1927 
did not remain with the Nazis until the end of the year. 
Apart from the obvious importance of these figures in 
determining the actual numerical strength of the NSDAP 
during its crucial formative period, the surprisingly 
high number of quitters poses several very interesting 
questions which will be pursued at some length in the 
conclusion.
CHAPTER III
FOOTNOTES
For a concise summary of the main provisions of 
the Dawes Plan and its importance in the ensuring recovery 
of the German economy, see Angell, The Recovery of Germany, 
pp. 61-7 6 . For the Instrumental role of Stresemann in the 
negotiations for the plan and attracting foreign capital 
into Germany, see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp.
280-295.
^Gerhard Bry, Wages in Germany, I87I-I945 (Prince­
ton, i960), pp. 398-399.
^Wages in Germany rose from 142.4 per cent of the 
1913 average in January, 1925, to 157-1 per cent in 192?. 
At the same time, the cost of living went from l42 per 
cent of the 1913 average, to l48 per cent during the same 
period, meaning that real wages increased from 95 per 
cent of the 1913 total in 1925 to 104 per cent at the end 
of 1927. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473.
^Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399*
^For exact agricultural production figures for
1925-1927, see Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248- 
251.
^For an account of the presidential election cam­
paign, see Halperin, Germany Tried Democracy, pp. 311-322. 
For critical evaluations of Hindenburg's role in the cri­
ses of 1932, see ibid., pp. 498-517, and Bracher, The 
German Dictatorship, pp. l69-2l4.
^The importance of Stresemann to the Weimar Repub­
lic is graphically illustrated in Henry Ashby Turner, Jr., 
Stresemann and the Politics of the Weimar Republic (Prince- 
ton, 1963). Stresemann's maneuverings during 1925-1928 
are related on pages 182-220,
Willing, "Munich: Birthplace of National Socialism,"
The Journal of Modern History 27 (December 1957): 319-33^- 
According to Franz-Willing, Hitler visited the police- 
president of Munich before Christmas in 1924 in an attempt 
to have the sanctions against the party lifted. The po­
liceman advised him to talk to Heinrich Held, the minister- 
president of Bavaria. "Hitler had a long talk with [him] 
and the result was that he was allowed to found the party 
again in Munich" (ibid., p. 333)*
the Zentralkartei, see Appen­
dix II. For a synopsis of the requirements and regula­
tions for admission to the NSDAP, see Hans Bucheiin's 
article in Gutachten des Institutes fuer Zeitgeschichte 
(Munich, 195Ô), p p . 313-321. Hitler's membership card is 
in the Hauptarchiv collection. A duplicate is in the 
Berlin Documents Center under lock and key. Phelps,
"Hitler and the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei," p. 9^1, looked 
at Hitler's card in the Hauptarchiv collection and con­
cluded that it was a fraud-- that number 555 had been 
erased and the number "7" put in its place. The number 
on the card in question is not a "7 " but a "1 ," and it 
is not a fraud. Hitler was the first member of the re­
founded party in 1925.
^^Nyomarkay, "Factionalism in the National Social­
ist German Workers Party, 1925-1926: The Myth and Reality
of the 'Northern Faction,'" Political Science Quarterly 
80 (July 1965): 2 6 , marshalls a great deal of evidence to 
show that the party organization in the north wooed the 
workers above all other groups in 1925-1926. He specu­
lates that as a result of this propaganda the bulk of the 
northern membership was "socialistic, working class." 
Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, presents 
convincing evidence that Nazi propaganda in Hannover dur­
ing the period 1925-1927 was designed to garner support 
from industrial labor. However, he concluded that the 
NSDAP attracted into its membership not workers but "pre­
dominantly students, apprentices, and young white-collar 
workers" (ibid., p. 86). Orlow, History of the Nazi Party,
p. 5 6 , concluded (largely on the strength of Noakes' find­
ings) that "significant differences" existed in the Nazi 
membership between the "northern" party and the "southern," 
at least in 1925. This difference resulted, according to 
Orlow, from the difference in the propaganda appeals of 
the two regions. "The Northerners were far younger; a 
large percentage of those joining in 1925 were under 25
years of age . . . who were ". . . often declassed or
displaced students and often pseudo-intellectuals. . . . "
Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. II3 and II8 , also makes much
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of the Nazi efforts to attract workers into the movement. 
Although Nazi propaganda in different local situations may 
have been directed at specific occupational groups, the 
Nazi publications of national stature were not, and there 
is no convincing evidence that any "significant differ­
ences" existed in the social composition of the Nazi party 
membership in the north and south of Germany. As Bullock 
points out in Hitler, p. 51, Hitler wanted the party to 
appeal to all social classes, and it was with this end in 
mind that the formulâtors of National Socialist propaganda 
worked. There is some evidence, however, that local vari­
ations in the party membership did exist. This being the 
case, it becomes even more imperative to secure a repre­
sentative sample of party members from the entire Reich 
if we are ever to identify the Nazis.
^^For example, during the first month of 1926, the 
Voelkischer Beobachtor carried feature length articles on 
the youth movement (January 9» P- 4, emphasizing the im­
portance of young people in the Nazi movement); the plight 
of German labor (January 9, p. 3); against chain stores 
(January 1, p. 1); the problems of farmers and farm work­
ers (January 3, p . 3); against Bolshevism and its threat 
to the German middle class (January 28, headline story); 
against "finance capitalism" (January 17 and l8, p. 1 in 
each issue); and daily diatribes against the Jews of Ger­
many and the menace they represented to all "true Germans."
^^See Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 92-93 and 105 «
^^Der Angriff from its inception had a weekly col­
umn aimed at the "workers," another at white-collar work­
ers, and carried frequent articles aimed at students.
Still others were directed at small shopkeepers, in the 
form of attacks on chain stores. The most characteristic 
feature of Goebbels' paper, however, was a particularly 
virulent and obnoxious anti-Semitism which depicted all 
Germans as brothers who. must unite to combat the "para­
site" that was destroying the Reich: the Jew.
1930 to resume the leadership 
of the SA, only to be purged in 1934.
^®Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, 464, and 46?. 
^^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248.
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idential runoff election on April 26, 
1925, Hindenburg received 14,655,766 votes for a narrow 
victory over Vilhelm Marx of the Zentrum, who garnered 
13 ,751,61 5 . Thaelmann was far behind with 1,931,151, 
while Ludendorff received only slightly more than 200,000.
^^According to Volz, Paten die Geschichte der 
NSDAP, pp. 21, 2 7 , and 117, persons joined the Nazi party 
in 1925.
cedure used in this study see Appendix I. For a statis­
tical analysis of the accuracy of the sampling method, 
see Appendix III.
^^Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 5 6 , con­
cluded on the basis of Noakes study ("Conflict and Devel­
opment in the NSDAP," pp. 3-36) that the persons joining 
the NSDAP during this period were very young the north, 
but not in other regions of Germany. These statistics 
indicate that Noakes' figures were indicative of a na­
tional trend and that the main basis of Nazi support all 
over the Reich came from young people. Noakes gives more 
detailed statistics on the youth of party members in 1925 
in The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 6 0 , which are based 
on surv iv ing membership lists for several areas of Ger­
many. Noakes' figures are very similar to those above 
for the lower age groups.
^^The total populations of the five regional divi­
sions of Germany used in this study were compiled from the 
1925 census recorded in Statistik des Deutschen Reich,
Band 402, I, pp. 14-15. The figures probably will not be 
absolutely accurate for the years after 1925, but there 
is no reason to assume the population distribution in the 
various regions changed radically between 1925 and 1930.
^^The size of the communities from which each mem­
ber came was determined by the use of a compilation of the 
551 towns and cities in Germany with populations of over
10,000 persons as of June, 1925, in Statistik des Deutschen 
Reich. Band I, pp. 12-13. The figures on the number of 
persons living in each size of community are also derived 
from this list. It is probable that the populations of 
some of the communities rose during the period 1925-1930 
due to the increasing population of the nation. There­
fore, the figures for the Reich will be slightly less 
accurate in each year after 1925. See also Appendix II.
ment as a "small town" phenomenon, see Bendix, "Social
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stratification," p. 371» and Beard, "The Tune Hitlerism 
Beats for Germany," p. ?4 .
^^Friedrich von Rabenau, Seeckt. Aus Seineni Leben, 
1918-1936 (Leipzig, 1941), p. 492.
^^This would seem to refute, at least for 1925» 
Mitchell's contention in Nazism and the Common M a n , p. 7, 
that the Nazis were largely uneducated and anti­
intellectual. It would seem that Lipset was correct 
when he speculated in Political Ma n , p. l46, that Nazism 
had even more appeal for the upper-middle class than for 
the lower-middle.
State (New York, 1943), P* 6 5 .
^^This picture of the NSDAP membership at the end 
of 1925 is considerably different in several respects 
than that offered by Noakes in "Conflict and Development 
in the NSDAP," p. 34. Although Noakes points out the 
youth of party members, he apparently believes that the 
rank and file of the party at this time was composed 
"predominantly of students, apprentices, and young white- 
collar workers." The statistics above illustrate that 
these groups were represented in the party in 1925, but 
were far from the only or even the largest groups in the 
Nazi party.
^^Other estimates for the numerical strength of 
the NSDAP at the end of 1925 vary widely. Heiden, His tory 
of National Socialism, p. 124, says 17,000, as do a number 
of others including Pest, The Face of the Third Reich, p. 
32; Carsten, Rise of Fascism, p. 130, says 27,000. He 
speculates that the party grew during the period 1925- 
1928 mainly through "absorbing most of the many racist 
and voelkisch groups" in Germany. His conclusions are 
based on a list of 124 persons who joined the party be­
tween 1924-1927.
^^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 217-218.
^^Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399*
^^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248-251.
Wages in Germany at the end of I926 stood at 
147.7 per cent of the 1913 level, while the cost of liv­
ing remained at 142 per cent of the 1913 total, the same
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figure recorded for 1925. This meant that real wages in 
Germany reached 102 per cent of the figures for 1913--the 
first time since the war that real wages exceed that 
level. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 46?, and 473-
^^Volz, Paten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 21, says 
49,523 persons had joined the Nazis by the end of 1926, 
meaning 22,4o6 new members entered the party in 1926.
^^Orlow, "The Conversion of Mytlis into Political 
Power: The Case of the Nazi Party, 1925-1926," American
Historical Review 72 (April I967) : 914, suggests that the 
Nazis north of the Main River wore very young, but gives 
the impression that in the south the membership continued 
to come from older, more conservative segments of society. 
It would appear that in reality new members from all geo­
graphic regions were very young. This is the conclusion 
of Fest in Hitler, p. 288. Fest characterized the party 
during this period "for a while" at least, as "a new kind 
of youth movement." In February, I926, the National- 
sozialistische Peu tsche S tudent en Üund was founded by 
Helmut Podlich and Wilhelm Temp el in Munich. Accoi'ding 
to Faust, Per Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Studcntbund, 
pp. 45-46, by June there were twenty affiliated groups in 
as many universities with a substantial number of students 
enrolled. Apparently, membership in tlie NSPSB did not 
necessarily require membership in the party. Faust out­
lined a number of reasons why students in particular were 
attracted to National Socialism. For example, their eco­
nomic predicament at this time was acute, and their chances 
of obtaining a job in their professions were not particu­
larly good (ibid., pp. 117-118). Also, Faust argues that 
anti-Semitism was more pronounced among students than any 
other group in German society due in part to the large 
numbers of Jews in the professions when compared to their 
numbers in the Reich.
^^This indicates that Noakes' findings in The Nazi 
Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, that a number of workers 
were attracted into the party in Lower Saxony, were not 
peculiar to that region. The Nazis attracted workers in 
all regions of Germany. Fest, Hitler, p. 285, was appar­
ently incorrect in concluding that the Nazis had their 
"first successes" among the workers only after the begin­
ning of the depression.
^*^These figures do not at all substantiate 
Nyomarkay's claim in "Factionalism in the National Social­
ist German Workers Party," p. 25, that the membership in 
North Germany "underwent a period of stagnation" in 1925-
1926. The North German party organization was still
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recruiting more new recruits than any other region of 
Germany, and its percentage of the total membership was 
still substantially higher than the population of North 
Germany relative to that of the Reich.
^^This conflicts with Gies' generalization in 
"NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organizationen," p. 346, 
that "prior to 1930 the National Socialist Party made 
little headway in the countryside other than in Schleswig- 
Holstein. . . . "
^^^The increase in the percentage of workers might 
have been predicted by the rise in the number of new mem­
bers from the Rhineland and the overwhelmingly urban 
character of the party--seo Tables 20 and 21.
time vary widely. Heiden, History of National Socialism, 
p. 113, guessed 3 0 ,000; however, on ibid., p. 124, he said 
the party grew from 1?,000 to 40,000 in 1926. The same 
figures are given by Bullock in Hitler, p. 109. Fest,
Face of the Third Reich, p. 32, estimated 40,000, but in
Hitler, p. 259, he gave the figure 108,000. Carsten, Rise 
of Fascism, p. 130, said 49,000. Bracher, The German Dic­
ta torship, p. 133, gave the figure 54,000.
^^The old numbers were generally left blank, al­
though there were several instances in which someone who 
joined the NSDAP in the years after 1934 received party 
numbers below 40,000. See also Orlow, History of the 
Nazi Party; and Tyrell, Fuehrer Befiel, p. 352, for other
comments on the "empty numbers."
NSDAP were based on a variety of different factors and not 
simply on the material interests of each recruit is graph­
ically illustrated in Merkl, Political Violence under the 
Swastika. Many of the life histories of early Nazis who 
joined the party before 1930 examined by Merkl defy any 
attempt at categorization into specific social groups-- 
see especially pp. 82-84 and 132.
46,
47^
Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 218.
cost of living rose from l42 per cent of the 
1913 level in 1926 to 148 per cent at the end of 192?.
During the same period, wages rose from 147-7 per cent of
the 1913 average to 157.1 per cent. This means real wages
during 1927 rose from 102 per cent to 104 per cent of the
figure recorded for I9I2 . Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464,
467, and 473.
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49Angell, The Recovery of Germany, pp. 248-251.
^^Goebbels eventually became the propaganda minis­
ter of the Third Reich. He is important to this narrative 
because he controlled one of the main organs of Nazi pro­
paganda- -2er_A]2,gri_ff. Goebbels has often been identified 
with the Nazi "left," those who wanted to emphasize the 
"socialist" part of the party name. See Kele, Nazis and 
Workers, pp. 92-93i and Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, 
pp. 5^-57.
^^Martin Broszat, "Die Anfange der Berliner NSDAP,
1926-2 7 ," Viert elsjahrhcfte fuer Zeitgeschichte 8 (Janu­
ary i960): 102-110.
^^Orlow, History of the Nazi Party, p. 123, says 
the emphasis of Nazi propaganda changed in 1927 in an 
effort to "capture" the bourgeoisie. However, Noakes,
The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 101, forcefully shows 
that the Nazi organizations in industrial centers in 
Lower Saxony were still devoting the major part of their 
propaganda efforts to winning the workers well into 1928. 
According to Noakes, it was only after 1928 that the em­
phasis in Nazi propaganda changed to appeal to tlie farmers 
and the petty bourgeoisie (ibid, p. IO5 ).
2 1 ,
gives the total number of persons who had joined the NSDAP 
between February, 1925, and December 31, 1927, as 72,590. 
This means that 23,063 new members entered the party in
1927.
86 and 95, and the articles in the Voelkischer Deobachter 
and Der Angriff, mentioned above. Another factor that may 
have influenced this "youth explosion" was an SA regula­
tion enacted in March, 1927, requiring all SA members to 
also be members of the NSDAP. The rank and file of the 
SA was probably composed largely of young men due to the 
strenuous activity required of them. See Heinrich 
Bennecke, Hitler und die SA (Munich, I962), p. 247.
^^Figures from Richard N. Hunt, German Social 
Democracy, 1918-1933 (New Haven, 1964), p. IO7 . Without 
giving exact figures, Ossip K. Flechtheim, Die KPD in 
Der Weimarer Republik (Frankfurt-am-Main, I969 ) , pi 6 5^ , 
said that the members under forty in the KPD were twice 
as numerous as in German society, while the over fifty 
age groups were greatly underrepresented.
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^^This substantiates Stoltenberg's contention in 
Politische Stroemungen iin Schleswi.g-Holsteinischen Land- 
volk, 1918-1933, that the Nazis made no substantial in­
roads into Schleswig-Holstein until 1928--see especially 
p. l4b.
^^Noakes, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, p. 104, 
has noted the heavy attrition in new Nazis in Hannover in
1927. He pointed out that while 542 persons joined the 
party in that year, 3?6 left it. His information is based 
on surviving local party lists.
remarkably close guess at the numerical strength of the 
party considering the quitters. He gave the figure
60,000 for the beginning of 1928, but did not say on what 
his estimate was based. Bullock, Hitler, p. IO9 , also 
said 6 0 ,0 0 0 , also without listing a source. Cars ten,
Rise of Fascism, p. I3O , says 72,000 at the beginning of 
I92Ô . Braeher, The German Dictatorship, p. 1331 says 
there were 8l ,000 members in the party at the end of 1927*
^^This does not at all agree with Martin's evalua­
tion of the social composition of the NSDAP in Le National 
Socialisme hitlérien, p. 212. "Le NSDAP devait recruter 
le gros de ses troups parmi ces classes Moyennes, parce 
qu'elles étaient les premieres victims de 1 'inflation 
d'abord, de la crise économique ensuit. Le national- 
socialisme fut surtout la révolté des classes moyennes, 
des moutons devenus enrages." Martin is correct that the 
middle classes were strong pillars of Nazi support, but 
as the statistics above show, so were several other seg­
ments of Gorman society. Table 29 also contradicts 
Lerner's conclusion in The Nazi Elite, p. v, that "the 
Nazi movement was a middle-class and lower-middle-class 
movement." Obviously, the National Socialist movement 
was much more complex than Lerner's generalization sug­
gests. Kuehnl, Die Nationalsozialistische Linke, pp. 59 
and 13 5 , also insists that the NSDAP was predominantly a 
"kleinburgerlich" party after 1925- Again, this is a 
misrepresentation. As Horn says in "Hitler und die NSDAP," 
pp. 466-484, the claim by Kuehnl and others that the Nazis 
were anything so simple as just a kleinburger party "can­
not be taken seriously." Eugene Weber's characterization 
of Fascists in "Varieties of Fascism” in Gilbert Allerdyce, 
ed., The Place of Fascism in European History (Englewood 
Cliffs, New Jersey, I97I ) , p"! 107, is perhaps not com­
pletely inappropriate to the social composition of the 
NSDAP at the end of 1927 : Weber sees Fascism as the con­
junction of the political left and right, "The Jacobin's 
of the 20th Century, the younger generation against the 
old." This is at least partially correct.
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^^This is somewhat different than the impression 
given in Norman Rich, Ideology, the Nazi State, and the 
Course of Expansion (New York, 1973), pl 1 ^  Rich char- 
acterizes the period 1925-20 in Nazi party history as one 
of slow expansion of the party "to every part of Germany." 
Actually, the party was already established all over Ger­
many at the end of 1925.
^^This indicates that, at least at the end of 192?, 
Talcott Parsons was correct in characterizing the NSDAP 
as "by-and-large" an urban movement, "Some Sociological 
Aspects of the Fascist Movements," p. l44. Dendix,
"Social Stratification," p. 371» seems to have been in­
correct in his assessment of Nazism as an "anti-urban" 
movement, at least in relation to the composition of the 
NSDAP membership at the end of 192?.
^^This largely agrees with the generalization of 
Loomis and Beegle, "The Spread of German Nazism in Rural 
Areas," p. 724, that Nazism spread slowly from the cities 
to the countryside in "the late twenties." It conflicts 
with Gies' argument in "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche 
Organizationen," p. 46, who insists the Nazis made "little 
headway into the countryside" before 1930* Broszat's gen­
eralization in Der Staat Hitlers, p. 37, that the party 
was "gar nicht vertreten" in the countryside before 1929- 
1930 also appears to be mistaken.
^^Abel, The Nazi Movement, p. 01, analyzed the 124 
party members in his sample (see above p. 6) who joined 
the party during 1925-1927- His study yielded the fol­
lowing results: ?1 per cent of the sample were between
seventeen and thirty-two years of ago. None were women.
Of the sample, Abel characterized 44 per cent as "workers, 
skilled or unskilled." He did not indicate what criteria 
he used for assigning persons to this group or which occu­
pations are included. A further 44 per cent of the sample 
is designated "lower-middle class." Again, no explanation 
of the classification system used was given. Of Abel's 
sample, 9 per cent came from the "professions," and a 
further 4 per cent from "agriculture." There are a number 
of important differences in the occupational structure of 
Abel's sample and that revealed in the statistics above. 
This is not surprising considering the inadequacies of 
Abel's sample and his sampling method. Abel also included 
data on the social composition of his sample not available 
on the membership cards which are of some interest: 54
per cent of Abel's sample had only public school educa­
tions; 20 per cent graduated from high school or profes­
sional schools; and 10 per cent had university degrees. 
Veterans of the World War made up 40 per cent and a
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further 20 per cent had participated in various 
Wehrverbaende activities after the war. At the time 
they joined the party, 9 per cent were unemployed or in 
financial difficulties, 60 per cent exhibited no anti- 
Semitism, and 4 per cent were openly critical of the 
party's racial stand.
CHAPTER IV
THE RADICALIZATION OF THE RURAL AREAS OF THE REICH
The cry of distress of the peasantry has 
become a battle cry 1 At last the com­
plaints and protests are at an end : Our
era has produced enough empty words and 
rhetoric 1 By are we able to fight? Can 
we oppose the terroristic actions of armed 
bands of leftists? Of lockouts by indus­
try? The corruption of the bloodsucking 
finance-capitalists? . . . The National
Socialists will provide the political 
leadership to a legal redress of 
grievances I
Voelkischer Deobachter 
April, I92Ô
The End of Weimar's Prosperity 
For both Germany and the Nazi party, 1928 and 1929 
were crucial years. Economic and political conditions in 
the Reich changed dramatically during this two-year period, 
leading directly to huge Nazi gains at the polls in the 
general elections of 1930. The economic prosperity that 
Germany had enjoyed since 1924 ended abruptly in 1929 when 
the American stock market crashed in October. Short-term 
loans that had been in large measure responsible for the 
industrial expansion and the Wirtschaftswunder in the 
Reich were not only no longer extended, but existing notes
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were called due. The rosy haze of borrowed affluence in 
which Germany had lived for five years dissipated in 1929» 
even as Stresemann predicted must eventually happen.
German farmers were at last provoked into violent 
protest by the years-long agricultural depression during 
the early months of 1928. A crisis atmosphere" was cre­
ated in the countryside by the radicalization of German 
farmers which the Nazis wasted no time in exploiting. 
Ironically, the depression in the agricultural section of 
the German economy ended in the summer of 1928. But in 
spite of abundant harvests and rising prices for farm 
goods, the damage had already been done. Farmers from 
all sections of the Reich, but particularly Schleswig- 
Holstein, swelled the ranks of the Nazis in 1928 and 1929-
Unemployment, which had remained alarmingly high 
even during the prosperous years, rose sharply in 1928 
and skyrocketed in 1929. However, those who have main­
tained the Nazi party recruited heavily from the ranks 
of the unemployed during this period will be surprised 
at the occupational statistics of new members.
The period 1925-1928 can be characterized as an 
era of political calm in Germany. Not so 1928-1930. In 
addition to the Reichstag elections of 1928, the last two 
years before the Great Depression also witnessed a na­
tional campaign of great bitterness waged by powerful 
anti-republican elements. Stresemann, doggedly pursuing
193
his objective of a peaceful revision of the terms of the 
Treaty of Versailles through diplomacy, succeeded in se­
curing a favorable new reparations schedule in 1929. 
German nationalists, led by Hitler and Alfred Hugenberg, 
launched a poisonous propaganda offensive against Strese­
mann' s plan and against the republic itself. Although 
the new plan was finally adopted, Hitler and the Nazis 
received an enormous amount of publicity from which they 
benefited greatly the following year at the polls.
In 1928-1930 the Nazis extended the social base of 
their party to include every strata of society. By the 
end of 1929 these diverse social elements had been welded 
into an organization which was largely responsible for 
the amazing electoral gains the Nazis registered in the 
general elections of 1930.
It has been suggested by several historians that 
the propaganda appeals of the Nazi party were redirected 
in 1928-1939. The implication is that during the period 
I925-I928 the Nazis had devoted most of their energy to 
winning the workers. When this proved unsuccessful, the 
party leadership decided to win the support of the middle 
class in the upcoming elections.^ Judging from the two 
best known Nazi organs, this is a misrepresentation. The 
Voelkischer Beobachter and Der Angriff did devote more 
articles to the problems of various middle-class groups
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ganda in 1928 continued to be directed at all segments of 
German society based largely on a militant nationalism, 
anti-Marxism, and anti-Semitism.^
1928--Electoral Disappointment for the NSDAP 
The economic boom which characterized the period 
1925-1928 in Germany leveled off in 1928. Industrial pro­
duction peaked in I928 and began a small but perceptible 
decline in 1928.^ At the same time, wages continued to 
go up sharply while the cost of living rose much more 
slowly, meaning that real wages were substantially higher 
at the end of 1928 than at the beginning.^ The agricul­
tural "depression" of 1924-1928 subsided in the summer of 
1928 as agricultural prices rose even as production in­
creased.® Seemingly the only incongruous note in this 
symphony of increasing prosperity was the still high per­
centage of unemployed which began to reach alarming pro­
portions by the end of the year.^
On the international scene, 1928 was, like 1927, a 
relatively uneventful year for Germany. This was not the 
case, however, in domestic politics. In 1928, Germany 
witnessed a national election, the results of which re­
flected the economic prosperity Germany had enjoyed since 
the last national election in December, 1924, and the 
relative domestic political tranquility that had charac­
terized the period. Predictably, the extremist parties--
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in particular the Nazis and the Communists--did not do 
well, while the parties which supported the republic made 
their best showing since 1919 « The results of the May, 
1928, national elections in Germany were as shown in 
Table 32.^°
TABLE 32
RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL ELECTIONS IN GERMANY, I928
No. of % of No. of
Party Votes Total Vote Deputies
KPD 3,264,793 10.6 54
SPD 9,152,979 29.8 153
DDP 1,479,37'i 4.8 25
Z 4,657,796 15.2 78
DVP 2,679,703 8.7 45
DNVP 4,381,563 14.2 73
NSDAP 810,127 2.6 12
Others 4,326,912 14.1 51
30,753,247 100.0 491
The election was followed by the formation of the 
"great coalition" government in June led by Hermann Muel­
ler of the SPD. Mueller's government had the support of 
all the parties which supported the republic. This was 
the first government in which the largest of the Weimar 
parties, the SPD, had participated since 1923-
The most influential member of the government con­
tinued to be the foreign minister, Stresemann of the DVP, 
who had no small share in creating the grand coalition. 
This alliance of the major political parties seemed to
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indicate that the Weimar parliamentary system had at last 
reached a level of political stability which it had not 
enjoyed since the republic's inception. However, the 
stability was illusory, and the grand coalition survived 
barely two years. After its fall, no reliable coalition 
was achieved until the NSDAP-DNVP alliance in 1933 which 
brought the end of parliamentary democracy in Germany.
The unimpressive showing of the Nazis was a source 
of severe disappointment and embarrassment to part of the 
leadership of the p a r t y . D e s p i t e  their poor performance 
at the polls, the Nazis had their best single year of 
party recruitment since the party's founding (with the 
exception of 1923). In 1928, 36,000 new recruits joined 
Hitler's party, swelling the membership numbers to over 
100,000.^^ However, the considerable number of withdraw­
als in 1928 appreciably reduced the actual number of mem­
bers. Of these 36,000-plus new members, 6,137 biographies 
are used in the sample below, or more than one-sixth of 
the total.
The percentage of women coming into the NSDAP con­
tinued to decline in 1920, falling to its lowest point 
ever. Of the 6,137 new Nazis in the sample, only 270 
(4.4 per cent) were women.
The trend toward recruitment of younger and younger 
members was reversed in I928 as seen in Table 33. The 
proportion of new members falling into the first two
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TABLE 33
AGES OF PERSONS ENTERING THE NSDAP IN 1928
% of
Age % in
Group Members Members
Under 20 1,142 18.6 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 2,667 43.5 11,458,015 26.6
30-39 1,193 19.4 8,863,091 20.5
40-49 682 11.1 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 315 5.1 6,561,314 14.9
Over 60 103 1.7 4 ,841,919 11.1
No Entry 35 0.6 - -
6,137 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
categories declined appreciably from the 192? figures, 
although it remained well above the relative strength of 
persons from those age groups in German society. Concur­
rently, there was a sharp rise in the percentage of per­
sons from the 30-39 age group coming into the party, which 
brought that group's strength in the NSDAP almost equal to 
its percentage in society as a whole. The other age 
groups remained relatively unchanged. Although a consid­
erable portion of new recruits for Hitler's movement in 
1928 continued to be very young, there was a substantial 
influx of more mature persons.
There were several interesting changes in the geo­
graphical origins of the new Nazis in 1928 when compared 
to earlier years--see Table 3^. The two areas which 
gained the most percentagewise in 1928 relative to 192?
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TABLE 34
GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PERSONS 
JOINING THE NSDAP IN I928
Geographic
N o . of 
New 
Members
% of 
Members
% in 
Reich
South Germany 1,657 27.0 16 ,485,000 25 .2
Rhineland l,04l 17.0 13.950.000
24.567.000
21.3
North Germany 2,399 39.0 37.6
East Prussia* 281 4.6 4 ,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 749 12.2 5,983,000 9.2
No Entry 10 0.2 - -
Totals : 6,137 100.0 65,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
were East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein--both largely 
agricultural regions. The area which showed the largest 
decline in the percentage of new party members furnished 
was the Rhineland, the most heavily industrialized region 
in the Reich. North Germany's share of Nazi recruits in­
creased slightly in 1928, while that of South Germany de­
clined somewhat. Both remained very near their percent­
ages of the population of the nation as a whole.
From the geographic origins of persons in this 
sample it could be deduced that new members in the NSDAP 
from small communities continued to increase in 1928.
This was exactly the case as seen in Table 35- The pro­
portion of new Nazis in I928 coming from small communities 
and/or the countryside increased considerably. However,
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TABLE 35
SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1928
No. of % of
Community N o . in % in
Size Members Members Reich Reich
Under 10,000 2,688 43.8 33,048,820 52.6
20-50,000 1,179 19.2 9,777,134 15 • 6
50-200,000 663 10.8 6 ,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 1,541 25.1 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 66 1.1 - -
6,137 100.0 62,828,000 100.0
this group remained appreciably below their strength in 
the Reich. The percentage of new members from urban com­
munities of all sizes declined somewhat in 1928, but 
remained higher than the proportion of the total popula­
tion living in such areas. It is clear that the Nazis 
were infiltrating more and more into the countryside in 
1928, but the largest part of the membership was still 
being recruited in the urban areas.
The statistics concerning the geographic origins
of persons entering the NSDAP in 1928 and those on the
size of communities from which they came suggest that the 
occupational breakdown of the new members should show an 
increase in rural occupational groups. This was the case 
as seen in Table 36.
The percentage of workers in this sample of persons
entering the NSDAP in 1928 shows a substantial decrease
TABLE 36
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928
No. of % of
Occupational % in
Categories Members Members
Unskilled Laborers 
Skilled Laborers 
Agricultural Laborers
1,128
196
143
1 ,46?
18.4
3.2
2.3
10,679,848
1 .146.945
2 .499.945
14,326,738
35.3 
3.8 
8.3
47.4
Artisans
White-Collar
Foremen
Managers
Civil Servants
Self-Employed
School Teachers
1,188
1,175
44
73
189
168
5 8
2,895
19.4
19.1 
0.7 
1.2 
3.1 
2.7 
0.9
47.1
4 ,488,428 14.8
5,274,232 17.4
Included with white-collar
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
10,321,736 34.3
Farmers
Large Landowners
929
25
954
15.1
0.4
15.5
2,139,878 7.1
Included with farmers
2,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
7
13
20
0.1
0.2
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
14
6
12
1.8
0.0
0.2
0.1
0.2
2.3
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
All Categories:
6
O
262
106
67
28
190
659
6,137
0.1
0.0
4.3
1.7
1.1
0.5
3.1
10.8
100.0
No figures available
8.6*
No figures available
15,650,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an 
average for the year compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399, 
based on the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely 
that the figure for non-union workers was higher.
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from 1927. Concurrently, there is a similar decrease in 
the representation from the lower-middle class, especially 
the artisans and white-collar workers, while the upper- 
middle class held approximately steady. The occupational 
category which showed the greatest change was the classi­
fication "farmer" which nearly tripled its representation 
in the party over the 1927 figure. If we accept the 
farmers as part of the "old" lower-middle class in Ger­
many, then the petty bourgeoisie in 1928 constituted an 
absolute majority of the total new members. None of the 
other occupational categories of new entrants in the NSDAP 
changed appreciably percentagewise in 1928 from the fig­
ures for 1927.^^
It is difficult to reconcile the dramatic increase 
in the proportion of farmers coming into Hitler's party 
in 1928 with the conclusion of many economic historians 
that the agricultural depression which had hung on in 
Germany since 1924 ended in 1928. Supposedly, conditions 
improved markedly for the German farmers in 1928 as pro­
duction and prices rose sharply. If this is so, why did 
so many German farmers turn to a radical political party 
like the Nazis?
The answer to this question apparently lies in the 
fact that the prolonged slump in agricultural production 
and prices finally provoked a violent response among many 
farmers before the recovery began. There were a number
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of protest demonstrations by members of several agrarian 
groups during January, 1928, especially in Schleswig- 
Holstein. Some of these sparked violence and conflict 
•with the police. The agrarian areas had already been 
alienated from the government before the recovery began, 
and the Nazis increasingly found the countryside to be a 
fruitful recruitment ground.
The number of persons who left the NSDAP in 1928 
increased sharply over the percentage for 192?. Of those 
persons in this sample who joined the Nazis in 1925» 11.5 
per cent left the party in 1928; l6 .3 per cent of those 
who joined in 1926 and 23.0 per cent of those who entered 
in 1927 were gone by the end of I928. Of those who joined 
Hitler in 1928, 11.6 per cent had left by the end of the 
year. If these figures are translated to the total party 
strength, it means that over I 6 ,000 people quit the NSDAP 
in 1928. Although the party membership numbers went to 
more than 108,000 in 1928, the actual numerical strength 
of the Nazi party was probably little more than 79,000 
active m e m b e r s . F i f t y - t w o  members who had previously 
left the party rejoined in 1928, complete with new member­
ship numbers. They are considered among the new recruits.
The new members coming into the Nazi party in 1928 
exhibited several important differences compared to the 
membership in previous years. The percentage of persons 
under thirty years of age, though still quite high.
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declined substantially. This indicates that Nazism was 
becoming acceptable to the more mature segments of German 
society, even as many fads of the young are adopted by the 
older generation in our own society (witness the now widely 
accepted longer hair styles among men). At the same time, 
the Nazi party showed increased strength in rural areas 
of Germany and a surprising increase in the number of 
farmers among new recruits. The percentage of workers 
among the now converts to Nazism declined markedly, as 
did other urban occupational categories, including white- 
collar workers and artisans.
The NSDAP can be characterized through its new mem­
bers in 1928 as a truly national party with its main 
strength lying slightly more in urban areas. Its social 
structure showed it to be a party of all occupational 
groups, although it appealed more to the lower-middle 
class than to any other segment of society. It is appar­
ent from the number of persons who left the party that 
conversion to Hitlerism was not necessarily a permanent 
affliction. Many people found the NSDAP did not meet 
their needs.
1929--The Young Plan and the Freedom Law 
Bring the Nazis National Prominence
For Germany, 1929 was an eventful year in a number 
of respects. On the international scene, Stresemann's 
policy of cooperation with the Allies in order to bring
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about slow but steady revisions of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles finally appeared to be succeeding. A new and 
more favorable (for Germany) plan for reparation payments 
was accepted by the Allies in June, 1929--the so-called 
Young Plan. At the same time, France agreed to commence 
the evacuation of the Rhineland ahead of the schedule 
envisioned in the original terms of the Versailles Treaty.
While Germany was experiencing diplomatic success 
and domestic political turmoil, the false economic pros­
perity evaporated almost overnight with the crash of the 
American stock market. Unemployment, already high, soared 
to its highest level since the months immediately follow­
ing the great i n f l a t i o n . E c o n o m i c  production fell off 
drastically. Strangely, wages continued to rise much 
faster in 1929 than did the cost of living, which meant 
that real wages in Germany showed a healthy increase in 
1929 over the figures for the preceding year. The 
farmers, radicalized the previous year, continued to turn 
away from the political parties which supported the repub­
lic as farm prices began once again to fall, along with 
agricultural production, wiping out the gains of I928.
On the domestic scene, the parties antagonistic to 
the Weimar Republic launched a vitriolic and well- 
publicized campaign, ostensibly against the adoption of 
the Young Plan and for the adoption of the so-called 
"freedom law," but actually against the republic itself.
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This campaign was led by the most powerful figure in the 
DNVP, Alfred Hugenberg, who controlled several newspapers, 
radio stations, and motion picture studios. But the man 
who became the most vocal critic of the republic and who 
gained a national reputation through the campaign for the 
freedom law was Adolf Hitler.
When Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Ver­
sailles, no definite sum had been set for her to pay as 
reparations. The Allies had justified the reparations by 
the unacceptable (from the German viewpoint) "war guilt" 
clause. This clause. Article 231 of the treaty, stated 
that Germany and her allies were solely to blame for World 
War I. The amount Germany must pay was to be fixed by a 
reparations commission no later than May 1 , 1921. On 
April 27 of that year the reparations commission presented 
Germany with a bill for 132 billion gold marks, plus 
i n t e r e s t . T h e  Germans proved either unwilling or unable 
to meet the payments, which led to the French occupation 
of the Ruhr in 1923 in an attempt to coerce Germany into 
paying. The occupation contributed to the great inflation 
discussed in Chapter I above which so completely disrupted 
the German economy. During his brief chancellorship in 
1923, Stresemann initiated negotiations with the Allies 
for a new reparations schedule. The negotiations resulted 
in the adoption of the Dawes Plan on April I 5 , 1924.
The Dawes Plan provided that Germany was to pay one 
billion gold marks during the first year of the plan, with
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an escalation in payments over the next four years until 
the figure of 2.5 billion gold marks was reached in the 
fifth year. The payments were then to remain at that 
level for an unspecified period--debt plus interest.
To ensure payment, the Allies placed controls over cer­
tain German industries, most notably the railroads. It 
was merely a stopgap measure, something to serve until 
a final, definitive agreement could be reached. The 
French demanded that a new settlement must be reached 
before they would consider the evacuation of the Rhine­
land. This occupation was a sore spot with most Germans 
and a constant target of the extremist political parties 
many.
A "committee of experts" was convened in Paris on 
February 9 , 1929, under the chairmanship of an American, 
Owen Young. Their objective was to effect a final plan 
for reparations payments and for the evacuation of the 
Rhineland.^* After considerable haggling by the repre­
sentatives of Germany and France, Young finally succeeded 
in drafting a plan acceptable to both sides. What came 
to be known as the Young Plan called foi' an initial pay­
ment of 1.7 billion gold marks the first year, with a 
gradual annual increase in the payments until a peak 
amount of 2.42 billion gold marks was reached in I966. 
From 1966 until I988 (when the bill would be considered 
paid) Germany would pay an average of 1 .65 billion 
annually.
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The total payment called for by the Young Plan 
amounted to slightly more than 111 billion gold marks, 
including interest--a considerable reduction from the 
132 billion plus interest demanded by the Allies after 
the Treaty of Versailles. Also, a provision was made 
for a revaluation of Germany's capacity to pay in the 
event of a major crisis in the German economy. It fur­
ther stipulated that should the United States cancel the 
war debts owed her by the Allies, Germany's obligations 
would be correspondingly reduced.
Mueller's cabinet formally accepted the plan as a 
basis for a conference on reparations and called for con­
current discussions on the Rhineland question. The en­
suing conference convened at the Hague on August 6 , 1929. 
Stresemann managed, not without difficulty, to secure an 
agreement with the Allies based on the Young Plan. At 
the same time, he convinced the French to set up a def­
inite timetable for the evacuation of the Rhineland, 
which was to begin on September I 3 , 1929, and to be com­
pleted by June 30, 1930. This agreement is usually seen 
as a resounding success for Stresemann's foreign policy.
Many German nationalists did not see the Young 
Plan as a success but rather as a disaster for Germany. 
Led by Hugenberg, the various nationalist parties united 
against acceptance of the Young Plan, arguing that Ger­
many's already unfavorable balance of trade on the
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international market dictated that no more funds should 
leave the country in the form of reparations. Hugenberg, 
with the support of most of the German nationalist parties 
and the endorsement of the Federation of German Industry, 
announced on June 15 a plan to submit for a vote to the 
people of Germany a law which would officially deny the 
war guilt clause of the Treaty of Versailles. This 
clause was the basis for the Allied claims for repara­
tions (this was the "freedom law"). The law also forbade 
the assumption of any new reparation payments and made the 
chancellor and his ministers liable to a charge of trea­
son should they agree to such payments.
While Nationalists in the Reichstag staged a number 
of bitter debates as a holding action to prevent the imme­
diate adoption of the Young Plan, a petition was circu­
lated throughout the country in an effort to put the 
freedom law before the Reichstag■ A "Reich Committee 
for the German Referendum" was created to push the peti­
tion, headed by Hugenberg, Hitler, Franz Seldte (leader 
of the S tahlhelm), and Heinrich Class (chairman of the 
Pan-German League). The committee eventually was able to 
gather over four million signatures, more than enough to 
put the proposed law before the Reichstag. During the 
petition drive, German democracy was dealt two staggering 
blows from which it never recovered: the death of the
Reich's ablest statesman, Gustav Stresemann, on October 3»
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1929) and the crash of the American stock market on 
"Black Thursday," October 24, 1929, which heralded the 
beginning of the Great Depression. The extremism of the 
law proposed by Hugenberg and Hitler had caused a schism 
in Hugenberg's own party. A faction led by Gotfried 
Treviranus came out in open opposition to Hugenberg's 
policies. When the proposed law was put up for debate 
in the Reichstag on November 29 it immediately became 
apparent that it would fail. The major outcome of the 
entire process was the elevation of Hitler to a nation­
ally known personality.
The political attacks on Mueller's government and 
the republic coincided with the crash of the American 
stock market which heralded the onset of the Great 
Depression. In several local elections in 1929 the 
Communists made spectacular gains, once again raising the 
specter of the "red menace" in Germany and frightening 
the middle classes. The era of prosperity and seeming 
progress of democratic institutions had ended. Once 
again a crisis atmosphere was created in which a radical 
political movement like the Nazis could flourish, by 
appearing to offer a viable alternative to the existing 
system.
The Nazis enrolled over 67,000 new members in 1929, 
its largest one-year gain ever, which practically doubled 
its strength as of December, 1928. NSDAP membership
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numbers reached more than 176,000, but due to the con­
tinued heavy attrition in the party ranks, the actual 
numerical strength was considerably less than that fig­
u r e . I n  this sample 12,186 biographies are used--inore 
than one-sixth of the total new members. Of these, only 
601 or 4.9 per cent were women. The membership of the 
NSDAP remained overwhelmingly masculine in 1929.
The proportion of persons joining the Nazi party 
in the very low age groups continued to decline in 1929 
as seen in Table 37* All of the older age groups became
TABLE 37
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929
Age
Group
N o . of 
New 
Members
96 of
Members
N o . in 
Reich Reich
Under 20 1,959 16.1 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 5,011 41.2 11,458,015 26 .6
30-39 2,448 20.0 8,863,091 20.5
40-49 1,583 13.1 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 827 6.7 6,561,314 14.9
Over 60 297 2.4 4 ,841,919 11.1
No Entry 61 0.5 - -
12,186 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
better represented in the Nazi party in 1929 at the ex­
pense of the two younger groups. It is apparent that in 
1928 and 1929 the National Socialist movement did not 
appeal just to the "romantic youth" of Germany, but to 
more mature members of society as well. Certainly, the
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young people continued to supply an absolute majority of 
new Nazi recruits which kept the party dynamic and vital, 
but it is obvious also that the appeal of the NSDAP began 
to reach an increasing number of the more settled members 
of German society.
The geographic origins of the new members in this 
sample from 1929 show a continuation of the trends begun 
in 1928, as seen in Table 38. The predominantly rural- 
agricultural areas of East Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein 
continued to rise in the total proportion of new members
TABLE 38
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS 
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929
Geographic
Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
South Germany 2,742 22.5 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 1,977 16.3 13.930.000
24.567.000
21.3
North Germany 5,059 41.5 37.6
East Prussia^ 
Schleswig-
724 5.9 4 ,397,000 6.7
1,650 13.5 5,983,000 9.2
No Entry 34 0.3 - -
Totals: 12,186 100.0 65,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
supplied to the N S D A P . E a s t  Prussia still did not sup­
ply quite as many recruits to the Nazis as its percentage 
in the total population of the Reich, while Schleswig-
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Holstein supplied somewhat more. The percentage of new 
members from North Germany continued to increase in 1929 
and stood somewhat higher than the percentage of its popu­
lation in the Reich. The proportion of new Nazis from 
South Germany and the Rhineland continued to decline in 
1929' For the first time, South Germany's share of new 
Hitler recruits fell below its total of the German popu­
lation. The highly industrialized Rhineland fell to its 
lowest point percentagewise in new Nazi party members 
since the refounding of the party.
These figures suggest that the main source of 
strength of the Nazis was shifting in 1928-1929 from 
urban areas to rural areas, from industrial centers to 
predominantly agrarian areas. This conclusion is sup­
ported by the statistics for the size of the communities 
from which the new NSDAP members came in 1929--see 
Table 39.
In 1929 the number of new members coining from 
large cities declined to the point where they supplied a 
lower proportion of new Nazis than their percentage of 
the total population of the country. The other three 
categories of rural, small city, and medium-size city 
all increased in the percentage of new members supplied 
to the NSDAP. Rural areas remained slightly lower in the 
number of new members supplied than the relative strength 
of the populations of those communities in the Reich.
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TABLE 39
SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS 
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1929
Community
Size Members
% of 
New 
Members
No. in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 10,000 5,935 48,7 33,048,820 52.6
20-50,000 2,440 20.0 9,777,134 15.6
50-200,000 1,406 11.5 6 ,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 2,316 19.0 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 89 0.8 - -
Totals : 12,186 100.0 62,828,000 100.0
Medium-sized cities were slightly above and small cities 
appreciably above the percentages of their respective 
populations in Germany. The Nazi movement had evolved 
by 1929 from a primarily urban phenomenon to one near a 
perfect balance throughout the country considering the 
distribution of the population of the Reich.
From the above statistics on the geographic origins 
of new members in 1929 and the size of the communities 
from which they came, it might be predicted that the 
occupational structure of the new Nazis in 1929 would 
show an increase in "rural" occupations and a decrease in 
the proportion of new members from typically urban occu­
pations. This is only partially the case as shown in 
Table 40.
Predictably, the percentage of laborers (skilled 
and unskilled) coming into the Nazi party in 1929 declined
TABLE 40
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1929
OcciipatioTinl 
Categori es Members
% of 
Members
% in
Unskilled Laborers 1,919 15.7 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled Laborers 318 2.6 1 ,146,945 3.8
Agricultural Laborers 390 3.2 2,499,945 8.3
Totals: 2,627 21.5 14,326,738 47.4
Artisans 2,367 19.4 4 ,488,428 14.8
White-Collar 2,112 17.3 5,274,232 17.4
Foremen 34 0.3 Included with white-collar
Managers 113 0.9 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 423 3-5 No figures available
Self-Employed 510 4.2 No figures available
School Teachers 63 0.5 308,741 1.0
Totals: 5,622 46.1 10,321,736 34.3
Farmers 2,080 17.1 2,159,878 7.1
Large Landowners 70 0.6 Included with farmers
Totals : 2,150 17.7 2,139,878 7.1
Military (enlisted) 
Military (officers)
28
15
43
0.2
0.1
104,000 0.3
No figures available
104,000
Professional 
Professors 
Capitalists 
Financiers 
Private Incomes
147
3
65
7
70
292
1.2
0.02
0.5
0.04
0.6
2.36
237,850 0.7
No figures available 
No figures available 
No figures available
2,944,872 9.2
3,182,722 9.9
Clergy
Unemployed
Students
Housewives
Retired 
No Entry
425
206
107
156
539
Totals: 1,446
All Categories: 12,186
0.04
0.1
3.5 
1.7 
0.9 
1.3
4.5
12.04
100.0
No figures available
13.3*
No figures available
15,650,000*
134,236 0.5
No figures available
134,236
30,259,310
0.5
100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an 
average for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398- 
399, based on the number of trades union members unemployed, 
likely that the figure for non-union workers was higher.
It is
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from the previous year, reaching its lowest total since 
the refounding of the party. Also predictably, the pro­
portion of agricultural laborers increased slightly. The 
largest gain percentagewise of any category in this sample 
was by the farmers--but their gain was not nearly as spec­
tacular as the gain they recorded in 1928.^^ The percent­
age of students coming into the party declined somewhat, 
as might be expected from the decline in the proportion 
of new members from the younger age groups.
The only other notable changes in the occupational 
structure of this sample of persons joining the NSDAP in 
1929 compared to former years was the small decline in 
the proportion of white-collar workers and a small in­
crease in the percentage of business owners converting to 
Nazism. The latter possibly reflects the deteriorating 
economic situation in 1929. A similar rise was noted in 
this category during the recession of I926. The former 
might be explained as a result of the general urban to 
rural shift in the incoming membership.
The decline in the percentage of workers entering 
the party coincided with a period of rising unemployment. 
This would seem to disprove the contention that it was 
the unemployed industrial workers who furnished much of 
the support of Hitler's movement in the pre-1930 period.
The percentage of new members who listed their occupations 
as unemployed in 1929 remained as in previous years.
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The lower-middle class continued to con­
stitute an absolute, but not overwhelming, majority of 
new members in 1929.
Of the persons who joined the Nazi party in 1925, 
5.2 per cent left it in 1929. They were joined by 8.7 
per cent of those who joined in 1926, 13*3 per cent of 
those who joined in 192?, and 20.6 per cent of those who 
joined in 1928. Of those persons in this sample who 
joined Hitler's movement in 1929, 7 « 7 per cent had left 
it before the end of that year. If these percentages are 
extended to the party as a whole, it means that more than
19.000 people left the NSDAP in 1929. Instead of the
176.000 members claimed by the Nazis at the beginning of 
1930, the actual figure was probably closer to 125,000. 
The party continued to have only a brief appeal for many 
of its converts. One hundred fifty-four persons in 
this sample who had left the party in previous years 
re-entered it in 1929 with new party numbers and are con­
sidered with the new members.
The social structure of the new Nazis in this 
sample of persons entering the NSDAP in 1929 largely re­
flects the trends already apparent in 1928. The average 
age of the new members continued to rise. Although more 
than half of the new members were under thirty, repre­
sentatives from the older age groups increased appre­
ciably. The geographical stronghold of the Nazis shifted
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significantly in 1929. South Germany for the first time 
supplied a louver proportion of new Nazis than its percent­
age of the total population in the Reich. The highly 
industrialized Rhineland continued to decline in the pro­
portion of new Nazis furnished, while the relative number 
of new members from the rural/agrarian areas of East 
Prussia and Schleswig-Holstein increased substantially.
The proportion of new Nazi party members coming from 
smaller communities came very close to equaling the per­
centage of persons living in such communities in the 
nation as a whole- For the first time in 1929 the new 
Nazis were not predominantly from urban areas but were 
dispersed among the different-sized communities in 
approximately the same proportion as the total population 
of the Reich.
The occupational structure of the Nazi recruits in 
1929 also showed a continuation of trends apparent in the 
statistics for 1928. The relative strength of urban 
workers entering the party continued to decline, appar­
ently establishing a negative correlation with the unem­
ployment rate in Germany, which rose considerably in 
1929. The proportion of business owners increased, per­
haps in response to the economic crisis, as did the per­
centage of farmers. The relative strength of white-collar 
workers among new members decreased slightly, reflecting 
the urban to rural shift in the geographical origins of 
new members.
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The entering members of the NSDAP in 1929 can be 
characterized as young, although increasing numbers of 
older people were joining the party. The new Nazis came 
from all parts of Germany, but Schleswig-Holstein and 
North Germany had replaced South Germany and the Rhine­
land as the most prolific producers of new recruits for 
Hitler. At the same time, smaller towns and the rural 
areas of Germany replaced large cities as the primary 
source of new members. Those persons joining the NSDAP 
in 1929 came from all occupational groups but were more 
likely to come from lower-middle-class jobs than from 
any other. The flow of people from the party reached 
flood proportions in 1929. Perhaps one-fifth as many 
persons left the party as joined it. Judging from past 
years, the odds were better than even that those persons 
who joined the party in 1929 would leave it within three
1928-1930--Summary 
A number of changes are evident in the social com­
position of party members in 1920-1930 compared to those 
entering the NSDAP during the previous three years. The 
predominance of men among new members became overwhelming. 
Over 95 per cent of the converts to Nazism in 1920-1930 
were male. The trend toward more and more recruits from 
the younger age groups evident in the earlier period 
ended as seen in Table 4l .
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930, COMPARED 
TO AGES OF THOSE ENTERING THE PARTY IN 1925-1928
Age
Group Entrants
1925-28
% of 
Entrants
1925-28
Entrants
1928-30
% of 
Entrants
1928-30 Reich
% in
Under 20 2,341 17.2 3,101 16.9 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 5,920 43.4 7,678 41.0 11,458,015 26.6
30-39 2,149 15.8 3,641 19-9 8,863,091 20.5
40-49 1,427 10.5 2,265 12.4 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 691 5.0 1,142 6.2 6,561,314 14.9
Ov er 6 0 262 1.9 400 2.2 4 ,841,919 11.1
No Entry 844 6.2 96 0.5 - -
13,634 100.0 18,323 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
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New converts to Hitlerism continued to come pre­
dominantly from the under-thirty segment of society during 
the period 1928-1930, but not to the same extent that the 
figures indicate for 1925-1928. Although the older age 
groups remained underrepresented in the new members enter­
ing the party compared to their strength in the Reich, 
they constituted a not inconsiderable percentage of incom­
ing Nazis. However, the Hitler movement of 1928-1930 
still exerted its greatest appeal to the youth of Germany.
The geographic origins of new members entering the 
NSDAP in 1928-1930 showed significant changes from the 
figures for 1925-1928 as seen in Table 42. The major 
change that emerges from this comparative table is the 
great increase in the percentage of new members from pre­
dominantly rural, agricultural areas and the corresponding 
decrease in the proportion of new members from the Rhine­
land and from the birthplace of Hitlerism, South Germany. 
This reflects both the Nazi success in capitalizing on 
the "green revolt" among German farmers, and the continu­
ing diffusion of Nazism from the cities to the country­
side, which is shown by the figures in Table 43 for the 
size of the communities from which the new recruits in 
1928-1930 came.
All the urban categories declined considerably per­
centagewise in 1928-1930, while new members from rural 
areas increased dramatically, although the figure remained
TABLE 42
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930
COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING IN 1925-1928
No. of % of r n ^ o f % of
Geographic Entrants Entrants Entrants Entrants % in
Area 1925-28 1925-28 1928-30 1928-30 Reich Reich
South Germany 4,470 32.8 4,399 24.0 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 3,011 22.1 3,018 16.5 13,950,000 21.3
North Germany 5,356 39.3 7,458 40.7 24,567,000 37-6
East Prussia* 419 3.1 1,005 5.5 4 ,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 330 2.4 2,399 13.1 5,983,000 9.2
No Entry 48 0.3 44 0.2 - -
13,634 100.0 18,323 100.0 65,382,000 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
TABLE 43
SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1928-1930 
COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING THE PARTY IN 1925-1928
% of % of
Community Entrants Entrants Entrants Entrants % in
Size 1925-28 1925-28 1928-30 1928-30 Reich
Under 10,000 3,931 28.8 8,623 47.1 33,048,820 52.6
10-50,000 3,269 24.0 3,619 19.8 9,777,134 15.6
50-200,000 2,242 16.4 2,069 11.3 6 ,246,998 9-9
Over 200,000 4,104 30.2 3,857 21.0 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 88 0.6 155 0.8 - -
Totals: 13,634 100.0 18,323 100.0 62,828,000 100.0
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slightly below the total proportion of all persons in 
Germany living in rural areas as defined in this study.
It is clear that during the period I928-I93O National 
Socialism became well established all over Germany, in the 
countryside as well as the cities, to a much greater extent 
than it was in earlier years.
The occupations of those persons joining the party 
during the period I928-I93O reflected, to some extent, the 
changes evident in their geographical and community ori­
gins as shown in Table 44. The most notable change in the 
statistics for 1928-1930 compared to those for the earlier 
period is in the tripling of the percentage of farmers 
entering the party and the corresponding decline in the 
proportion of new members in the laborer categories, the 
white-collar workers, and artisans. However, the percent­
ages of the latter two categories entering the party re­
mained higher than the relative strength of those two 
groups in the Reich. The proportion of professional peo­
ple coming into the party continued its slow decline 
already apparent in earlier years. The percentage of 
incoming members from the other occupational categories 
remained approximately the same for the period 1928-1930 
as they had been in 1925-1928. Although all occupational 
segments of German society were represented among new mem­
bers entering the NSDAP in 1928-1930, the largest group 
was the "old" lower-middle class--artisans and farmers.
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1928-1930 
COMPARED TO THOSE ENTERING IN 1925-1928
N o . of , % of ^ ^ o f % of
Occupational Entrants Entrants Entrants Entrants
Categories 1925-28 1925-28 1928-30 1928-30
Unskilled
Laborers 2,697 19.8 3,047 16.6 10,679,848 35.3
Skilled
Laborers 501 3.7 514 2.8 1 ,146,945 3.8
Agricultural
Laborers 256 1.9 533 2.9 2,499,945 8.3
3,454 25.4 4,094 22.3 14,326,738 47.4
Artisans 2,818 20.7 3,555 19.4 4 ,488,428 14.8
White-Collar 2,865 21.0 3,287 17.9 5,274,232 17c4
Foremen 98 0.7 78 0.4 Included with
Managers 179 1.3 186 250,335 0.9
Civil Servants 496 3.6 612 3.3 No figures available
Self-Employed 517 3.8 678 3.7 No figures available
School Teachers 120 0.9 121 0.7 308,741 1.0
7,093 52.0 8,517 46.5 10,321,736 34.3
Farmers 689 5.1 3,009 16.4 2,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 28 0.2 95 0.5 Included with farmers
Totals : 717 6.3 3,104 16.9 2,139,878 7.1
Military
(enlisted) 25 0.2 35 0.3 104,000 0.3
Military
(officers) 6 0.04 28 0.2 No figures available
Totals : 31 0.24 63 0.5 104,000 0.3
Professional 307 2.2 257 1.4 237,850 0.7
Professors 3 0.02 3 0.02 No figures available
Capitalists 67 0.5 79 0.4 No figures available
Financiers 11 0.08 13 0.07 No figures available
Private Incomes 75 0.5 82 0.4 2,944,872 9.2
Totals : 463 3.3 434 2.29 3,182,722 9-9
Clergy 8 0.05 11 0.06 No figures available
Unemployed 0 0.0 8 0.05 11.2 & 10.9*
Students 580 4.3 687 3.7 No figures available
TABLE 44--Continued
No. of % of No. of % of
Occupational Entrants Entrants Entrants Entrants % in
Categories 1925-28 1925-28 1928-30 1928-30 Reid, Reich
Housewives 354 2.6 312 1-7 15,650,000*
169 1.21 174 0.9 134,236 0.5
Retired 165 1.2 l84 1.1 No figures available
No Entry 600 4.4 735 4.0 - -
Totals : 1,876 13.76 2,111 11.51 134,236 0.5
All Categories: 13,634 100.0 18,323 100.0 30,259,310 100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average 
for the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399> based on 
the number of trades union members unemployed. It is likely that the figure 
for non-union workers was higher.
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This lends credence to the characterization of the 
Nazi movement by some historians as anti-urban and 
anti-modern. However, Nazism was much more than this 
explanation implies.
As the exit of members from the party had changed 
from a trickle to a sizable stream during the period 
1925-1928, it became a veritable flood in 1928-1930.
By the beginning of 1930, 6O.8 per cent of the persons 
who joined the party in 1925 had dropped out. Before 
the end of 1929, 5^.9 per cent of the I926 entrants and 
48.6 per cent of the 1927 recruits were gone. By the 
beginning of 1930, 32.2 per cent of those who joined in 
1928 and 7-7 per cent of those who entered in 1929 had 
quit the party. The ramifications of these figures will 
be considered in some detail in the Conclusion below.
CHAPTER IV
FOOTNOTES
Saxony, pp. 105-
106, says the propaganda of the party in Lower Saxony wa 
primarily designed to attract the petty bourgeoisie and 
the peasantry after 1927 « This redirection supposedly 
resulted from a suggestion from Hitler. Orlow, His tory 
of the Nazi Party, p. 1231 dates the change of emphasis 
in the party propaganda efforts as 192?. It was an 
effort, Orlow said, to "capture" the bourgeoisie. Kele, 
Nazis and Workers, p. 122, also gave the impression that 
the NSDAP despaired of ever winning the workers in 192? 
and redirected their appeals to the middle class.
^Articles dealing with the problems of small busi­
nessmen and Handwerker became more frequent in both news­
papers in the early months of 1928 and continued through 
1929 in addition to the daily columns aimed at those groups 
already carried on back pages.
^A number of articles on agricultural problems, 
which had not previously been numerous, began to appear 
in the columns of both newspapers in January, 1928.
From January through most of May there was at least one 
story in each issue aimed directly at the farmers. The 
quotation at the beginning of this chapter is typical of 
the content of these articles.
^The daily column in Per Angriff on German labor 
continued throughout I928 and 1929- During the same 
period, articles extolling the benefits to be derived by 
workers from affiliation with National Socialism did not 
diminish in either newspaper.
tinned to be devoted almost exclusively to politics and 
foreign affairs. The main theme in these articles was the 
domination of the German government by a group of corrupt 
Marxist Jews who were exploiting the country for their own 
benefit, helped along by the Versailles Treaty.
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^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 220. The 
German production index for all industries declined from 
117 to 113 in 1928 (1913=100) (ibid., p. 393). For de­
tailed production tables in key industries see ibid.,
pp. 377-392.
^The cost of living in Germany increased from 
l48 per cent of the 1913 average in 1927 to 152 per cent 
at the end of I928. Concurrently, wages went from 157*1 
per cent of the 1913 level to l69»3 per cent. As a re­
sult, real wages took their highest jump of the entire 
Weimar period in I928: from 104 per cent of the 1913 
total to 110 per cent. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 464, 
467, and 473.
^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248. For 
exact production figures of the most important agricul­
tural products, see ibid., p. 397*
^The unemployed in the trade unions totaled 7 .4 
per cent of the total membership in April, 1928 (the 
lowest figure for the year), and rose to 11.9 per cent 
by December. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399*
^*^These figures are from Fritz Stern, ed . , The 
Path to Dictatorship, 1918-1933, trans. John Conway, 
with an introduction by Fritz Stern (New York, I966),
pp. 206-207.
Turner, Stresemann, pp. 239-242.
says the
leaders of the Nazi "right" rationalized the poor elec­
toral showing of the party in 1928 into a victory (using 
Frick as an example), while the "left" leadership blamed 
the defeat at the polls on the failure of the party to 
win the workers. As a result, Goebbels and Otto Strasser 
redoubled their appeals to German labor. Kele marshalls 
convincing evidence to support his thesis.
says 108,717 persons had joined the party by December 3I» 
1928. This means 36,127 Germans became Nazis in that
^^This conflicts with Bracher's generalization in 
Aufloesung der Weimarer Republik, p. 120, that the NSDAP 
began to attract young people in great numbers in 1928. 
Actually, the youth trend did not begin in 1928, it sub­
sided slightly from previous years while remaining at a 
high level.
15
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This substantiates Stoltenburg's contention in
Folitische Stroemungen, p. 14$, that the NSDAP membership 
in Schleswig-Holstein increased sharply in 1928-1929*
^^It is incorrect, however, to conclude as did 
Broszat, Der Staat Hitlers, p. 37» that the party was 
"gar nicht v ertret en" in the countryside before 1929-1930.
^^This constitutes ample evidence for the radicali- 
zation of the German farmers discussed above.
_______ * 154, and
Angress, "The Political Role of the Peasantry in the 
Weimar Republic," pp. 540-546. Angress also suggests 
that Hitler's "clarification" of point I7 of the Nazi 
platform (the land appropriation plank) was a powerful 
factor in winning the farmers for the NSDAP (ibid., 
p. 546) .
^^Most estimates of party strength have been very 
close to the 108,000 figure. One notable exception is 
John E. Rodes, The Quest for Unity. Modern Germany, 1048- 
1970 (New York, 1971), pp. 233-234, who guessed 60,000 
persons were members of the NSDAP "at the end of 1928."
members unemployed 
dropped to 11.7 in April, but had risen to 15.6 by October. 
The figure for the entire labor force was probably much 
higher. Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399*
^^The cost of living in Germany rose from 152 per 
cent of the 1913 level at the end of 1928 to 154 per cent
at the beginning of 1930. During the same period, wages
increased from I69 * 3 per cent of the figure for 1913 to 
180.0 per cent. Consequently, real wages went from 110 
per cent of the 1913 total to 115 per cent. Bry, Wages
in Germany, pp. 464, 467, and 473 *
^^Waldo E. Stevens, Revisions of the Treaty of 
Versailles (New York, 1939), P* 233 *
1 . The final determination of Germany's liability 
for reparations. This included the fixing of the amount 
of annuities which Germany should pay and the period of 
time over which they should be paid.
2. The abolition of foreign controls in Germany 
and the setting up of a new organization for the receipt 
and disbursement of the annuities.
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3 . The development of a plan for the mobilization 
and ultimate issuance for sale on the world market of a 
certain portion of the German annuities.
From Thomas Lamont, "The Final Reparations Settlement," 
Foreign Affairs 8 (1929-1930): 336.
^^The proposal also included other important advan­
tages for Germany over the Dawes Plan: the exact amount
and duration of payments was firmly established, and the 
index of prosperity was abolished. 41s o , Germany regained 
her financial autonomy and could, if necessary, postpone 
part of the payments for two years without permission of 
the Allies, and Germany was absolved of responsibility for 
the debts of the other former Central Powers. Stevens, 
Revisions of the Treaty of Versailles, pp. 236-238.
Westarp of the DNVP. He argued that reparation payments 
were being used by France to build up their army on a huge 
scale. Dy making more payments, Germany would continue to 
strengthen her greatest enemy militarily and ensure that 
France would continue to be the dominant power in Europe. 
Stresemann, answering for the government, pointed out that 
Germany had but three alternatives: she could accept the
Young Plan; she could continue to pay reparations under 
the old schedule of the Dawes Plan, or she could refuse to 
pay and be invaded. The final two alternatives were 
clearly unacceptable. Several debates were staged, a rec­
ord of which are in Martin Vogt, ed., Akten der Reich- 
skanzlei (Doppard-am-Rhine, 1970)> I , N o . 192, R 43
1/1437, pp. 524-627.
^^Volz, Paten die Geschichte der NSDAP, p. 131» 
gives the .total number of persons who had joined the party 
by the end of 1929 as 176,426.
ith Stoltenberg's find­
ings in Politische Stroemun.gen im Schleswig-Holstein Land- 
volk, ppl 145-146 , 148-150, and 162, that the Nazi party 
in Schleswig-Holstein grew very rapidly beginning in 1928.
^^Parson's generalization in "Sociological Aspects 
of the Fascists Movements," p. l44, that fascism was by 
and large an urban movement is correct for the period be­
fore 1930. However, the trend toward more and more new 
members from smaller communities entering the party appar­
ent before the beginning of the depression suggests that 
Parson's thesis may not apply after 1929.
^^The large increase in the percentage of farmers 
among new party members in 1928-1930 substantiates the
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generalizations of Loomis and Beegle in "The Spread of 
German Nazism in Rural Areas," p. 734, of the "green 
revolt" in Germany during that period. The Nazis made 
significant gains among farmers before 1930, contrary to 
Gies, "NSDAP und landwirtschaftliche Organizationen."
It may have been this facet of the complex phenomenon of 
National Socialism that led Bendix, "Social Stratifica­
tion," p. 371, to identify the movement as "anti-urban."
^^Hans Moms en, Beanitentuni im Dritten Reich. Mit 
Aus.gevalten Quell en zur National sozialismus in Beaiiiten- 
politik (Stuttgart, I966 ) , p"^  21 , said the Nazis made 
special appeals to officials "in and after 1929." By 
1930, Moms en said, they "als Berufsgruppe ueberreprae- 
sentiert waren," in the party membership. Momse n 's gen­
eralization is not supported by the occupational statis­
tics for persons joining the NSDAP in 1929 above.
^^This, indicates Bracher, The German Dictatorship, 
p. 137, was mistaken in concluding the Nazis made some 
inroads among unemployed workers in 1928-1929• It also 
contradicts Schoenbaum's statement in Hitlers Social Revo­
lution, p. 22, that 30 per cent of the party membership 
was unemployed in 1930. It appears that Orlow, History 
of the Nazi Party, p. 1751 was at least partially correct 
in attributing the "sharp rise in membership" in 1929 to 
middle-class "fear" of the depression. Orlow was also 
correct in concluding in ibid., p. 177, that the unem­
ployed did not go over to the Nazis. Florinsky, Fascism 
and National Socialism, p. 43, suggests unemployed per­
sons swelled the ranks of the party after 1928, as does 
Mitchell, Nazism and the Common M a n , p. 13. According to 
Mitchell, "waves of unemployed" poured into the party with 
the beginning of the depression. Hardy-Hemery, "Le 
Nazisme," p. 307, makes a similar generalization about 
new members being unemployed.
^^Heyen, Nationalsozialismus im Alltag, p. 52, 
gives the following occupational breakdown of the members 
of Ortsgruppe Koblenz in the autumn of 1929, based on 
regional records: farmers, 1.5 per cent; artisans and
small businessmen, 40 per cent; white-collar workers,
23.5 per cent. In ibid., p. 53, Heyen gives a similar 
breakdown of I70 Nazis in Ortsgruppen Brohl, Sinzig, and 
Bad Neumahr at about the same time : workers, 5 per cent;
professional, 15 per cent; artisans and small businessmen, 
60 per cent; and white-collar workers, "etwas," 20 per 
cent. On the same page, Heyen gives the following occupa­
tional breakdown for I50 members in five new Rhineland 
Ortsgruppen: farmers, 20 per cent; artisans and small
businessmen, 15 per cent; white-collar workers, I5 per
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cent; workers, 40 per cent; farm laborers, 5 per cent; and 
professional, 5 per cent. "Annaehernd 70% der mitglieder 
sind junge Leute im alter von l8 bis 25 Jahren." The fig­
ures are based on persons in the party in the autumn of 
19291 not on new members. Heyen's figui'es suggest there 
was appreciable local variation in the NSDAP membership 
before 1930-
estimates of party strength for 1929 
that differ radically from Volz' figures are Broszat, Der 
Staat Hitlers, p. 491 and Hardy-Hemery, "Le Nazisme," 
p. 307. Broszat says there were no more than 121,000 
members in the party as late as September, 1930. Hardy- 
Hemery gives the figure 389,000 as the number of Nazis at 
the end of 1929 -
sociale des NSDAP dans 
les annes 1928-1930," analyzed the Nazi vote in the 
Reichstag elections of 1928 and 1930. His conclusion was 
that although the Nazis received their strongest support 
in North and South Germany, from the young, and from the 
middle-class districts, they nevertheless received many 
votes from all areas of Germany and from all social 
strata regardless of religion, wealth, or age. This is 
entirely consistent with the cumulative statistics pro­
duced above for the social composition of the Nazi party,
1928-1930.
CONCLUSION
Testing the Most Popular Generalizations about 
the NSDAP Membership. Were the Rank-£incl-File 
Nazis Largely from the Lower-Middle Class?
In the Introduction to this study I showed that the 
most pervasive characterization of Nazi party members by 
social scientists is as members of the lower-middle class. 
A major problem with this thesis is one of definition: 
Which groups in society constitute the lower-middle class? 
What criteria should be adopted for assigning a particular 
individual to those groups? Few historians subscribing to 
the hypothesis that the Nazis were a class party have 
bothered to deal with this question.^
If the system of class assignation which I have 
used in this investigation is accepted,^ then the defini­
tion of National Socialism as primarily a class movement 
is not substantiated. Table 4$ shows clearly that those 
occupational groups considered here as the lower-middle 
class, although admittedly overrepresented in the NSDAP 
relative to their numbers in German society, were far from 
being the overwhelming majority which alone would justify
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TABLE 45
OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, 1919-1923 AND 1925-1930
No. of % of % of
Occupational Members Members Members Members N o . in % in
Categories 1919-24 1919-24 1925-30 1925-30 Reich Reich
Unskilled
Laborers
Skilled
Laborers
Agricultural
Laborers
1,339
258
96
Totals: 1,693
16.4
3.2
1.2 
20.8
5,744
1,015
789
7,548
18.0
3.2
2.5
23.7
10,679,848
1 .146.945
2.499.945 
14,326,738
35.3
3.8
8.3
47.4
Artisans
White-Collar
Foremen
Managers 
Civil Servants 
Self-Employed 
School Teachers
1,765
1,935
40
51
272
216
70
Totals: 4,329
21.7
23.8
0.5
0.6
3.3
2.7
0.9
53-5
6,373
6,152
176
365
1,108
1,195
241
15,610
19.9 
19.3
0.6
1.1
3.5
3.7
0.8
48.9
4 ,488,428 14.8
5,274,232 17.4
Included with
white-collar
250,335 0.9
No figures available 
No figures available
308,741 1.0
1 0,321,736 34.3
Farmers 366 4.5 3,698 11.6 2,139,878 7.1
Large Landowners 11 0.3 123 0.4 Included with farmers
377 4.6 3,821 12.0 2,139,878 7.1
Military
(enlisted) 44 0.5 60 0.2 104,000 0.3
Military
(officers) 70 0.9 34 0.1 No figures available
Totals : 114 1.4 94 0.3 104,000 0.3
Professional 296 3.6 564 1.8 237,850 0.7
Professors 17 0.5 6 0.02 No figures available
Capitalists 82 1.0 146 0.5 No figures available
Financiers 26 0.3 24 0,1 No figures available
Private Incomes 35 0.4 157 0.5 2,944,872 9.2
Totals : 456 5.8 897 2.92 3,182,722 9-9
Clergy 1 0.0 19 0.1 No figures available
Unemployed 9 0.1 8 0.03 3.2 & 13.3*
Students 413 5.0 1,267 4.0 No figures available
TABLE 4g--Continued
N o . of % of N o . of % of
Occupational Members Members Members Members % in
Categories 1919-24 1919-24 1925-30 1925-30 Reich Reich
Housewives 216 2.7 666 2.1 15,650,000*
81 1.0 343 1.1 134,236 0.5
Retired 120 1.5 349 1.1 No figures available
No Entry 315 3.9 1,320 4.1 - -
Totals: 1,155 14.2 3,972 12.53 134,236 0.5
All Categories: 8,144 100.0 31,957 99.95 30,259,310 100.0
*No included in totals. The percentage of unemployed is an average for 
the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399i and Angell, The 
Recovery of Germany, pp. 370-371»
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the definition of Nazism as a class movement. While it 
is true that the lower-middle class made up the largest 
single block of the membership, a majority of the pre-1930 
Nazis came from other segments of German society. This 
was also true of the early NSDAP.
Undoubtedly, many persons from the lower-middle 
class joined the Nazi party for the variety of reasons 
discussed by historians who hold that National Socialism 
was a class movement; there was definitely a great fear 
of Bolshevism among the lower-middle class; this group did 
suffer greatly during the great inflation; along with most 
other Germans, the petit bourgeoisie did have its national 
pride severely damaged by the defeat in I9I8 and was out­
raged by the Treaty of Versailles; the lower-middle class 
was also alienated by continuing industrialization and 
confused and disoriented by the anomie of modern society; 
this did make them susceptible to the appeal of a radical 
political party promising immediate redress of their prob­
lems .^ However, the basic argument underlying the class 
hypothesis of Nazism is that a certain segment of German 
society was motivated by its own economic interests to 
support Adolf Hitler and his party. The statistics in 
the preceding chapters cannot prove or disprove this 
thesis, but they do suggest that since the party attracted 
such widely divergent groups, factors other than strictly 
material ones might be important in the decisions of
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individuals to join the movement. This generalization 
is supported by Peter Merkl's recent work.^
While the various appeals National Socialism held 
for the lower-middle class have been exhaustively ex­
plored, it is not at all clear why the other groups 
present in the party in strength should have become fol­
lowers of Hitler. Why would members of the proletariat 
join a movement that is usually characterized today as 
reactionary? Why did farmers in great numbers join a 
political party with an agricultural program that was 
little short of ridiculous? Why would persons from the 
upper and upper-middle classes support a movement that 
called for egalitarianism and an end to privilege?
These questions deserve much more attention than they 
have received.
Max Kele has shown convincingly that the Nazis 
made a continuing effort to di'aw workers into the move­
ment through propaganda in the years before 1930.^
These appeals were based on three issues which the Nazis 
felt would win the proletariat away from Marxism-- 
Nationalism, anti-Semitism, and the contention that the 
Marxist parties had betrayed the social revolution begun 
after the war. The super-nationalism of the NSDAP was 
attractive to many workers who had been infused with 
national pride since childhood,^ and felt, along with 
many other Germans, a deep sense of humiliation because
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of the lost war and the Treaty of Versailles. That large 
sections of the proletariat were intensely nationalistic 
is demonstrated by the behavior of the workers' parties 
during the First World War. Hitler's party, by constantly 
appealing to the national pride of Germans--workers and 
others--made itself more attractive to many workers than 
the avowedly internationalist KPD or the pacifist S P D .
The anti-Semitism of the NSDAP was also attractive 
to certain workers who preferred it to the outspoken anti- 
anti-Semitism of the SPD.^ It has been shown that hatred 
of Jews was not as pervasive in the proletariat as in 
other classes in Germany,^ but it was nevertheless 
present.
There was widespread resentment in the ranks of 
German workers against the SPD for its "counterrevolu­
tionary" actions in 1919 which many felt prevented any 
true or meaningful social changes in the Reich.^ Most 
of these dissatisfied workers found their way into the 
KPD, but after that party went into decline^^ they were 
left without a political home. Some gravitated to the 
N a z i s . A s  it became less and less likely that the SPD 
was going to pursue the socialization of the country, 
many members left it--especially younger members who could 
see no hope of dislodging the old leadership of the party 
or convincing them to adopt a more activistic policy. To 
these young workers the Nazis offered a brand of socialism
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and action, as well as a chance to move into positions of 
leadership within the party.
Thus, although the proletariat was not present in 
the Nazi party in numbers commensurate with its strength 
in German society, there was nevertheless a large and 
dedicated group of proselytizers from the ranks of German 
labor working for Adolf Hitler by 1930. Their presence 
alone in the NSDAP precludes the characterization of 
National Socialism as a movement of the lower-middle 
class. But apart from the workers there were also sev­
eral other segments of society well represented in the 
pre-depression Nazi party.
Farmers were present in the movement at the begin­
ning of 1930 in much greater strength than in German 
s o c i e t y . S o m e  historians have included the farmers as 
a part of the lower-middle c l a s s , b u t  since the tradi­
tional political affiliations of the two groups were 
always different in imperial G e r m a n y , a n d  for several 
other r e a s o n s , t h e y  are considered here as separate 
categories. The great increase in the percentage of 
farmers among new members in 1928-1929 coincides with a 
period of recovery in the economic situation of German 
agriculture. Agricultural prices were higher and pro­
duction greater in the last two years before 1930 than 
at any time since the war. It is tempting to conclude 
from this that farmers were less motivated to join the
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NSDAP by economic considerations than by fear of Bolshev­
ism, disgust with the Weimar regime, wounded national 
pride, etc. However, Rudolf Heberle's work on the farmers 
in Schleswig-Holstein suggests that it was primarily the 
small farmers in that region, practically destroyed by the 
agricultural depression of 1924-1928 financially, who 
joined Hitler's party in desperation because of the Weimar 
government's inability to do anything about their prob­
lems.^® Heberle's contentions cannot be substantiated or 
disproved by the statistics derived in this study. How­
ever, the figures for the early party argue against the 
conclusion that farmers joined the Nazis primarily in 
reaction against their financial plight.
The great inflation, according to several authori­
ties on German agriculture, worked to the benefit of Ger­
man farmers. Many of them were able to pay off heavy 
indebtedness with the practically worthless currency of 
1923. Nevertheless, there was apparently a large influx 
of farmers into the NSDAP during that year. This indicates 
that the qualities of the Nazi movement which appealed to 
all segments of German society were as important in at­
tracting farmers into the party as the economic problems 
of German agriculture.
The upper and upper-middle classes were also pres­
ent in the NSDAP in some s t r e n g t h . P r o f e s s i o n a l  persons 
were more than twice as numerous in the Nazi party as in
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German society and six times as numerous in the early 
party. The percentage of capitalists and financiers in 
German society was not ascertainable, but it could not 
have been much greater than the percentages of those 
groups in Hitler's party. The presence of these groups 
in the NSDAP, even in the modest numbers indicated above, 
is not compatible with the definition of National Social­
ism as a movement of the lower-middle c l a s s . W h y  per­
sons from the upper strata of German society would be 
attracted to a party which espoused an egalitarian pro­
gram inimical to the established positions of those upper 
strata is not readily apparent. It is not, however, 
totally inexplicable.
The upper ranks of the bourgeoisie were not immune 
to the Nazi super-nationalist appeals, and neither they 
nor the upper classes were fond of the Treaty of Ver­
sailles which Hitler promised to demolish. Further, the 
outspoken anti-Semitism of the NSDAP propaganda apparatus 
found a sympathetic audience not only in the upper-middle 
class but in the old aristocracy and the super-rich of 
the R e i c h . P r e d i c t a b l y ,  the anti-Marxism of National 
Socialism was also well received in the social classes 
under d i s c u s s i o n , H o w e v e r ,  these factors alone would 
not be sufficient to explain the presence in a radical 
"socialist" party of any appreciable representation from 
the upper classes.
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A plausible explanation for the attraction of 
Hitler's party to these upper classes has been provided 
recently by Walter S t r u v e . S t r u v e ,  although convinced 
that the lower-middle class provided the great bulk of
of the "neoconservative" intellectual spokesmen for the 
upper classes were interchangeable with the tenets of 
National Socialism. This was also true, Struve argues, 
even in the case of many of the more moderate liberal 
intellectuals of the Weimar period, especially the recur­
ring demand in both Nazi propaganda and liberal philosophy 
for the creation of an "open-ended e l i t e . A s  a result 
of this affinity of ideas, according to Struve, not only 
did many members of the upper ranks of German society 
sympathize with the Nazi cause, but--as shown by the sta­
tistics above--many joined the party and actually worked 
for its political triumph.
It should also be pointed out that there was a 
great deal of discontent among aspiring professionals in 
Germany during the period 1925-1930 owing to the fact that 
many more new professionals were produced each year than 
there were positions for in Weimar s o c i e t y . I t  would 
not be surprising if the less successful of these would-be 
professionals, denied the opportunity to practice the pro­
fessions for which they spent long years in preparation, 
gravitated toward radical political parties which held
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out hope of eventual redress for their problems and an 
immediate opportunity to move into responsible positions 
in the party ranks. The NSDAP certainly met these crite­
ria. It may well be that Hans Gerth was correct when he 
characterized professional people in Hitler's party as 
"doctors without patients, lawyers without clients, [and] 
writers without readers . Howevei’, this is not probable
one way or the other by the statistics produced above.
To summarize, the membership of the Nazi party was 
not comprised overwhelmingly by persons from the lower- 
middle class. The petty bourgeoisie was much more numer­
ous in the NSDAP than in German society but not to the 
degree that National Socialism may accurately be described 
as a class movement. Nazis before 1930 came from all seg­
ments of German society--from the proletariat to the no­
bility. Its propaganda was designed to attract support 
from all regions of the Reich, from all religious persua­
sions, and all classes. As Hitler himself insisted in 
the quotation at the beginning of Chapter II, above, the 
Nazis attempted and succeeded in bridging the political 
gap separating the many classes in Germany.
National Socialism: A Youth Movement/
Generational Revolt?
The figures in Table 46 substantiate the general­
izations of several historians that the Nazis before 1930 
were very young. Whether or not National Socialism was a 
generational revolt, however, is much more problematical.
TABLE 46
AGES OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1919-1924 AND 1925-1930
No. of % of No. of % of
Members Members Members Members N o . in % in
1919-24 1919-24 1925-30 1925-30 Reich Reich
Under 20 1,513 18.5 5,442 17.0 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 3,333 40.8 13,498 42.6 11,458,015 26.6
30-39 1,432 17.6 5,790 18.1 8,863,091 20.5
40-49 891 11.0 3,692 11.6 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 326 4.0 1,833 5.7 6,561,314 14.9
Over 60 151 1.9 662 2.1 4 ,841,919 11.1
No Entry 498 6.2 940 2.9 - -
Totals: 8,144 100.0 31,957 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
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Recently two studies have appeared which attempt 
to explain the phenomenon of National Socialism wholly or 
in part as the result of a generational revolt. Peter 
Loewenberg has stated categorically that "the relation­
ship between the period 1914 to 1920 and the rise and 
triumph of national socialism . . .  is specifically gen­
erational. The war and post-war experiences of the small 
children and youth of World War I explicitly conditioned 
the nature and success of national s o c i a l i s m . P e t e r  
Merkl, in his reworking of the Abel biographies, has also 
pointed out numerous aspects of the Nazi movement which 
resemble a classic youth revolt but identifies three dis­
tinct generations in the NSDAP which differed greatly in 
their motivation for joining Hitler's party.
The major difficulty with the generational hypoth­
esis is defining exactly what is meant by a "generation." 
There is no consensus among social scientists on this 
p o i n t . F o r  the purposes of this study, the following 
definition of a generation has been formulated: A gener­
ation is composed of all persons in a given society of 
roughly the same age who have experienced events during 
their formative years which imparted to them a world view 
significantly different than that held by younger or older 
groups in the same society. The more profound the shared 
experiences of the group, the more cohesive it becomes, 
with age outweighing factors such as class and geographic
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that the dramatic events of the First World War must have 
produced at least one extremely cohesive generation, with 
a homogeneous world view despite its class content. This 
is precisely the argument advanced by Lowenberg and, with 
variations, by Merkl.
The "Under 20" group in the early party column in 
Table 46 represents those persons who were children and 
adolescents during the war. They were present in the 
NSDAP in numbers twice as great as in German society at 
large. This same group is represented in the "20-29" 
category for the post-1925 party. Once again, they are 
proportionately far more Nazis of this age than there are 
common citizens. Lowenberg and Merkl, both drawing evi­
dence from the Abel biographies, argue convincingly that 
it was the shared experiences of wartime Germany that pre­
disposed people in this age group toward Nazism.
It is at this point that Merkl's work diverges from 
Lowenberg's . Merkl argues that two other related but dis­
tinct generations were also attracted to the NSDAP: a
prewar generation which came of age shortly before or dur­
ing the war and furnished Germany's soldiers, and a post­
war generation which experienced the war as very young 
children and were still adolescents in the turbulent early 
years of the Weimar R e p u b l i c . M e r k l  points out that the 
professed egalitarianism of the Nazi party especially
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appealed to the "front generation" which often longed for 
the comraderie of the trenches and close relationships 
formed in combat. The "front socialism" often commented 
on by veterans of the war seemed closely akin to the Nazi 
brand of socialism. As seen in preceding chapters, the 
Nazis made specific propaganda appeals to the "front- 
soldaten." The "20-29" and the "30-39" categories in 
Table 46 represent the front generation for the period 
1919-1924. Part of the "20-29" group, all of the "30-39" 
group, and part of the "40-49" category from the 1925- 
1930 period were of conscriptable age during World War I. 
The front generation in the early party was strongly 
overrepresented compared to its strength in German society. 
Merkl's argument that many of this age group were still 
dazed by the experiences of the war during the early 
Weimar period, angry at the outcome of the war and the 
Versailles Treaty, disgusted with the government and 
hence fertile recruiting ground for militant political 
movements, seems to be substantiated by the statistics 
produced by this investigation. However, it would appear 
that by 1930 most of the war generation had settled into 
Weimar society. Their strength in the NSDAP was certainly 
no greater than their relative numbers in German society, 
and probably was less. They were displaced as the primary 
source of Nazi recruits by Merkl's other generation, the 
post-war children.
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This generation, very young children during the war 
itself, grew up with the civil war of the early post-war 
years, the great hue and cry raised against the Treaty of 
Versailles, the constant real or imagined "red threat," 
and the great inflation. Represented in the 1925-1930 
party by the "Under 20" and most of the "20-29" age cate­
gories, they provided an absolute majority of the rank- 
and-file of Hitler's party before the Great Depression.
To further support the generalization that National 
Socialism "received its virulance from the youth rebellion 
of the Weimar Republic." Mcrlcl pointed out that over 70 
per cent of the respondents to Abel's prize essay contest 
had belonged to youth groups. It would thus appear that 
Herbert Holler's argument that youth invariably plays a 
pivotal role in revolutionary movements applies to the 
N a z i s . T h e  class affiliations of persons joining the 
NSDAP before 1930 are not as important a sociological 
datum as their ages.
However, two important considerations argue against 
defining Hitler's movement solely in terms of a genera­
tional revolt. Firstly, approximately one-fifth of the 
party membership did not belong to any of the war genera­
tions discussed above. That these older men played an 
important role in the leadership of the party and the 
formulation of its policies is demonstrated by the ages 
of the Nazi Reichstag delegations in 1928 and 1930.^^
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Secondly, National Socialism was not an invention of 
the German youth movement. Its basic themes--super- 
nationalism , anti-Semitism, and anti-Marxism--had a 
long history in imperial Germany and were shared, in 
one form or another, by other political movements not 
oriented around youth.
The conclusions suggested by the above data 
are these: there was a broad stratum of young Germans
born between I89O-I9IO who shared the traumatic expe­
riences of the First World War and the revolution of 
1918, the humiliation of Versailles, civil war, and 
the great inflation as the formative events of their 
lives. Because of these shared experiences, these 
young people were much more susceptible to the appeal 
of the Nazi party during the period 1919-1930 than was 
the rest of the German population, regardless of class 
affiliation. The Nazi leaders recognized the poten­
tial value of these young people and made continued 
efforts to attract them into the party through propa­
ganda. The result was a young and dynamic political 
movement which out-competed all others in the early 
1930s. The Nazi movement was not initially a youth 
movement or a generational revolt, but it did capi­
talize on the widespread dissatisfaction among German 
youth to gain the fanatical supporters who turned the
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other Generalizations 
The Sex of NSDAP Members 
As has usually been assumed, the Nazi party member­
ship was overwhelmingly masculine--see Table 4?. The rea­
sons why women made up no appreciable part of the party
TABLE 47
SEX OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP,
1919-1923 AND 1923-1930
Sex
of
Members
N o . of 
Members
1919-24
% of 
Members
1919-24
Members
1925-30
of
Members
1925-30
F emale 
No Entry
7,457
642
45
91.6
7.9
0.5
30,232
1,725
94.6
5.4
Totals: 8,144 100.0 31,957 100.0
membership relative to their numbers in German society 
are reasonably clear. To begin with, the NSDAP was from 
1920 on a highly militant, combative organization. Its 
members frequently took to the streets in violent clashes 
with rival political groups, particularly the Marxists. 
This is not the sort of activity to which women are 
usually attracted. Also, the more glamorous areas of 
the party, the SA and the S S , were closed to women in the 
1920s. Finally, the party took the unofficial stand that 
the place of women was in the kitchen. Women were pro­
hibited from holding high positions in the party, which
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would discourage militant "modern women" like, for 
example, Rosa Luxemberg of the KPD, from pursuing a 
party career. As a result, the NSDAP remained largely 
the preserve of men before 1930.
Was National Socialism a Regional Movement?
From its refounding in 1925 to January 1 , 1930, the 
NSDAP was never confined to any particular region in Ger­
many. The cumulative statistics in Table 48 show that the 
percentage of members in the party from each of the five 
regions of Germany was approximately equal to the percent­
age of the total population of the Reich living in those 
regions.
TABLE 48
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING
THE NSDAP, 1925- 1930
Geographic No. of of % in
Area Members Members Reich
South Germany 8,869 27.8 16,485,000 25.2
Rhineland 6,029 18.9 13,950,000 21.3
North Germany 12,814 38.1 24,567,000 37.6
East Prussia* 1,424 4.5 4 ,397,000 6.7
Schleswig-
Holstein 2,729 8.5 5,983,000 9.2
No Entry 92 0.2 - -
Total.: 31,957 100.0 65,382,000 100.0
* Includes Danzig
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It is very probable, however, that for the first 
few years of its existence the party's recruits were 
drawn largely from South Germany. The membership lists 
in Adolf Hitlers Mitlcaempfer almost invariably listed 
only a street address under the "address" column, indi­
cating they were probably from Munich. During 1921-1922 
the party began spreading to surrounding communities in 
South Germany. Even during the great period of member­
ship expansion in 1923 the bulk of the new members prob­
ably came from South Germany.
The involvement of the interim leaders of the 
movement during Hitler's imprisonment with political 
groups of similar persuasion apparently resulted in the 
rapid spread of National Socialism to all parts of the 
Reich in 1925. Thus, although the official NSDAP itself 
drew its members primarily from South Germany before 
1925, the basic tenets of Nazism were accepted by Ger­
mans from around the nation prior to that time. National 
Socialism was not a regional movement, but drew its sup­
port from all areas of Germany.
Did the Nazis Come Primarily from 
Small Towns or Rural Areas?
The contention that Hitler's movement was a small 
town and rural phenomenon before 1930 is refuted by the 
statistics in Table 49. From 1925 to 1930 persons from 
small towns and rural areas were underrepresented in the
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TABLE 49
SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS 
JOINING THE NSDAP IN 1925-1930
Community
Size
N o . of 
Members
% of 
Members
N o . in 
Reich
% in 
Reich
Under 10,000 12,554 39.3 33,048,820 52.6
10-50,000 6,888 21.6 9 ,777,134 15-6
50-200,000 4,311 13.5 6,246,998 9.9
Over 200,000 7,961 24.9 13,755,048 21.9
No Entry 243 0.7 - -
Totals : 31,957 100.0 62,828,000 100.0
NSDAP relative to their numbers in German society. Nazism 
IVas overwhelmingly an urban phenomenon before 1930. It is 
true, however, that a greater and greater percentage of 
new members in the party came from small towns and/or 
rural communities in each of the years between 1925-1930. 
Nevertheless, the party was, at the beginning of the 
Great Depression, a largely urban movement with its 
strength in the cities of Germany.
The same generalization is probably even more true 
of the early party, at least up until 1922. The majority 
of the members were almost certainly from Munich before 
this time, a major population center. The size of the 
communities from which those persons came who joined the 
party in 1923 is not certainly known, but there is some 
evidence to suggest that a great many of them were from
39small towns and rural areas.
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The Quitters: Who Left the NSDAP, and Why?
An unexpected discovery about the NSDAP membership 
brought to light by this investigation is the large number 
of persons who quit the party. Of the 311957 persons in 
this sample who joined the Nazi party before 1930, 10,500 
had left it by the beginning of that year (32.9 per cent). 
By the time Hitler assumed the Chancellorship of the Reich 
in February, 1933, only 13,412 of those who had joined 
during the Kampfzeit were still in the party (42 per cent). 
The question immediately arises as to whether these per­
sons who left the party came from a particular age group, 
region, social class, etc. If they did, their very num­
bers could considerably alter the model of the social 
structure of the NSDAP membership constructed in Chapters 
III and IV, above. Statistical Tables 50 through 54 show 
the number of Nazis who fell into each of the social and 
demographic categories examined and how they compare per­
centagewise with the sample as a whole and with the popu­
lation of the German Reich.
Table 50 shows that sex is not a reliable guide in 
predicting whether a given member might leave the party.
The men who joined the NSDAP before 1930 appear to have 
been only slightly more prone to leave the party then 
women but not to any significant degree. The overwhelm­
ing masculinity of Hitler's movement demonstrated in 
Table 4? was not altered by the great flow of members 
from the party.
TABLE 50
SEX OF PERSONS WHO LEFT THE NSDAP BY 1930, BY 1933, AND IN THE REICH
?o of
1925- 1925
1930 1926
Quit-
1930
°/a Of N o . of % of
Quit- Quit- Quit­
ters % in
1930 1933 1933 Reich Reich
Male 30,232
Female 1 ,725
94.6
5.4
Totals: 31,957
9,946
554
94.7
5.3
17,578
967
94.8
5.2
100.0 18,545 100.0
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Table 51 shows that Germans from the younger age 
groups who joined the NSDAP before 1930 were somewhat 
more likely to drop out of the movement than were those 
members who were thirty years of age or more when they 
became Nazis. This prediliction on the part of younger 
persons to drop out of the party is not great enough to 
significantly alter the age structure of the party pre­
sented in Table 46. Even with more persons under thirty 
years of age leaving the party proportionately than the 
older age groups, the NSDAP clearly retained its extremely 
youthful character.
The geographic origins of the individual party 
member had very little to do with whether or not he left 
the movement, as shown by Table 52. The two slight ex­
ceptions to this were the areas of the Rhineland and 
Sclileswig-Holstein. Persons from the Rhineland who joined 
Hitler's party before 1930 were somewhat more likely to 
quit the Nazis than persons from other areas. The exact 
reverse is true for Schleswig-Holstein. It appears that 
persons from this region were the least likely to leave 
the National Socialist movement once they had joined.
Since the Rhineland was the most heavily indus­
trialized region of Germany during the period under con­
sideration, while Schleswig-Holstein was a largely agri­
cultural section of the Reich, it is tempting to suggest 
that this explains the disparity in the number of quitters
AGES OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE NSDAP BEFORE 1930 COMPARED TO
THE AGES OF NAZIS WHO LEFT THE PARTY BY I93O AND BY 1933
No. of % of
N o . of % of N o . of % of
Quit- Quit­ Quit-
Age 1925- 1925- ters N o . in % in
Group 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 Reich
Under 20 5,442 17.0 2,052 19.5 3,430 18.5 3,897,555 9.0
20-29 13,589 42.6 4,612 43.9 7,959 42.9 11,458,015 26.6
30-39 5,790 18.1 1,517 14.5 2,998 16.2 8,863,091 20.5
40-49 3,692 11.6 996 9.5 2,016 10.9 7,754,071 17.9
50-59 1,833 5.7 420 4.0 929 5.0 6,561,314 14.9
Over 60 662 170 1.6 374 2.0 4 ,841,919 11.1
No Entry 940 2.9 733 7.0 839 4.5 - -
31,957 100.0 10,500 100.0 18,545 100.0 43,375,965 100.0
TABLE 52
GEOGRAPHIC ORIGINS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NAZI PARTY, 1925-1930
COMPARED TO THOSE WHO HAD LEFT THE NSDAP BY 1930 AND BY 1933
No. of % of
N o . of % of N o . of % of
Quit­ Quit- Quit­ Quit-
graphic 1925- 1925- ters ters % in
Area 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 Reich Reich
S. Ger. 8,869 27.8 2,937 28.0 5,145 27.7 16,485,000 25.2
N. Ger. 12,814 40.3 4,336 41.3 7,491 40.4 24,567,000 37.6
Rhlnd. 6,029 18.8 2,306 21.9 3,920 21.1 13,950,000 21.3
* 1,424 4.4 485 4.6 854 4.6 4 ,397,000* 6.7
Sch.-Hoi 2,729 8.5 417 4.0 1,106 6.0 5,983,000 9.2
Totals : 31,957 100.0 10,500 100.0 18,545 100.0 65,382,000* 100.0
♦Includes Danzig.
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from the two areas. However, East Prussia was also a 
largely rural, agrarian area, like Schleswig-Holstein; 
the percentage of persons from East Prussia who left the 
NSDAP was almost exactly the same as the proportion of 
persons from that area in the total party membersliip 
before 1930» The same generalization is true of North 
Germany, a relatively more industrialized region. The 
answer may lie in the different effects of the depression 
on the Rhineland as compared to Schleswig-Holstein. The 
electoral support of the KPD in the former region in­
creased enormously between 1928 and 1933, while that in 
the latter area did not. It appears possible that in a 
period of acute economic crisis, the Communists had 
greater appeal in industrial areas than did the Nazis.
At first glance, the size of the communities from 
which persons joining the NSDAP before 1930 came (Table 
53) seems a significant determinant of whether a partic­
ular individual might leave the party. The percentage 
of persons from all the urban categories who dropped out 
of the movement prior to that date was higher than their 
percentages in the party. The proportion of persons 
from rural areas and communities of under 10,000 popula­
tion was lower than their party strength. This means the 
structure of the party membership presented in Table 49 
is somewhat inaccurate when the sizable number of quitters 
is taken into consideration. However, the figures in
TABLE 53
SIZE OF COMMUNITY OF ORIGIN OF PERSONS WHO JOINED THE NAZI PARTY, 1925-1930 
COMPARED TO PERSONS WHO LEFT THE NSDAP, BEFORE 1930 AND BEFORE 1933
No. of % of
N o . of % of % of
Commu­ Quit- Quit- Quit- Quit-
nity 1925- 1925- No. in % in
Size 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 Reich Reich
10,000 12,554 39.3 3,203 30.5 6,848 36.9 33,048,820 52.6
10-
50,000 6,888 21.6 2,410 23.0 4,079 22.0 9,777,134 15.6
50-
200,000 4,311 13.5 1,670 15.9 2,671 14.4 6 ,246,998 9.9
200,000 . 7,961 24.9 3,162 30.1 4,867 26.3 13,755,048 21.9
No
Entry 243 0.7 55 0.5 77 0.4 - -
31,957 100.0 10,500 100.0 18,542 100.0 62,828,000 100.0
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columns six and seven of Table 53 show that by 1933 this 
discrepancy had largely disappeared. The number of drop­
outs from the urban areas were still slightly higher in 
1933 than their percentages in the party membership but 
not significantly so. The proportion of persons from 
rural areas and small communities who left the party 
before the Machtergreifung was only a little lower than 
their percentage in the NSDAP. As in the case of the 
geographic origins of those who left the movement, there 
appears to be a direct correlation between exits from 
the Nazi party and the electoral success of the Nazis 
during the period 1930-1933-
As Table 54 illustrates, the occupations of party 
members did not play a significant role in proclivity to 
leave the party. Nazis from the laborer classifications 
were somewhat more likely to drop out of the movement 
than members of other occupational groups, while recruits 
from the white-collar and artisan categories were slightly 
more likely to stay in the party once they had joined it. 
Members from the other occupations left the NSDAP in more 
or less the same proportion as they joined it. The occu­
pational model of the party membership up to 1930 was not 
changed significantly from the picture presented in 
Table 45 by exits from the party.
How can we explain the incredible number of defec­
tors from the ranks of Hitler's movement? The reasons are
TABLE 54
OCCUPATIONS OF PERSONS JOINING THE NSDAP, I925-I930 COMPARED TO 
THOSE WHO LEFT THE PARTY BEFORE 1930 AND BEFORE 1933
No. of % of
N o . of % of N o . of % of
Occupa- Quit­ Quit­ Quit­ Quit­
1925- 1925- ters ters ters ters N o . in % in
Group 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 Reich Reich
Un. Lab. 5,744 18.0 2,255 21.5 3,776 20.4 10,679,848 35.3
Sk. Lab. 1,115 3.2 412 3.9 686 3.7 1 ,146,945 3.8
A g . Lab. 789 2.5 252 2.4 542 2.9 2,499,945 8.3
Totals : 7,548 23.7 2,919 27.8 5,004 27.0 14,326,738 47.4
Artisans 6,373 19.9 2,216 21.2 3,794 20.5 4 ,488,428 14.8
W. -Collar 6,152 19.3 2,187 20.8 3,433 18.5 5,274,232 17.4
Foremen 176 0.6 60 0.6 115 0.6 Included with
Managers 365 1.1 118 1.1 209 1.1 250,335 0.9
1,108 3.5 286 2.7 530 2.9 No figures available
Self Emp. 1,195 3.7 347 3.3 645 3.5 No figures available
Teachers 241 0.8 64 0.6 123 0.7 308,741 1.0
15,610 48.9 5,278 50.3 8,849 47.8 10,321,736 3^.3
Farmers 
Landons.
3.698
123
11.6
0.4
631
22
6.0
0.2
1,685
56
9.0
0.3
2,139,878 7.1
Included with
farmers
Totals: 3,821 12.0 653 6.2 1,741 9.3 2,139,878 7-1
Military
(enl.) 60 0.2 14 0.1 35 0.2 Lo4,000 0.3
Military
(off.) 34 0.1 7 0.1 16 0.1 No figures available
Totals: 94 0.3 21 0.2 51 0.3 104,000 0.3
Profes-
sionals 564 1.8 189 1.8 305 1.6 237,850 0.7
6 0.02 3 O.02N0 figures available
Cptlists. 146 0.5 41 0.4 80 0.4 figures available
Finan. 24 0.1 11 0.1 11 0.1 No figures available
Pvt. Inc. 157 0.5 38 0.4 93 0.5 2,944,872 9-2
Totals ; 897 2.92 279 2.7 492 1.02 3,182,722 9-9
TABLE 54— Continued
% of
Mem- N o . of % of N o . of % of
Occupa- Quit­ Quit­ Quit- Quit-
1925- 1925- ters ters N o . in % in
Group 1930 1930 1930 1930 1933 1933 Reich Reich
Clergy 19 0.1 8 0.1 11 0.1 No figures available
Unemployed 8 0.03 13.1 & 33.8*
Students 1,267 4.0 498 4.7 842 4.5 No figures available
Housewives 666 194 1.8 330 1.8 15 ,630,000*
343 1.1 93 0.9 177 0.95 134,236 0.5
Retired 349 1.1 76 0.7 171 0.9 No figures available
No Entry 1,320 4.1 481 4.6 867 4.7 -
Totals : 3,972 12.53 1,350 12.8 2,398 12.95 134,236 0.5
All
Categories: 31,957 9 9 . 9 5 1 0 , 5 0 0 100.0 1 8 , 5 4 5 100.0 3 0,2 5 9 , 3 1 0 100.0
*Not included in totals. The percentages of unemployed are averages for 
the periods compiled from Bry, Wages in Germany, pp. 398-399.
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probably as complex and numerous as the reasons why these 
people joined the Nazis to begin with. Nithout interview­
ing the individual party member to ascertain why he left 
the NSDAP, it is impossible to make positive generaliza­
tions. It is apparent, however, that many people found 
the Nazi party did not live up to their expectations.
Toward a Definition of National Socialism 
The Nazis capitalized on the "fear" of the middle 
classes in Germany--especially its lower ranks--to swell 
its membership from the ranks of the bourgeoisie. Never­
theless, National Socialism cannot be characterized as a 
class movement because of the presence in its adherents 
of representatives of all strata of German society in 
large numbers. Neither was Nazism a youth movement/ 
generational revolt. The opportunistic NSDAP leadership 
exploited the widespread dissatisfaction among the young 
people in Germany and absorbed many of them into its 
ranks, but the party's direction remained in the hands 
of more mature men. Hitler's movement was not regional, 
nor was it an anti-urban revolt of persons from small 
towns and the countryside. What, then, was it?
National Socialism was designed to appeal to all 
segments of society regardless of age, social class, or 
regional origins. The statistics on the preceding pages 
show that it was successful in this design. Nazi propa­
ganda and the National Socialist platform were designed
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to appeal to something more in man than .jus t his own eco­
nomic interests. The explicit purpose of Hitler's party 
was to wipe away the undesirable features of modern soci­
ety, in particular its impersonality and materialism, and 
to end the corruption and exploitation of the national 
government. The program of the NSDAP was also designed 
to stir the irrational, paranoid nature of men by blaming 
the problems of the world and of each individual on a 
group of conspirators and offered them a scapegoat to 
blame for their misfortunes. Therefore, Nazism was more 
than a political movement. It was--as Hitler himself 
insisted--also a spiritual movement, thus creating the 
confusion in attempting to define its nature solely in 
political or economic terms. The ideological structure 
of National Socialism encompassed the entire political 
spectrum by designing its appeals to attract persons of 
all political persuasions. At the same time, it held 
itself above politics by insisting it was a movement of 
the Volk.
National Socialists in the pre-depression period 
were by and large men of ideals, convinced that it was 
possible--through Hitler-- to create a new and better 
society. Theirs was not the first dream of a brave new 
world to become a Huxlyian nightmare. There is general 
agreement in historical circles that without the severe 
dislocations in German society caused by the loss of the
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First World War, the great inflation of 1922-1923» and, 
above all, the Great Depression, Hitler could never have 
come to power in Germany. This argument is advanced by 
those who maintain National Socialism was an anomaly, an 
accidental phenomenon outside the mainstream of the devel­
opment of Western civilization. The critics of this argu­
ment point out that a number of other nations underwent 
experiences similar to those of Germany, and that in no 
case did they submit to a regime of the inherent brutality 
and inhumanity displayed in the Third Reich. These theo­
rists conclude that Nazism was a logical result of pre­
vious German history and was in some way due ro a vaguely 
defined "flaw" in the character of the German people.
This racism directed at Germans is as unpalatable 
as the Nazi brand directed against the Jews. The poten­
tial for the development of a movement similar to Nazism 
is inherent in every society. Given the extraordinary 
circumstances which facilitated the Nazi rise to power 
and, above all, a leader with the fanatical dedication 
and almost extrasensory rapport with the masses like 
Adolf Hitler, something like Nazism could arise anywhere 
in the industrial world.
The social and demographic origins of the members 
of the National Socialist German Workers Party revealed 
in the preceding pages emphasize that the phenomenon of 
National Socialism is susceptible to understanding and
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explanation only by a multi-causal approach. To attempt 
to "explain" Hitler’s success in attracting fanatical 
and dedicated disciples in the period before 1930 as a 
youth movement, a green revolt, or a reaction of the 
lower-middle class crushed between big capital and 
Marxism, is to see only one facet of an incredibly com­
plex whole. Hitler was able to capitalize on all those 
elements in German society and a number of others. By 
the end of 1929 the NSDAP was solidly entrenched in 
every area of Germany with a cadre of capable and fanat­
ical members from all segments of German society.
CHAPTER V
FOOTNOTES
Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical 
Problems," pp. 409-436, has recognized the inconsis­
tencies associated with the lower ranks of the middle 
class. He has argued persuasively that the lower-middle 
class is a cohesive and important group in modern poli­
tics. His occupational classification system (p. 42?) 
is similar to the one used in this study.
^See Appendix II below for a comprehensive ex­
planation of exactly which occupations are included in 
each occupational category used in the statistics above.
especially Lipset, Political M a n ; Heinrich August Winkler, 
"Extremismus der Mitte?" \'iertels,j ahrhefte fuer Zoitge- 
schichte 20 (April 1972): 175-191 ! and Winkler, Mittel- 
stand, Deniokratie und Nationalsozialismus .
^Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika.
Most of the respondents to Abel's prize essay contest 
whose biographies Merkl examined in great detail exhibit 
less concern with their own financial interest than with 
an idealistic desire to create a new and better society.
^Kele, Nazis and Workers.
^On this see especially Walter C. Langsam, 
"Nationalism and History in the Prussian Elementary 
Schools under Wilhelm II," in E. M. Earle, ed., National­
ism and Internationalism (New York, 1^6 0 ). According to 
Langsam, the teaching of history in German public schools 
during the Wilhelinine period in Germany amounted to little 
more than nationalist and militarist indoctrination. It 
was designed primarily for the purpose of producing "pa­
triots" eager for war and the opportunity to die glori­
ously for Kaiser, Volk und Vaterland.
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Jew (Baton Rouge, 1971) > convincingly points out that the 
SPD vigorously and outspokenly opposed anti-Semitism.
^This is a central thesis in Peter G. Pulzer, The 
Rise of Political Anti-Semitism in Germany and Austria; 
1867-1918 (New York, 1964).
^Flechtheim, Die KPD in Der Weimarer Republik,
p. 321.
^^The KPD went from 380,000 members in 1922 to
267,000 in 1923 and 100,000 in 1924. By 1928 the Commu­
nists could count only 130,000 members. Flechtheim,
Die KPD, p. 157.
^^The Nazis were very fond of giving great public­
ity to persons who had formerly been Communists, had left 
that party, and joined the NSDAP. Goebbels in particular 
made a number of propaganda attempts to lure the KPD mem­
bers into the ranks of the NSDAP. See especially Der 
Angriff, October 22, 192?, p . 2.
^^The ages of the delegates sent to the Reichstag 
in 1930 by the NSDAP and the SPD, respectively, is very 
revealing on this subject:
Age NSDAP % SPD %
Over 70 - - 1 0.7
50-70 12 11.4 73 51.0
40-50 21 20.0 49 34.2
30-40 63 60.0 20 15.0
Under 30 9 8.6 -
Obviously, younger men had a much greater possibility of 
advancement to responsible positions in the NSDAP than 
with the Social Democrats. Sigmund Neumann, Die Parteien 
der Weimarer Republik (Berlin, I965), p. 120.
^^Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika, 
p. l4 , erroneously gives the percent ^ ge of farmers in 
German society as 20.7 • This figure, taken from the 
Parteistatistik includes everyone employed on the Land ; 
lumberjacks, forest rangers, game wardens, fishermen, 
etc. The figure used in the occupational studies is 
taken directly from the Statistik des deutschen Reichs, 
and contains only persons actually engaged in agriculture.
^^See especially Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class 
as Historical Problems," p. 4ll.
^^For the traditional political affiliations of 
these two groups see the following: R. M. Berdahl, "Con­
servative Politics and Aristocratic Landholders in
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Bisniarckian Germany," Journal of Modern History 10 (March
1972): 1-20; and Neumann, Die Parteien der Weimarer 
Republik.
^^The economic goals of the tv;o groups were basi­
cally incompatible. The farmers desired a policy of 
tariffs against importation of foodstuffs and to keep the 
prices of farm goods at unnatural highs. The artisans 
and other city dwellers naturally desired low food prices 
and a free-trade policy. Also, the urban dwellers were 
much more drastically effected by the financial crises of 
Weimar like the great inflation and the depression.
^^Angell, The Recovery of Germany, p. 248.
sozialismus. Eine soziologische Untersuehung der politi­
se hen Willensbildung in Schleswig-Holstein 1918-1932 
(Stut tgar t , I9Ô3)1 especially, p p . 133-134.
list of occupa­
tions in this category.
^^Previous historians of the Nazi movement have 
recognized that the tipper-middle class was an important 
part of the party membership. See especially Lipset, 
Political M a n , p. l40, and Walter Struve, Elites Against 
Democracy. Leadership Ideals in Bourgeois Political 
Thought in Germany, 1890-1933 (Princeton, 1973)) p. 4lO.
■ Social Conservatism and 
the Middle Classes in Germany, 1914-1933 (Princeton, I969),
pp. 188-189.
^^Struve, Elites Against Democracy.
^^Ibid., p. 419.
^^Ibid., p. 4lO. "Here then is the basic source 
of the affinity between Nazi and liberal elitism: Both
called for an elite which would ineluctably function 
within the parameters of bourgeois society and whose 
members would be selected in accordance with the basic 
values of that social order."
^^Walter M. Kotschnig, Unemployment in the Learned 
Professions (London, 1937)i Pp" II8-II9. According to 
Kotschnig, an average of over 23,000 students graduated 
from German universities in the 1920s, while there were 
positions available for less than half that number.
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^^Gerth, "The Nazi Party," p. 426.
^^Peter Loeivenberg, "The Psychohistorical Origins 
of the Nazi Youth Cohort," American Historical Review 75 
(March 1971): 1457-1502.
^^Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika,
pp. 142, 152-153.
^^For several different definitions see the fol­
lowing : S. N. Eisenstadt, From Generation to Generation:
Age Groups and Social Structure (G1encoe, 1956); Ben- 
nett iM. Berger, "How Long is a Generation?" British Jour­
nal of Sociology 11 (May I960): 10-23; Marvin Pontala,
"A Generation in Politics: A Definition," Review of
Politics 25 (January I96 5) : 409-522; Jose Ortega y Gasset, 
The Modern Theme (New York, 1971); Julian Marias, Genera­
tions. A Historical Method (University of Alabama, 197^). 
A definition very similar to the one used in this study 
can be found in Allen B. Spitzer, "The Historical Problem 
of Generations," American Historical Review 78 (December
1973): 1353-1385.
in Karl Mannheim, Essays on the Sociology of Knowledge, 
ed. Paul Kecskemet! (Oxford University Press, 1952), pp.
302-303.
 ^ See especially Loewenberg, "Psychohistorical 
Origins," pp. 1467-1468, and Merkl, Political Violence 
under the Swastika, pp. 132-133»
^^Merkl, Political Violence under the Swastika,
pp. 152-153 »
^^Ibid., p.
35See above, n. 12.
^^For example, the Pan-German movement and the 
Thule Society.
^^Herbert Mol1er, "Youth as a Force in the Modern 
World," Comparative Studies in Society and History 10 
(July 1968): 237-260. "
^^Of eighty-five Gauen listed in the Aus der 
Bewegnung column in the 1922 Voelkischer Beobachter, 
eighty-one were in south German towns and cities.
39,The Gauen mentioned in n. 38 were largely from
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very small communities. Another bit of evidence that 
points in this direction is the rising percentage of 
farmers in the party in 1922 and especially 1923.
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APPENDIX I
A NOTE ON THE BERLIN DOCUMENTS CENTER AND THE 
HISTORY AND ORGANIZATION OF THE MASTER 
MEMBERSHIP CARD FILE OF THE NSDAP
The Master ^(embership Card File of the Nazi party 
is stored at the Berlin Documents Center, a United States 
government installation instituted in 19 *^5 - The Center 
is located in a plush residential district of a section 
of West Berlin called Zahlendorf. The building was once 
a secret SS complex which monitored all phone lines in 
Berlin. It is now staffed largely by Germans, but its 
director is an American and the deputy director is a 
naturalized American--a German Jew who fled the Nazis in 
1938.^
A number of captured Nazi documents are held at 
the BDC, but the most voluminous is the Zentralkartei of 
the NSDAP. This file was found by U.S. occupation forces 
in a paper mill near Munich where it was about to be used 
for pulp in 194$. The cards were transported to Berlin 
in that year in a state of complete disorganization.
There are actually two sets of membership cards. One was
292
293
arranged geographically according to Gau by the Nazis, 
then alphabetically within each Ga u . The other was 
arranged alphabetically for the national membership.
The German-American staff at the BDC was faced with the 
considerable task of putting the cards back into some 
sort of usable order. They rearranged both files in 
alphabetical order, separately, but did not attempt to 
use the geographical separation for the Gau files used 
by the Nazis.^
Somehow, over the years, the German personnel at 
the Documents Center have confused the two files and now 
refer to the more complete Gau file as the Reich file, 
and to the less complete alphabetical file as the Gau 
file. The original Reich file was chosen as the source 
for this study for two reasons. First, a different form 
of card was used from 1925-1930 which was slightly larger 
and clearly distinguishable from cards for later years. 
This made the cards for the first five years of the re­
founded party much easier to locate than in the Gau file 
in which all cards were alike. Second, the entries for 
Austritt (exits from the party) are much easier to read 
from the original alphabetical file than from the more 
ambiguous Gau cards.^
The Reich file contains approximately 5 .72 million 
cards, making it about 53 « 4 per cent complete. The miss­
ing cards appear to be from several readily identifiable
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letters of the alphabet rather than from all of the file 
(see below, Appendix III). The cards which commenced 
with the refounding of the NSDAP in February, 1925i con­
tains the following information: name, date of birth,
occupation, address, Ortsgruppo, Gau, membership number, 
date of entry into the party, and date of exit from the 
party. Some cards have a place for return to the party.* 
In addition to the card file, I was fortunate 
enough to find a volume entitled Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer 
a bound collection of membership lists whose history no 
one at the Documents Center was able to trace with any 
certainty. There is little doubt of the authenticity of 
the lists but when the volume was compiled, why, and by 
whom, is unknown. The lists contain the following data: 
party number, name, occupation, address (usually only a 
street address), date of birth, and date of entry into 
the party. These lists, arranged alphabetically, contain 
the records of members who joined the party between its 
inception and October, 1921. There are no records in the 
volume for persons who entered the party after that date. 
The pages from Adolf Hitlers Mitkaempfer containing Hit­
ler's two membership entries are reproduced on the fol­
lowing pages. On the next page are reproductions of 
typical membership cards from both the alphabetical file 
and the geographical file.
APPENDIX I
FOOTNOTES
deputy director of the Docu­
ments Center, related his story to me personally. He 
also told me the history of the complex of buildings now 
known as the Berlin Documents Center.
"Who Was a Nazi? Facts about the Membership Procedure 
of the Nazi Party," a pamphlet compiled by the 7771st 
Document Center, Omgus, 1947. The mission of the Docu­
ments Center is to furnish evidence in war-crime trials.
^Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin 
Documents Center," pp. 362-380, made a survey of the 
Zentrallcartei in 1972. He was struck by the huge number 
of persons who apparently left the party but concluded 
that the entries were too confusing to make any meaning­
ful generalizations possible. Browder apparently looked 
only at the geographical file. From the reproductions 
of typical cards from both files at the end of this 
appendix it is apparent that exits from the party as re­
corded from the alphabetical file used in this study are 
not at all difficult to interpret. For further evidence 
that Browder considered only the geographical file, see 
the following footnote 4 .
^Browder, "Problems and Potentials of the Berlin 
Documents Center," p. 386, said the membership cards c o n ­
tained information on the marital status of party members. 
This applies only to the geographical file, not to the 
alphabetical file.
295
296
^  "3
«ry é_ :^ '^ -v£^ .et'^ irvV:.
f:yZ
r.T±
>:,o_
AX,3. 
x r r
^T/
rrf
yTf
rJ 0^. 
n-{_
SAZ..
y.AJ.
y.(yi
%/f
7^3
7/7
7/'*'
7/.^ .
A f 7
n r
tt\
.1.
 -:-
- < A ^ '
---
.
. ..
r^ Cf.y%^ *A^,__
?S&dy__
 -
.7//  /-'y^.
r^ '^ y^i<!L.<?^ — ÙÈ:É^ -.
T^'OiWyC/i—
^aCryxÆ..
«A O'/^
7-.
<<77^
fn/^/y
?\t.%J.!6
ryyt^ rr^ Z/rTAf^ 'Sy
V7/./7
. ÿ V ,.
'p.-,/crJ<A^ A^  y ■}. /. y ^ "%■ -«
---
'y.'P./‘9
f1 4  
.#
:3
.0
-I
m
z i
11
H i F î î F ï f F î m ^
I I I I I I 1 I Rx iP ! '  p '^ i < ^ - ; r  ■ '^Vjv' p
# # È Ë m m m  W m  A M  ^
298
Oliime;  ..
Rfk.'Sarum:...t!>l:..l.:./.ï.
&m<.: A,%:........
...
/i i-Ui/.jvÿ»* /' Y'p . 
üt/'iiU
Ortaaruppt; ....... .....................................
Bériin
© pu:.......... _:..Z  .................................
• /
9)iiti)t..O To ..../:i,J ..S .4 .7
,  .........
5fua^ «lrcf eu .....................
©(pub:'....6'. •-.^. K.  ....
2Dof;nung :. .?
VOrtCgnipper...
®ii3i.-oii>'.. ? . o 2 l !  4r:" ;■■■.■ _
/. -I. Feb. 1928
©mgemieu : ......... ,•-'••■•.v-.. . ...'•
.•■' Sfflicbemngeh-effn: A J . . : . : l t  ..... .•...••.......... •
Tlic cards obove arc typical representatives from the original 
alphabetical file. On the readers' left, Robert Ruerap, a 42-year-old 
artisan from Berlin, Joined the Nazi party in August, 1926, only to leave 
It in December of the same year, never to return. On the right, Gottfried 
Rlegel, a 25-year-old employee when he joined the party in February, 1928, 
was from the city of Rostok in North Germany. He left the party in October 
1929 and rejoined it in August of the next year. He was killed in action 
in June, 1942.
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Above is a card fron the original 
geographical file for the some in­
dividual as the card on the right 
from the alphabetical file. Note 
tlie inform.ition on nwrital status 
on the Gau card. The party mem­
ber in question was a 21-year-old 
student when he entered the party 
in 1929. He left the party the 
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APPENDIX II
OCCUPATIONAL CLASSIFICATION AND 
DETERMINANTS OF SOCIAL CLASS
One of the greatest difficulties of a study of this 
sort is constructing categories of occupation within which 
all the many and various jobs in a complex industrial so­
ciety may reasonably fall and yet restrict those categories 
to a manageable number. It is necessary that the cate­
gories should accurately reflect the social class of the 
persons contained in it.
There is no unanimity of opinion among social sci­
entists as to what categories should be included in each 
social class or which occupations should be included in 
each category. For the purposes of this study, I have 
created categories and made admittedly arbitrary decisions 
about which occupations should fall into which categories. 
These should be explained in some detail.
Twenty-five separate categories are used, although 
some of them are clearly related. They are as follows: 
unskilled laborer, skilled laborer, agricultural laborer, 
enlisted man (military), officer (military), professional,
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school teacher, professor, clergy, farmer, large land­
owner, self-employed, capitalist, financier, private 
income, civil servant, white-collar, unemployed, student, 
housewife, foreman, manager, artisan, arts, and retired.
The following occupations were included under each 
category. (This is not an exhaustive list of all occupa­
tions encountered in the membership cards. Its purpose 
is to acquaint the reader with the spirit of the classi­
fication system used.) All persons whose occupations were 
listed as Arbeiter (worker) on the membership cards are 
included under unskilled laborer. These made up the 
largest part of that category. Other occupations encoun­
tered in the Zentrallcartei listed here as unskilled 
laborer include Hilfsorbeiter, Ladeschauffour (longshore­
man), Stuetze (maid), Portfeullier (porter), Eisenbahner 
(railroad worker), Sager (sawer), Dergmann (miner), Kamin- 
kahler (chimney sweep), Kutscher (driver), Kellner 
(waiter), Dienst (servant), and Heizer (stoker). Some 
argue, with justification, that household servants should 
be included separately from industrial laborers. I feel 
that the difference in the wages and Weltanschauung of the 
two groups were close enough together to merit inclusion 
under the same category. It can also be maintained that 
railroad workers are technically civil servants. Once 
again, it appears to me that railroad workers had much 
more in common in Weimar Germany with factory workers 
than with, for example, police officials.
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The most difficult part of a difficult job was 
differentiating between skilled laborers and artisans. 
This is a critical distinction, since the skilled labor­
ers are generally considered as a part of the proletariat, 
while artisans are usually identified with the lower- 
middle class. Some occupations were not difficult to 
classify. For example, there would be little argument 
about calling a tool and dye maker a skilled laborer or 
a blacksmith an artisan. Many other occupations, however, 
are much less readily classifiable. For example, is a 
printer an artisan or a skilled laborer? What about a 
Spen.gler (tin smith)? The following criteria were finally 
adopted to distinguish between skilled laborers and arti­
sans: (1) Did this occupation exist prior to I8OO (a date
approximating the beginning of industrialization in Ger­
many)? (2) Did this occupation have a clearly defined 
apprenticeship period during which the apprentice goes 
through a series of stages to emerge as a journeyman?
(3) Did a member of this occupational group have a reason­
able expectation of one day owning his own business prac­
ticing his trade? (4) Did persons practicing this occupa­
tion necessarily rely on one of the processes or products 
of the industrial revolution in his trade?
If the answers to the first three questions is 
"yes" about a specific occupation and "no" to the fourth, 
then that occupation is included under the category
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artisan; if exactly the reverse is true, then that occu­
pation is included under skilled laborers. If the 
responses to those questions provide no clear results, 
then an arbitrary decision was made about the category 
in which to place a specific occupation.
Using this method, the following occupational 
groups were included under the category skilled laborers; 
Fabrikheizer (fabric stoker), Dreher (machinist or lath 
operator), Walzer (skilled iron worker), Nieter (riveter), 
Artmanane (galvanizer), Telegrapher, Ankerwinkier (arma­
ture winder), and Monteur (fitter or mechanic).
Classifying agricultural laborers was not diffi­
cult. Persons giving the following occupations were 
placed in that category: Landwirtsgehllfen (farmers'
helper), Pferdepf1eger (literally "horse nurse'),
Schaefer (shepherd), Gartner (gardener), Knecht (liter­
ally knight--actually refers to someone employed on the 
land), Dienstknecht, Schweiger (dairy worker, and 
Kakerknecht.
The two military categories are not controversial. 
Not included under these classifications are persons who 
gave their occupations as retired military personnel or 
reserve officers.
The following occupations are included under the 
category professional: Arzt (medical doctor), Zehnarzt
(dentist). Ingénieur (engineer--various kinds), Baumeister
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(architect), Tierarzt (veterinarian), Rechtsanwahlt 
(lawyer). Mus eumclir ektor , Apotheker (drugist).
Teachers, professors, and clergymen are all readily 
identifiable. The persons who listed the following occu­
pations are included under the category farmers: Landwirt,
Landmann, Bauer, Gutesbesitzer, and Adler were included 
under large landowners.
Those persons listing the following occupations 
were included under the category self-employed: Wirt,
Gastwirt (both mean innkeeper). Handler (retail merchant 
or wholesaler), Kuschner (furrier), Kontraktor, Handels- 
mann, Desitzer, Verlager (publisher), Immobilien Makler 
(real estate dealer). Included in the category capital­
ists are persons whose occupations were given as Fabrikant 
and Fabrikantsbesitzer. Only the occupation Bankier was 
included under the category financier. Private income 
includes persons whose occupations were given as: Rentier,
Hausbesitzer, Privatisier, Privatmann. Under the category 
civil servant were included all persons other than common 
laborers who worked for the local, state, or federal gov­
ernments. These included people working for the post 
office, police, railways, etc., as well as mayors, Reich- 
stag representatives, etc.
The following occupational groups were listed under 
the category white-collar: Seeretar, Kassier (cashier), 
Vertreter (representative), Kaufmann (salesman), Prokurist
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(head clerk), Schlichter (counselor), Schriftsleiter 
(editor), Redakt eur (editor), Drogis t (clerk), llandels- 
gehilfer (assistant), Reisender (traveling salesman), 
Vcr.geichner (bookkeeper), Angestellter ( einployee--many 
prefixes).
The category students includes those persons whose 
occupations were given as students, whether from universi­
ties or lower schools. The category housewives is self- 
explanatory .
Persons whose occupations were listed as Geschafts- 
fuehrer, Verwalter, Betriebsleiter, and Direktor are in­
cluded under the category manager. Most occupa ions 
listed with the suffixes "Fuehrer" or "Leitor" are in­
cluded under the category foremen. Persons receiving 
pensions were usually listed as Pensionier and were in­
cluded under retired. The category arts includes those 
whose occupations were given as one of the following: 
Stepperin (dancer), Pianist, Schriftsteller (author/ 
writer), Konzert Direktor, Musiker, Dekaratur,
Opernsaenger, Schauspieler (actor), Kunstgewerber, and 
Kunstmahler (artist).
The most controversial category is that of artisan. 
Included are the following occupations: Maurer (mason),
Steinmetz (stonemason), Battler (harness maker), Gipser 
(plasterer). Friseur (barber). Backer (baker), Schlechter, 
Schachter, Metzger, and Fleischhandler (all mean butcher),
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Ziegler (bricklayer), Weber (weaver), Gerber (tanner), 
Spengler (tin smith), Konditioner (pastry cook),
Korbmacher (basket maker), Klempner (plumber), Tischler 
(joiner), Drucker (printer), Schlosser (locksmith),
Schmid (smith), Zimmermann (carpenter), Kobbler and 
Schumacher, F arber (dyer), Platzmeister (handyman), 
Lackierer (lacquerer), Schnittmacher (pattern maker), 
Filenhauer (file maker), Dachdecker (thatcher).
Ofensitzer (stove fitter), and Maier (painter).
The division of these categories into social 
classes is also a difficult proposition. In this matter 
I relied heavily on the works of Theodore Geiger and Ralf 
Dahrendorf.^ As in the case of occupational classifica­
tion, there can be several objections raised to the assign­
ment of the various categories to a particular "class."
This is especially true in the case of the categories 
white-collar, artisans, and farmers. Persons in these 
occupations clearly exhibit a number of dissimilarities 
in income, Weltanschauung, and social status, and yet are 
all considered in this study as parts of the "lower- 
middle class," the Kleinburgerturn. The rationale in 
lumping them together is that all three groups have a 
great deal more in common with each other than with the 
readily distinguishable social classes above and below 
them.^
Harold Gordon has made a strong argument that the 
old divisions of German society into upper, middle, and
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lower classes is no longer valid.^ According to Gordon, 
Angestellte were not foreseen in the Marxist models of 
social stratification and do not easily fit into them.* 
In addition, he argues that the old distinctions between 
artisan and skilled laborers had disappeared by the end 
of the First World War. As a result, Gordon maintains 
that both these occupational categories should be in­
cluded under "workers" and considered a part of the work­
ing class. Max Kele has reached similar conclusions.^
In my opinion, these arguments are not valid for 
one overriding reason: the white-collar workers and
artisans consider themselves a part of the middle class. 
They therefore adopt the lifestyle, attitudes, and expec­
tations of that class which are considerably different 
from those of the working class.^ Therefore, although 
they may differ considerably from the middle class in 
income, they constitute a part of it--a 1ower middle
APPENDIX II 
FOOTNOTES
^Theodor Geiger, Die Soziale Schichtung des 
Deutschen Volkes. Soziographische Versuch auf Statischen 
Grundlagen (Stuttgart, 1932); Ro1f Dahrendorf, Soziafe 
Klassen und klassenkonflikt in der Industriellen Gesoll- 
schaft (Stuttgart, 1957)! and Dahrendorf, Society and 
Democracy in Germany (London, 1968).
^This argument is developed in great detail in 
Mayer, "The Lower Middle Class as Historical Problems."
^Gordon, Hitler and the Beer Hall Putsch, pp. 72-
73.
^Fritz Croner, Soziologie der Angestellton (Berlin, 
1962), also concluded that the Angestellte are a new 
class, neither lower nor middle. For the growth of this 
group relative to other occupational categories in Ger­
many, see Hans Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern 
Society," Social Research 1 (February l ^ ' } k ) 133-
^Kele, Nazis and Workers, pp. 90 and 215.
and farmers consider themselves a part of the middle 
class, see Speier, "The Salaried Employee in Modern Soci­
ety," pp. 124-125, and Morris Janowitz, "Soziale Schich­
tung und Mobilitaet in Westdeutschland," Koeiner 
Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsvchologie 10 
(June 1958): 112-144. For a number of striking differ- 
ences in the life styles, outlook, and expectations of 
persons who conceive of themselves as "workers" compared 
to those who describe themselves as "middle class" see 
Heinrich Popitz, H. P. Bahrndt, E. A. Jueres, and Hans 
Nesting, Das Gesellschaftbild des Arbeiters (Luebingen,
1961).
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APPENDIX III
THE SAMPLING METHOD USED IN THIS STUDY 
AND TESTS OF ITS VALIDITY
The ideal way to study the social composition of 
any group is to compile statistics on every member of 
that group. Often, however, this is either impractical 
or impossible. Since the membership cards at the Berlin 
Documents Center used in this study are only $4 per cent 
complete, compiling statistics for the entire 1925-1930 
membership of the NSDAP was not possible. Also, the 
time and expense involved in surveying all the surviving 
cards was prohibitive. Therefore, it was necessary to 
take a sample that would incontrovertibly be representa­
tive of the whole.
After a series of conversations with Professor 
David Schwarzkopf of the mathematics department at the 
University of Oklahoma (whose specialty is statistical 
theory), the following hypothesis was formulated. Since 
the card file is arranged alphabetically, se decided that 
the total of cards under any given letter of the alphabet 
should constitute a representative sample of the whole
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providing they were complete. To test this hypothesis I 
determined to record the data from the membership cards 
of all the persons in a given letter of the alphabet who 
joined the party before January 1 , 1930, and consider 
that as a sample in itself. This procedure was to be 
repeated for as many letters of the alphabet as possible, 
and each was to be regarded as a separate sample. By 
comparing each variable in these separate samples by the 
chi-square method it should be possible to determine the 
accuracy of the sample as a whole.
Following this hypothesis, I recorded biographical 
data from the cards of all the persons who joined the 
NSDAP before January 1 , 1930, from the following letters 
of the alphabet: C, D, E, I, P, R, U, V, and Z. These
letters were not chosen at random. The number of cards 
in each letter of the alphabet in both the surviving card 
files (see above. Appendix I) is as follows:
Letter Reich Gau
A 50,000 165,600
B 1 ,045,000 801,000
C 95,600 72,200
D 402,600 262,800
E 299,200 199,800
F 59,400 345,600
G 17,600 450,000
H 899,800 853,200
I 41,800 32,400
J 132,000 198,000
K 123,200 1,011,600
433,800L 19,800
M 28,600 549,000
N 6,600 171,000
0 2,200 100,800
P 312,400 349,200
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Q 2,200 9,000
R 338,800 484,200
S 1,111,000 1,418,400
T 123,200 237,600
U 85,800 63,000
V 143,000 102,600
w 233,400 646,200
X&Y 2,200 1,800
Z 118,800 113,400
Totals : 5,772,200 9,052,200
The number of cards in the letters chosen indicate that 
the surviving cards for those letters are the most nearly 
complete in the original alphabetical file which was used 
in this sample.
Table 55 shows the number and percentage of persons 
from each letter group who fell into the various age cate­
gories. The chi-square statistic ^or this table was 
13.787 with l4 degrees of freedom. The error code = 0 
indicating there was no significant difference between the 
letter groups. The widest deviation from the group totals 
was 2.1 per cent.
Table 56 indicates the number of men and women who 
joined the NSDAP in 1925-1930 in each letter group. The 
chi-square statistic = 6.139 with 8 degrees of freedom 
giving an error code = 0 indicating no significant dif­
ference between the letter groups. The widest deviation 
from the group totals was 1.0 per cent.
The geographic origins of Nazis in each letter 
group is recorded in Table 57- The chi-square statistic 
for this table is 26.019 with 21 degrees of freedom and
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an error code = 0 indicating no significant difference 
between letter groups. Letter group "I" shows the widest 
deviations from the party totals percentagewise, probably 
owing to the small size of that group. Letter groups "U" 
and "Z" show a larger percentage of persons from Schleswig- 
Holstein than do the other groups, while group "R" shows a 
higher percentage from North Germany and group "C" shows 
a high percentage from the Rhineland. These deviations 
apparently balance each other to the point that the chi- 
square test disregards them.
The figures for Table $8 showing the occupations 
of persons in all letter groups yielded chi-square sta­
tistics which showed a significant difference between 
letter groups until it was computed without letter group 
"I." Leaving out "I" resulted in a chi-square statistic 
of 94.773 with 95 degrees of freedom with an error code =
0 indicating no significant differences between letter 
groups. The variation was again probably due to the 
small size of the population within letter group "I."
The final Table 59 shows the size of the communi­
ties from which each person in each letter group came.
The chi-square statistic = 27-974 with 28 degrees of 
freedom and an error code = 0 indicating no significant 
differences between letter groups. In this instance 
letter group "E" showed the greatest deviation from the 
norm for no apparent reason.
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The above statistics show that the sample used in 
compiling the statistics on NSDAP members used in the 
previous chapters is representative of the persons who 
joined the Nazi party between 1923 and 1930. There is 
no reason to believe that if it were possible to compile 
statistics on the population as a whole they would differ 
significantly from those presented on the pages above.
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